Tuesday, March 24, 2015
In re: Z.R., Case no. 2014-0277
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
Grange Indemnity Insurance Co., et al. v. Phillip Laboy et al., Case no. 2014-0708
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
What Is Proper Venue for Filing Case Involving Juvenile’s Welfare?
In re: Z.R., Case no. 2014-0277
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
ISSUES:
- When a complaint alleges that a child is a “dependent child,” as defined in juvenile statutes based on a parent’s earlier acts involving other siblings, may the complaint properly be filed either in the county where the child resides or in the county where the siblings reside?
- Is a juvenile court permitted to dismiss a complaint because of improper venue?
BACKGROUND:
Five of Latoiya R.’s children were taken from her custody in Summit County and found by a court to be “neglected and dependent.” In August 2012, Latoiya gave birth in a Cuyahoga County hospital to a child, identified in court documents by the initials Z.R.
The next day, Summit County Children Services filed a complaint in the county juvenile court. Because Z.R.’s siblings had been removed from the home, the child services agency raised concerns about the mother’s ability to care for Z.R.
Z.R.’s mom claimed she and the child lived in Cuyahoga, not Summit, County and asked the court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied her request, and Z.R. was placed in the temporary custody of Summit County Children Services.
The mother appealed, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The child services agency then filed an appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Child Service’s Positions
Attorneys representing Summit County Children Services cite a statute (R.C. 2151.04) that states that the proper venue for a complaint alleging the abuse, neglect, or dependency of a juvenile is either the county where the child resides or the county in which the abuse, neglect, or dependency took place.
They assert that earlier actions by Z.R.’s mother involving the other siblings happened in Summit County, so it was appropriate to file the complaint involving Z.R. in that county. In addition, a caseworker stated that the mother hadn’t secured stable, permanent housing and had provided multiple addresses. While a case involving the siblings was pending in Summit County court, the agency received the referral about Z.R. The mother’s last known, verified address was in Summit County, which permitted the agency to file the case in Summit County, the lawyers argue.
They note that the agency was aware the mother had been evicted from her Akron home and was staying temporarily with relatives in Cuyahoga County. Agency staff visited the Cuyahoga County home and found it didn’t have a crib or newborn supplies. The Summit County Juvenile Court was the proper venue to file the complaint regarding Z.R., they contend, because the Summit County agency knew the family, had handled the issues with the other siblings, and had evidence to support its complaint.
If Summit County is found to be the improper venue for filing this complaint, the agency’s attorneys argue the proper remedy is to transfer the case to the appropriate county, not to dismiss the case.
Responses from Child’s Mother
Attorneys for Z.R.’s mother respond that she and the child didn’t live in Summit County and that no abuse, neglect, or dependency related to Z.R. occurred in Summit County. Given those requirements in both the statute and the rules for juvenile proceedings, the complaint had to be filed in Cuyahoga County where the mother and child resided, they contend. It was improper to file the complaint in the county where the judgments involving the other siblings were handed down, they maintain.
They describe the issue in this case as one of jurisdiction – determining which court has the authority to consider the case – rather than venue.
“The statutes and rules read logically and together paint a full picture of being able to file in the county where the alleged act took place and then transferring to the county where the child resides,” they write in the brief to the court. “It does not allow for a complaint to be filed in any juvenile court in the state and then transferr[ed] to the ‘appropriate’ county ….”
A child services agency cannot file a complaint in any county it wants and then rely on a transfer to the correct county, they argue. Given that, they maintain the juvenile court’s dismissal of Z.R.’s case was appropriate.
Based on regulations in the Ohio Administrative Code, they also assert that the Summit County agency should have notified the children services agency in Cuyahoga County of its concerns so it could investigate. In fact, they contend, the agency was mandated by law to report the issues to Cuyahoga County.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Summit County Children Services Board from the Summit County Prosecutor's Office: Heaven DiMartino, 330.643.7459
Representing Latoiya R.: Denise Ferguson, 330.217.1820
What Rate Must Auto Insurer Pay Based on Policy’s Medical Coverage?
Grange Indemnity Insurance Co., et al. v. Phillip Laboy et al., Case no. 2014-0708
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- Is an auto insurer providing medical coverage in its policy obligated to pay for medical care at the coverage rate negotiated by the insureds’ health insurance company?
- Did the appeals court err when it ordered more fact-finding about the meaning of the medical payments coverage language in the auto insurance policy?
Editor’s Note: While the case docket lists one party as “Philip” Laboy, the briefs from those involved in the case spell his name “Phillip.”
BACKGROUND:
Phillip and Heidi Laboy purchased automobile insurance through Grange Mutual Casualty Company. Their policy includes a medical payments coverage provision, which states, “B. We will pay under Part B - Medical Payments Coverage, the lesser of: 1. reasonable expenses incurred by the insured for necessary medical and funeral services because of bodily injury; or 2. anynegotiated reduced rate accepted by a medical provider.”
Heidi, Alexandrea, and Gabrielle Laboy were injured in an auto accident on May 23, 2006. They received treatment from a doctor, hospital, and a few other facilities, and the Laboys submitted the expenses to their health insurance provider, Medical Mutual Insurance Company. They also sent their medical bills to Grange under the medical coverage provided through their auto insurance.
Grange paid some medical expenses. The Laboys settled with the party found responsible for the accident, and Grange was reimbursed from the settlement for the money it paid for the Laboys’ medical costs.
Case History
The Laboys sued Grange, claiming that their policy requires the auto insurer to pay for expenses at the rate negotiated by the family’s health insurer. In a summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Grange.
The insureds appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals agreed with the Laboys. Grange asked the Ohio Supreme Court to review the case, and it agreed to consider the matter.
Auto Insurer’s Arguments
Attorneys for Grange contend that section (B)(2) of its policy contract doesn’t require the company to reimburse the healthcare providers at the rates negotiated by Medical Mutual. They note that Grange actually paid the providers more than the amounts the health insurer had agreed to pay.
When auto and health insurers share the same customer, that doesn’t give the auto insurer the right to reimburse medical expenses at the health insurance company’s negotiated rates, they argue. They assert that “any negotiated reduced rate accepted by a medical provider” in (B)(2) clearly refers to agreed-on rates between Grange and the entities that Grange negotiates with to accept its rates.
They maintain that the auto insurer is not party to the health insurance contract between Medical Mutual and the Laboys.
“[A] stranger to a contract between two other parties has no rights under the contract, and cannot force one of those parties to accept the same terms in its dealings with the stranger,” they write in the insurance company’s brief to the court.
They also argue the Eighth District incorrectly concluded that clear policy language can be seen as ambiguous if it leads to “absurdity,” and that ambiguity can require further fact-finding. Based on a 2005 Ohio Supreme Court decision, they counter that contract language doesn’t become ambiguous only because multiple readings are possible and that additional fact-finding by the trial court isn’t needed.
Insureds’ Assertions
Attorneys for the Laboys note that higher payments to the doctor, hospital, and facilities for the family’s medical expenses led to a reduction in the accident settlement received by the Laboys after the insurer was reimbursed. They point out that Grange’s coverage paid providers twice the amount that Medical Mutual was reimbursing.
They maintain that Grange had access to the rates Medical Mutual paid for health care through the Laboys, as the insureds under both policies. They contend that the (B)(2) language applies to both parties to the contract – Grange and the Laboys.
“If the insured, also a party to the insurance contract, can secure a lower negotiated reduced rate through its private health care provider, and thereby provide Grange access to that lower negotiated rate, then Grange is obligated under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance to pay that lower rate,” they write in the brief to the court.
Access to a lower rate can come from either party, they argue. “Nothing in the terms or conditions of the policy excludes the undefined ‘medical provider’ in (B)(2) from being one that the insured has access to via its own health carrier,” they add.
They also assert that the Eighth District held that the contract language was unambiguous, but that the trial court had to sort out a critical fact – whether the Laboys can provide Grange access to Medical Mutual’s rates for medical payments.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Grange Indemnity Insurance Co., Grange Mutual Casualty Company: Mark Johnson, 614.462.2698
Representing Phillip and Heidi Laboy: Thomas Connick, 216.364.0512
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