When initiating a civil lawsuit by certified mail, the mailing must comply with court rules for civil cases and a constitutional requirement that it be “reasonably calculated to notify the defendant of the lawsuit,” the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed lower court decisions dismissing a lawsuit against Summit County Deputy Sheriff Robert Alderman Jr. filed by his former coworker, Miguel Hunt, and Hunt’s wife.

The Hunts attempted to perfect service of their complaint by sending certified mail to a property where Alderman no longer lived. Alderman had previously informed the Hunts of his correct address. After changing hands several times, the complaint eventually reached Alderman. Alderman asked the Summit County Common Pleas Court to dismiss the case, arguing that he had not been properly served within the required time period. The trial court agreed, finding Alderman’s constitutional “due process” rights were violated because the service of the lawsuit was not reasonably calculated to reach him.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice Joseph T. Deters stated the trial court correctly dismissed the lawsuit. The lawsuit was not timely commenced under Rule 3(A) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Deters explained, because service was insufficient. Justice Deters noted that the Hunts had the burden to ensure that service was reasonably calculated to reach Alderman regardless of whether he eventually received actual notice. 

“Service to Alderman’s former residence was insufficient because it was not ‘reasonably calculated’ to reach him,” Justice Deters explained.

Justices Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Justice Deters’ opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy explained that service on Alderman complied with the Rules of Civil Procedure. She also noted that the “reasonably calculated” standard applied by the majority comes into play only when the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is at issue. And even then, the chief justice wrote, that standard controls only if the defendant did not receive actual notice of the lawsuit.

While the misrouted lawsuit reached Alderman with just days before the deadline to answer the complaint, he was able to answer and provide a defense. Because Alderman was actually notified of the case and had the opportunity to be heard, neither the Rules of Civil Procedure nor due process were violated, and the Hunts’ case should proceed in the trial court, she stated.

Justice Jennifer Brunner joined the chief justice’s dissent.

Deputy Disputed Lawsuit Service Procedure
In 2012, Hunt was injured in a training exercise and blamed Alderman for the injury. The Hunts' lawsuit was pending for seven years before the Hunts voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice in 2018. Less than a year later, they refiled the lawsuit against Alderman.

The Hunts attempted to serve Alderman by following the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a), which governs service by certified mail. The Hunts sent the summons by certified mail to a residential property in Cuyahoga Falls, which was owned by Alderman’s father. Alderman had once lived at the property as a tenant but was living in Canal Fulton when the second complaint was filed.

While the first lawsuit was pending, Alderman had notified the Hunts’ attorney that he had moved to a property in Canal Fulton. The Hunts claimed they inadvertently directed the summons by certified mail to Alderman’s former Cuyahoga Falls address.

When the summons arrived at the Cuyahoga property, a woman who rented the property from Alderman’s father signed for the letter without realizing it was addressed to Alderman. About three weeks later, the summons was mailed to Alderman’s father, who handed the documents to his son in early June. Notably, if service to the Cuyahoga Falls address was sufficient, then Alderman's deadline to file an answer in the lawsuit was also in early June. After receiving the summons, Alderman filed his answer and raised the defense that service was insufficient.

Almost two years after the lawsuit was refiled, Alderman sought to have the case dismissed for insufficient service of process. He argued the Hunts failed to comply with Civ.R. 4.1 because he neither owned nor lived at the Cuyahoga Falls address.

The trial court decided that the Hunts had complied with Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a) but that service to the outdated address was insufficient because it was not reasonably calculated to give notice to Alderman. In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth District affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

Supreme Court Analyzed Service Requirement Standards
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and principles of due process govern the service of process rules, Justice Deters explained. Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a) focuses on “how” service is made, while standards for “where” and “to whom” process may be served are derived from due process guarantees. The opinion stated that the rules on how to serve a lawsuit do not specify which addresses of a defendant must be used to sufficiently serve notice so courts have looked to the requirement under due process principles that notice must be “reasonably calculated” to alert all parties to the case and afford them the opportunity to present their objections, the opinion stated. Service on Alderman was sufficient only if it was reasonably calculated to notify him of the lawsuit, the opinion noted.

The Court stated the service to the former residence was not reasonably calculated to reach Alderman. Alderman did not live, own, or work at the Cuyahoga Falls address, and indisputably, the Hunts were on notice that his address had changed, the opinion noted.

“Although Alderman’s father owned the property where the service was mailed, he rented it to third parties. There is no evidence that Alderman received mail there, and his father’s tenants were under no obligation to forward the summons to Alderman,” the opinion stated. “That the summon eventually reached Alderman – after passing through three sets of hands – was pure happenstance.”

The Court also rejected the Hunts’ claim that Alderman’s actual notice of the lawsuit constituted service under the rules. The opinion stated the Court has ruled that “a defendant’s knowledge of a pending lawsuit does not alleviate the plaintiff’s burden to ensure sufficient service to the defendant.”

Majority Misinterpreted Service Rule, Dissent Maintained
Chief Justice Kennedy explained that there were two things wrong with the majority’s analysis. First, the words “reasonably calculated” do not appear in Civ.R. 4.1. Instead of allowing the Court to “fill in the gaps” with its decision, if the reasonably-calculated standard should be in the civil rules, then the proper way to revise them is through the rulemaking process provided in the Ohio Constitution, the dissent stated.

Second, she noted that the majority only applied “due process” halfway by requiring that notice always to be reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. For service to comport with due process, she wrote, a defendant must “either” receive actual notice of litigation or receive constructive notice — notice reasonably calculated to reach him or her. Constructive notice is not necessary when actual notice has been given, and “because actual notice is better than constructive notice, actual notice satisfies due process.”

According to the dissent, there is a two-stepped approach to determining whether service is sufficient. The court initially asks whether service comported with the Rules of Civil Procedure, and if so, the court then considers whether service satisfies due process. Here, the dissent noted, service on Alderman complied with Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a) because the summons was sent by certified mail and a person at that address signed for it. As for due process, not only did Alderman receive notice of the lawsuit, but also he had an opportunity to defend his case, the dissent stated. Alderman answered the complaint and first argued the merits of the case by seeking summary judgment based on the claim that he was immune from the lawsuit.

“Only after he lost on that issue did he pull the insufficient-service defense like a rabbit from a hat,” the chief justice wrote.

2023-1463. Hunt v. Alderman, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2944.

View oral argument video of this case.

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