To grant a civil stalking protection order, a court must find only that a person seeking the order believes an offender will cause mental distress if encounters continue, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court resolved competing interpretations by Ohio courts of R.C. 2903.211, a law allowing a person to petition a court for a civil stalking protection order. In some instances, courts have ruled that a petitioner must actually experience mental distress to obtain an order. In contrast, others have found that a belief that mental distress will occur is enough.

The decision affirmed a Fifth District Court of Appeals ruling granting a civil stalking protection order to a Richland County man claiming to be harassed by the new boyfriend of his ex-wife.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice Daniel R. Hawkins noted that R.C. 2903.211 has been read two different ways by appellate courts. When applying the rules of grammar, however, only one interpretation is appropriate.

“And the natural reading of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) reveals that a victim’s belief that an offender will cause him mental distress is enough to establish a violation of the menacing-by-stalking statute ,” he wrote.

Justices Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Justice Hawkins’ opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Kennedy wrote that there is not a single best reading of the statute. In such cases, the rule of lenity applies, and the court must interpret the statute in favor of the accused. Under that principle, a court can issue a protection order only if the petitioner proves that the accused knowingly engaged in behavior that led the petitioner to experience mental distress, she stated.

Justice Jennifer Brunner also dissented without a written opinion.

Rude Exchanges, Allegations Lead Men to Court
Today’s opinion notes two men once linked by family ties are “now separated by resentment, animosity, and legal processes.” One identified as “Z.J.” has known the other, identified as “R.M.,” for more than 30 years. They attended the same church, and R.M. at one point was married to Z.J.’s cousin. The two men had been civil to each other, but that ended when R.M. had an affair with Z.J.’s wife.

After that, Z.J. and his wife filed for divorce. R.M. became the future ex-wife’s new boyfriend. Then nearly every interaction between Z.J. and R.M. devolved into a confrontation. During child exchanges between Z.J. and his ex-wife, R.M. would become provocative and confrontational, including one instance daring Z.J. to hit him. On another occasion, R.M. stopped across the street from Z.J.’s house and revved his motorcycle until Z.J. came outside to investigate, and then R.M. left.

Z.J. and his new girlfriend were at the grocery store when R.M. sought them out and began hurling insults. On social media and in face-to-face interactions, Z.J. retaliated, accusing R.M. of being a pedophile. On one occasion, Z.J. initiated hostile contact with R.M. when R.M. was attending church with Z.J.’s ex-wife.

In November 2021, Z.J. obtained a temporary civil sexually-oriented-offense protection order against R.M. that designated Z.J. and his two minor children as the protected parties. At a full two-day hearing on whether to continue the order, both Z.J. and R.M. testified in Richland County Common Pleas Court. A magistrate granted a civil stalking protection order naming just Z.J. The magistrate’s opinion found insufficient evidence that R.M. committed a sexual offense and found no basis for designating Z.J.’s children as protected parties.

In granting the order to Z.J., the magistrate interpreted the statute to require that Z.J. only believe that R.M. would cause him mental distress if the two continued to confront each other. The order set conditions to keep the two men from having contact.

R.M. objected to the decision, arguing the law required Z.J. to have experienced mental distress and that he failed to prove that during the hearing. A trial judge made minor modifications to the protection order and adopted the magistrate’s decision.

R.M. appealed to the Fifth District, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. In a split decision, the Fifth District ruled that Z.J. met the standard because R.M. engaged in a pattern of conduct causing Z.J. to believe that R.M. would cause physical harm or mental distress to Z.J. or his family. The dissenting judge indicated R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) requires a victim to actually experience mental distress. The Fifth District also noted its decision was in conflict with those from three other appellate courts.

R.M. appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the conflict among Ohio courts.

Supreme Court Analyzed Protection Order Law
Justice Hawkins explained that under R.C. 2903.214(C)(1), a person can seek a civil stalking protection order against someone believed to be engaging in menacing-by-stalking. At issue is what constitutes menacing-by-stalking under R.C. 2903.211, he stated.

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) establishes the conduct, mental state, and consequences of a person’s behaviors that form menacing-by-stalking. The law states, “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person … or cause mental distress to the other person.” The conflicting interpretations of the law turn on what the verb “to believe” applies to in the rest of the sentence, the opinion stated.

Some courts have ruled that “to believe” applies only to the belief “that the offender will cause physical harm.” Other courts interpret it to mean a person believes the offender will either cause physical harm or cause mental distress, the opinion explained.

The Court stated that when interpreting a statute, it does not examine what the General Assembly intended to enact, but “the meaning of that which it did enact.” The opinion explained that to find the “statute means what it says,” it engaged in a more technical analysis than is usually required.

“But this isn’t grammatical hair-splitting. It is applying the rules of grammar to understand what the General Assembly wrote and what the text means,” the opinion stated.

The opinion noted that the parallel use of “cause physical harm” and “cause mental distress” leads the reader to understand that “to believe” modifies both aspects of the statute. When in context with the rest of the statute, which indicates what evidence the person must produce to receive a protection order, it becomes clearer that the statute means either a belief that the offender will cause physical harm or a belief that the offender will cause mental distress.

The Court majority noted that Chief Justice Kennedy’s dissent pointed out that a petitioner’s belief of future mental distress, unlike actual mental distress, is not capable of being proven. The Court stated whether a person is likely to succeed in proving mental distress does not factor into the Court’s role of determining what the law requires, and the Court’s role is to interpret the law as written.

Law Requires Proof of Mental Distress, Dissent Maintained
In her dissent, Chief Justice Kennedy wrote that R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) defines a criminal offense – menacing-by-stalking – and that the law is ambiguous. She explained that the statute can be read two ways. One reading of the statute requires the victim to believe that he or she will experience mental distress. The other reading requires the accused to cause actual mental distress.  According to the dissent, applying the rule of lenity dictates that the second reading is the one that the court must adopt.

She maintained that the majority’s interpretation makes little sense in practice. A person can prove that the accused knew their words or actions would cause the other person to believe physical harm was imminent, she wrote. For example, if the accused “waves an axe” or “threatens to shoot” the person seeking a protection order, a belief of physical harm can be established. In contrast, mental distress can only be proven by describing a symptom or a diagnosis of a mental illness or condition, the dissent explained.

“But how does a petitioner ever prove that the respondent knew that his or her words or actions would cause the petitioner to believe that he or she will suffer mental distress in the unspecified future?” the dissent stated.

2024-0340. Z.J. v. R.M., Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5662.

View oral argument video of this case.

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