Federal Firearm Prohibition Does Not Prevent Trial Court from Restoring State Gun Rights

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The Court ruled a man barred from having a gun may seek to have his firearm rights reinstated.

An Allen County man barred from possessing a gun under state and federal law may petition to have his firearm rights reinstated, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

In a 6-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal prohibition from possessing firearms does not prevent a person from petitioning to have their state firearm rights reinstated if the state and federal prohibitions stem from the same conviction. The decision affirmed a Third District Court of Appeals decision that found Patrick Heffley could pursue the restoration of his gun rights after 17 years.

Heffley was convicted in 2006 for domestic violence, which led to both a state and a federal prohibition on possessing a gun. Federal law, however, provides that a person’s firearms will be restored if the state restores the person’s firearm rights.

A trial court denied Heffley’s application for the reinstatement of his firearm rights under R.C. 2923.14 because the statute prohibited granting reinstatement for applicants that were “otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.” In Heffley’s case, the trial court determined he was “otherwise prohibited” from owning firearms because of the parallel federal ban, even though removal of the state disability would also remove the federal disability.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice R. Patrick DeWine explained that “otherwise” means in a “different way or manner.” And because the same conviction led to both the state and federal bans, Heffley is “not otherwise prohibited by law from having a firearm,” Justice DeWine stated.

Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justices Patrick F. Fischer, Joseph T. Deters, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Justice DeWine’s opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jennifer Brunner wrote that the phrase “otherwise prohibited by law” in R.C. 2923.14(D)(3) does not refer only to situations in which a federal firearms prohibition arises from a separate conviction. Instead, the plain language of the statute makes clear that the phrase includes situations in which the federal prohibition is triggered by the same conviction that led to the Ohio firearms disability.

“To the extent the state and federal prohibitions create a catch-22, whereby the existence of the state prohibition makes it impossible for the federal prohibition to be removed and vice versa, that situation is for the General Assembly to address, if it wishes to do so,” she wrote.

Prosecutor Objected to Gun Rights Restoration
After being convicted of domestic violence in 2006, Heffley served a prison term, paid his fines and court costs, and was discharged from postrelease control. As a result of his conviction for a felony offense of violence, he was prohibited from owning a firearm unless he was relieved of the disability.

Federal law prohibits anyone convicted in any court of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year from having a firearm. But the right to have a gun can be revived if the person’s
civil rights have been restored, and that restoration does not explicitly bar a person from having a firearm. Heffley’s conviction was punishable by up to 18 months in prison, placing him under the federal disability.

Heffley filed an application in common pleas court in 2023 to remove his firearm disability. R.C. 2923.14 allows the restoration of rights if a trial court finds the person has “led a law-abiding life since discharge or release, and appears likely to do so.” The trial court has discretion to grant or deny the restoration of gun rights.

The trial court denied Heffley’s application, finding that because he was under a federal disability, he was “otherwise prohibited by law” from possessing firearms. Heffley appealed to the Third District, which agreed with him that he was not otherwise prohibited by law since both his federal and state disabilities arose from a single conviction.  Because the trial court still has discretion to grant or deny the application based on the other statutory factors, the Third District remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether to approve Heffley’s application.

The Allen County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the Third District’s decision to the Supreme Court.

Ohio Supreme Court Analyzed Restoration Law

The Court’s opinion today explains that federal law expressly allows the restoration of federal gun rights where state civil rights have been restored. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this restoration procedure in its 1998 Caron v. United States decision. In Caron, a Massachusetts citizen attempted to have his federal firearm rights reinstated after having his state civil rights restored. However, Massachusetts’ restoration law limits the right to possess rifles and shotguns, but not handguns. Because the state law did not fully restore rights to all firearms, the high court ruled the federal firearms disability remained.

Reacting to the Caron decision, the General Assembly amended Ohio’s restoration law to add that a successful application under R.C. 2923.14 restores “all civil firearm rights to the full extent enjoyed by any citizen.” In an uncodified section of the new law, the lawmakers stated the amendment was to clarify that relief under R.C. 2923.14 restores a person’s civil firearm rights to the extent that the federal ban does not apply to that person.

Justice DeWine explained that relieving Heffley of his Ohio firearms disability, therefore, also relieves him of the federal disability stemming from the same conviction. The question then becomes whether the federal disability prevents a trial court from granting relief from the state firearms disability, he wrote.

The prosecutor argued the federal disability must be removed before the trial court can consider removing the state disability. Heffley countered that “otherwise prohibited by law” refers to the source of the disability, and a trial court is permitted to remove the federal disability if it arises only from the same state conviction as the state disability.

“Although both parties raise reasonable arguments in support of their construction of the statute, we conclude that Heffley’s reading is the better one,” the Court stated.

Finding that “otherwise” refers to whether a separate conviction led to the federal disability, the Court stated Heffley is not “otherwise prohibited by law” from possessing a firearm since he only has one disabling conviction. The trial court may grant an application for the restoration of state gun rights under R.C. 2923.14 so long as the federal disability is supported only by the same state conviction, the opinion stated.

The Court remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Federal Ban Prevents Restoration of Gun Rights, Dissent Maintained
In her dissent, Justice Brunner noted that Heffley’s domestic violence conviction triggered the federal disability. By the plain language of the state law, the phrase “otherwise prohibited by law” includes the federal prohibition, which would have to be removed first before the trial court could consider Heffley’s application, she wrote.

She stated that the majority decision “creates a galling disparity” in state laws designed to impose greater sanctions for more serious offenses. Under the Court’s 2021 State ex rel. Suwalski v. Peeler decision, the Court found a person convicted of certain state misdemeanor domestic violence crimes, which carried only a federal firearms ban, cannot regain their rights to possess firearms. But under today’s decision, a person convicted of felony domestic violence can, she wrote.

“Distilled to its essence, the rule of law calls on the judiciary to apply laws fairly and follow established rules in rendering decisions. But the majority opinion does not do that here. Instead, it undermines the public trust, creates a result that is more likely to continue harm to victims, and sets the stage for more serious repeat crimes to occur,” the dissent stated.

2024-1304. State v. Heffley, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1990.

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