Court News Ohio
Court News Ohio
Court News Ohio

Wednesday, April 24, 2019

Aaron Anderson et al. v. WBNS-TV Inc., Case no. 2018-0792
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)

Barbara Rieger v. Giant Eagle Inc., Case no. 2018-0883
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)

State of Ohio v. Justin Hawkins, Case no. 2018-1177
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Fayette County)

Did TV Station Defame Individuals Whose Identity Were Sought in Connection with Robbery of Child’s Hoverboard?

Aaron Anderson et al. v. WBNS-TV Inc., Case no. 2018-0792
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)


  • Is the standard set by the Ohio Supreme Court in a 1987 case for what constitutes defamation of a private figure by a media company still applicable? Or has it been changed by the advent of online news reporting?
  • Must a news organization demonstrate it used “reasonable care” in reporting information about a private figure that turned out to be incorrect, or does a news organization now have a “stronger duty” to ensure accuracy because false statements may remain public forever on the internet?
  • Is a news organization acting negligently when it changes words provided by public officials, which are later is found to be incorrect, without further investigation of the information?

In January 2016, the Columbus Division of Police issued a short news release to Columbus-area media regarding a Nov. 26, 2015, crime at a water park. Included with the release were two still photographs taken from security-camera video. The first photo showed a parking lot and individuals too far away to be recognizable. The second was from a water park hallway, which clearly showed the faces of three people.

The news release stated:
The victims were walking in the parking lot of Fort Rapids waterpark watching their eight year old daughter ride her “hoverboard.” The suspects approached on foot, put a gun to the eight year old’s head, and demanded the hoverboard. The suspects then ran to a white PT cruiser and fled out of the parking lot.

Anyone that can help identify the persons in the attached photographs who may have been involved are asked to contact the Columbus Police Robbery Unit at 614-645-4665.

WBNS-TV, a Columbus television station, prepared two early morning broadcasts based on the release and posted one story on its website. The headline of the website story stated: “Robbers Put Gun to Child’s Head and Steal Hoverboard.” Underneath the headline was the photo from the hallway with the three unidentified people.

A WBNS viewer recognized the broadcasted photo showed of her three children, Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson. She took the three to the Columbus police station, and they told police they were at the water park to deliver Thanksgiving dinner to a friend who worked there. The police interviewed the family for several hours then cleared them of any potential wrongdoing. A second news release from the police sent after the broadcast stated:

Follow-Up and Update: Following the news coverage, the individuals in the video immediately came into Columbus Police Headquarters. The individuals in the video spoke to detectives, and, after further investigation, were found to not be the suspects in the robbery. Please discontinue the use of this video for any further reporting of this crime.  

WBNS didn’t broadcast any more segments about the crime after receiving the release. The website report remained, but the hallway photograph depicting the Andersons was removed and replaced with the parking lot photograph.

Stories Prompt Lawsuit
In October 2016, the Andersons filed a defamation lawsuit in Franklin County Common Pleas Court against WBNS, noting they were depicted in the hallway photograph and labeled as “robbers.” The TV station asked the trial court for summary judgment, arguing that the Andersons failed to prove the station acted negligently when it relied on information provided by the police that later was found to be incorrect. The trial court sided with WBNS, and the Andersons appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals.

The Tenth District ruled the TV station changed the police department’s statement by indicating the people in the hallway were “robbers,” not “suspects” of a robbery.  The court ruled that a jury should decide whether the TV station was negligent in its reporting and if it defamed the Andersons. Defamatory statements are statements that reflect poorly on a person’s reputation, integrity, or morality. The Tenth District’s opinion also noted that because false stories posted — then taken down — by a news organization can be found elsewhere on the internet, the media now has “a stronger duty to research the facts” than before the advent of the internet.

WBNS appealed the Tenth District’s decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. The Court will hear oral arguments at a special off-site court session in Ashtabula County.

Reporting Wasn’t Negligently Conducted, Station Argues
WBNS offers two key arguments in its effort to have the trial court judge’s ruling in their favor restored. The company says that under the current definition of “negligence” in Ohio law, the station wasn’t negligent in its reporting. It also argues that the Tenth District is setting a new standard for the media by stating it now has a “stronger duty to research the facts.” The court offered the new standard without supplying any definition of what the stronger duty might require a news reporter to do to comply, WBNS asserts.

WBNS notes that the Andersons were never named in the story, and at the time of the broadcast, neither the station nor the police knew their identities. While the station used the term “robbers,” in each of the stories along with the photos of the Andersons, the reports all also used the term “suspects.” The station argues that the police stated the persons in the photo “may have been involved,” which is another form of saying “suspect.” And when informed by the police in the update that the Andersons were “no longer suspects,” the station immediately removed the hallway photo. Reporting that the Columbus police viewed the Andersons as suspects isn’t defamation, WBNS argues.

The station argues that Ohio case law doesn’t require the media to obtain “absolute corroboration” of information from law enforcement sources, which means it doesn’t have to closely match, before reporting it. The station wasn’t acting unreasonably when it broadcast the information, it states. WBNS notes that the inclusion of both the terms “robbers” and “suspects” in the reports would lead any reasonable viewer to conclude the police viewed the Andersons as suspects and weren’t at that time accusing them of committing any crimes.

New Standard Would Cripple News Organizations, Station Adds
WBNS also explains the Ohio Supreme Court set the standard for what is defamation of a private person, which is someone who is not a public official or public figure, in its 1987 Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. decision. The standard requires a private figure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the media failed to act with reasonable care when reporting information that turned out to be false and harmful. The station notes that failing to act with reasonable care is referred to as “negligence” in civil lawsuits, and the legal definition of negligence is “a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of others against unreasonable risk.”

WBNS argues the Andersons offered no evidence to the trial court to demonstrate the station was negligent.

In reversing the trial court, the Tenth District maintained that because information posted on the internet could remain there “forever,” WBNS had a “stronger duty” to make sure the information was accurate before reporting it. The station notes the Tenth District didn’t explain what it meant by “stronger duty,” and that the requirement has never been applied in any jurisdiction to a defamation case. WBNS asserts that requiring news outlets to independently investigate and verify statements made by reliable sources, such as the police, would add undue burdens and costs that would have a chilling effect on the media’s ability to report the news. The station urges the Supreme Court to clarify that the standard in Lansdowne still applies and that under the current standard, WBNS didn’t defame the Andersons.

Rewording Police Information Is Negligence, Family Argues
The Andersons maintain that the Tenth District didn’t create a new standard for the media, but rather found that the TV station defamed the family by rewording the information from police without further investigating whether it was accurate to describe them as “robbers.”

The Andersons note that when the Tenth District ruled against WBNS, the TV station raised the argument that the “stronger duty” new standard was developed by the three-judge appellate panel hearing the case. The company asked the Tenth District for an en banc review, in which all of the Tenth District judges would consider the issue. In denying the request, the Tenth District panel stated that its ruling indicated that the standards in Lansdowne still apply.

The Andersons explain the statement about “stronger duty” was dicta, meaning it had no impact and wasn’t meant to change the legal standard. Instead the statements was to warn the TV station that the present day speed by which information is disseminated on the internet and the “permanency of such false claims” means the news media needs to be more responsible in its reporting, the Andersons state.

The Andersons also counter that they aren’t challenging the right of the TV station to report “credible source information” from the police, but rather that it was the TV station, not the police, that made the story defamatory. The family notes the police never identified the people in the photos as robbers or accused them of robbing a child a gunpoint. Instead, the TV station’s posting of the Andersons picture and describing them as robbers, without doing any further investigation of the facts, could be defamatory, they argue. They maintain there is enough information to allow a jury to decide whether the station failed to use reasonable care in its reporting.

Friend-of-the-Court Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting the WBNS position has been jointly submitted by the Ohio Association of Broadcasters, the Ohio News Media Association, the American Society of News Editors, the Associated Press Media Editors, the Radio Television Digital News Association, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and the Society for Professional Journalists. The groups urge the Court to retain the Lansdowne standard and they want the Court to state it is effective and necessary in the age of fast-moving online reporting.

“As reporters work to balance the public’s need to know emergent information quickly with the time it takes to accurately report the news, they should not be required to conduct unnecessarily drawn-out investigations and second-guess trusted sources such as public officials before publishing online. The Court of Appeals’ ‘stronger duty’ standard threatens to slow public access to what is, at times, life-saving breaking news or sweeping news from the Internet entirely, just as a majority of working-age adults look to the web for news,” their brief states.

Attorney General Urges Case Dismissal
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office requested to participate as an amicus curiae and was granted five minutes of time to present arguments in favor of the trial court’s ruling. The attorney general states that the office as well as federal and local law enforcement has an interest in protecting the right to solicit public tips, identifications, and other information relating to criminal investigations through the media. Because the Court granted time to the attorney general following WBNS’ 15 minutes for oral argument, the Court extended the Andersons’ oral argument time to 20 minutes.

- Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing WBNS-TV Inc.: Marion Little, 614.365.9900

Representing Aaron Anderson et al.: Sonia Walker, 614.252.2300

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Should Jury Award Against Grocery Chain for Motorized Cart Crash Be Upheld?

Barbara Rieger v. Giant Eagle Inc., Case no. 2018-0883
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)


  • Must stores offering motorized shopping carts warn shoppers using the carts about collision dangers, train them how to operate the carts, and determine whether they might be disqualified from driving the carts?
  • Did the appeals court rule the mere possibility of harm from the wrongful conduct was enough to support an award of punitive damages (which punishes the wrongful conduct of the person or entity that caused the harm and is designed to deter future misconduct)?
  • Did the appeals court create a new legal standard for these types of cases?

On Dec. 8, 2012, Barbara Rieger visited the Giant Eagle grocery store in Brook Park, near Cleveland. Rieger, 71, was standing next to her shopping cart in the bakery department. Ruth Kurka was driving one of the store’s motorized shopping carts and hit Rieger’s cart, which knocked Rieger into the bakery counter and onto the floor. When Kurka’s husband arrived in the bakery department, he asked Kurka, who had dementia, what happened, and she said she didn’t know.

A Giant Eagle employee stated in a report that Rieger hit her head on a cake display case and had cuts on both of her hands. An ambulance took Rieger to the hospital. Along with the cuts, she had a bump and bruising on her head as well as neck sprain and strain. She obtained follow-up treatment for her injuries, and her medical bills totaled $11,511.

Injured Woman Sues Grocery Store Chain, Cart Driver
Rieger filed a civil lawsuit in February 2014 against Kurka and Giant Eagle, which operates more than 200 supermarkets in five states. Rieger alleged in her lawsuit that Giant Eagle didn’t use reasonable care to protect her from the carelessness of other customers and that the store was negligent for allowing Kurka to use a motorized cart. Kurka also was negligent for causing the collision, the lawsuit argued.

Kurka died before the trial, and her estate paid Rieger $8,500 in a settlement. The case against Giant Eagle went forward and was heard by a jury.

In October 2016, the jury found that Giant Eagle was negligent for the accident. The jury awarded Rieger $121,000 for her injuries (called “compensatory damages”) and nearly $1.2 million to punish and deter Giant Eagle from future misconduct (called “punitive damages”).

This amount for punitive damages is higher than a limit set in state law. Rieger argued after the trial that the state’s cap was unconstitutional in her case and that she had a right to adequate punitive damages. The trial court agreed and approved the full award.

Store Owner Appeals Million-Dollar Award
Giant Eagle appealed the decision. The Eighth District Court of Appeals upheld the jury verdict but determined that the state law’s cap on punitive damages had to be applied. The court reduced the punitive damages from almost $1.2 million to $242,000.

The grocery chain appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the issues. The Supreme Court will consider arguments in the case during a special off-site court session in Ashtabula County.

Danger Was Open and Obvious, Store Owner Argues
Giant Eagle argues that a store owner has no duty to warn customers about the risk of harm from a motorized shopping cart because the open and obvious nature of the hazard acts as a warning. This argument is based on a 2003 ruling from the Ohio Supreme Court in Armstrong v. Best Buy Co. A store owner likewise has no duty to provide motorized cart training to customers or to “interrogate” them to find out whether they can operate the cart safely, Giant Eagle’s brief to the Court states. The grocery store chain indicates that the store posted an overhead sign with safety guidelines for the carts, and the instructions referred customers to safety warnings posted on the carts.

Giant Eagle states that court decisions in Ohio and other states have declined to impose these types of duties on companies that sell, rent, or lease more-dangerous motor vehicles, such as automobiles, rental cars, and recreational vehicles, and even jet skis. The grocery store chain warns that ruling in Rieger’s favor could burden store owners so much that they may stop offering motorized carts to customers, and that decision would limit the mobility of disabled customers. Giant Eagle adds that asking customers about their ability to drive a motorized cart would violate federal regulations in the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Store Knew of 117 Prior Incidents, Injured Woman Counters
Rieger responds that the question whether the motorized carts presented an open and obvious danger in the stores must be decided by the jury. However, Rieger insists, Giant Eagle didn’t present any evidence at the trial to support this argument and never requested an instruction about open and obvious dangers for the jury to consider. Because the grocery store chain didn’t bring up this issue during the trial, it can’t raise this argument now in an appeal, she argues.

She also notes that her lawyers obtained Giant Eagle’s reports of 117 incidents in their stores involving motorized carts that caused injuries during the nine years leading up to her injuries. This evidence was presented to the jury. She adds that the safety warnings focus on the driver’s safety but include nothing about steering, stopping, or accelerating for the protection of others. The company had a duty to protect her from harm while shopping at its store, and doing nothing when it had knowledge of other accidents shows that Giant Eagle didn’t comply with this duty, Rieger argues.

She also states that Giant Eagle can comply with the ADA while still protecting its customers as required by state law. For example, the store could post instructions about how to steer and stop the carts or offer other precautions, she argues.

In her view, the store’s duties to its customers depend on the “foreseeability” of harm. Because Giant Eagle knew of 117 motorized cart accidents, it didn’t exercise reasonable foresight by taking action to protect its customers, Rieger maintains. Giant Eagle can be held legally responsible, or liable, for the incident, she argues, because the store, while exercising reasonable care, should have known that customers could’ve been harmed by others driving motorized carts.

Award to Punish and Deter Grocery Chain Debated
Punitive damages are designed to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter it from happening again. Giant Eagle notes that the person or entity that commits the wrong must have acted with “actual malice” for punitive damages to be awarded. Quoting a 1987 Ohio Supreme Court decision, Giant Eagle explains that actual malice is a “conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.”

Giant Eagle argues that the earlier motorized cart accidents didn’t lead it to believe, and wouldn’t have led any store owner to believe, that providing the carts to untrained customers with mobility limitations would expose them to a near certainty of harm that would be substantial. Given this, the grocery store chain maintains that it didn’t have a duty of care to its customers related to the motorized shopping carts.

Again, Rieger argues, Giant Eagle knew about 117 incidents resulting in injuries and did nothing, which showed a conscious disregard for her rights and safety. In addition, the employee who took the incident report didn’t try to obtain information from others who were standing nearby who may have witnessed the accident. Rieger testified that she contacted Giant Eagle after the accident asking who had hit her and whether there were witnesses, but Giant Eagle didn’t cooperate. She contends that all the evidence proved the grocery store chain acted with actual malice, which allowed the punitive damages award.

Store Owner, Injured Woman Disagree about Connection Between Crash and Store’s Duties
Giant Eagle maintains that Rieger had to prove that the store’s negligence was the cause of her injuries. Because Rieger didn’t present any evidence about what specifically caused Kurka to run into Rieger’s cart, nothing could connect the accident to a breach of duty by the store, Giant Eagle argues.

Rieger states that the incident reports contained enough information for the jury to consider whether Giant Eagle knew about the problem. The trial court determined that the incidents were substantially similar to hers and could be admitted and considered by the jury, Rieger argues. She adds that the jury decides how much weight to give the evidence.

Trade Groups Back Grocery Chain’s Arguments
An amicus curiae brief supporting Giant Eagle’s positions has been submitted by trade organizations that represent Ohio and national retailers:

  • Food Marketing Institute
  • Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice
  • Ohio Chamber of Commerce
  • Ohio Council of Retail Merchants
  • Ohio Grocers Association
  • National Grocers Association

They note that 14 percent of Ohio’s population are disabled individuals, and many of them are elderly. The number of citizens 65 years old and older is expected to grow substantially. For senior citizens or the state’s residents with disabilities, motorized carts are essential for them to maintain their mobility and independence, the organizations note.

- Kathleen Maloney

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing Giant Eagle Inc.: Roger Williams, 330.405.5056

Representing Barbara Rieger: Thomas Wilson, 440.234.0662

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When Vehicle’s Paint Color Doesn’t Match Registration Information, Can Police Stop Driver to Investigate?

State of Ohio v. Justin Hawkins, Case no. 2018-1177
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Fayette County)


  • Does the discrepancy between the paint color of a vehicle and the paint color listed on the vehicle’s registration records provide a police officer the required level of reasonable suspicion to make an investigative traffic stop?
  • Is an officer’s experience and belief that paint color discrepancies are an indicator that a vehicle or its license plates might be stolen enough to allow for an investigative traffic stop?

At 3 a.m. on May 20, 2016, Washington Court House patrolman Jeffery Heinz was completing a traffic stop when a black GMC SUV passed his patrol car. Heinz’s onboard license plate reader captured an image of the SUV’s license plate. Heinz requested that a dispatcher obtain the vehicle’s registration information. The dispatcher reported the plates were registered to a 2001 white GMC SUV.

Heinz, a 14-year veteran of the city police force, stopped the SUV, believing that the vehicle might have been stolen. Heinz asked the vehicle driver, Justin Hawkins, for his driver’s license, car registration, and proof of insurance. Hawkins didn’t have any identification with him, but gave the officer his date of birth and Social Security number. After running a check, Heinz told Hawkins that the Social Security number belonged to a different person, and Hawkins gave Heinz a different number. Heinz was able to verify the registration of the vehicle matched the license plates. While Heinz was verifying the information, Hawkins began to slowly drive away.

When the second Social Security number also didn’t match Hawkins, Heinz asked the dispatcher to conduct additional research and found that Hawkins had an arrest warrant in Delaware County. Heinz caught up to Hawkins again and stopped him. When informed of the arrest warrant, Hawkins sped away. As he attempted to flee, he veered off the road, driving through yards before eventually hitting a bush or small tree. He attempted to run away and was captured.

Stop Leads to Felony Conviction
Hawkins was charged with three felonies including operating a motor vehicle that caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property. Prior to his trial, Hawkins submitted a motion to suppress the evidence relating to the traffic stop, arguing that Heinz “lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.” He maintained that a mismatch between the SUV’s paint color and the reported color on the registration isn’t enough to justify a stop, and that it violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Heinz testified at a hearing on the suppression request that it has been his experience that vehicle thieves search out other vehicles of the same make and model and steal the license plates from similar vehicles. The thieves then drive the stolen vehicles with the newly stolen plates. If the vehicles weren’t the same color, there would be mismatches in the vehicle registration system. Hawkins’ mismatch led him to make the traffic stop, Heinz said.

The trial court denied Hawkins’ motion, and a jury found him guilty of the serious risk of injury charge. He was sentenced to three years in prison.

Hawkins appealed his conviction to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s ruling on suppressing the evidence and the conviction. The Twelfth District noted that its decision that a paint color discrepancy is sufficient to make a stop conflicts with a Fifth District Court of Appeals decision on the same issue. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the conflict.

Oral arguments in the case will be conducted at a special off-site court hearing in Ashtabula County.

Changing Color Legal, Not a Reason to Stop Motorist, Driver Argues
Both the Twelfth District and Fifth District turned to court decisions in other states for guidance on the question of whether color discrepancy alone is enough to make a traffic stop, Hawkins explains. He notes the Twelfth District might have made the wrong decision because it agreed with the officer’s assessment that Hawkins potentially violated the law against “fictitious registration.” The law, R.C. 4549.08, prohibits motorists from driving with counterfeit or illegal copies of license plates, altering vehicle identification numbers or marks, or using plates that belong to another vehicle.

In Ohio, when a vehicle is first registered, the owner reports the vehicle color to the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. But after the initial registration, the state doesn’t require the owner to update the vehicle color when the registration is renewed. Hawkins notes that Florida and Arkansas have similar registration laws to Ohio. The Florida and Arkansas supreme courts ruled that a police officer’s stop of a vehicle based on color discrepancy alone wasn’t enough reasonable suspicion to make a stop. A federal appeals court hearing a case from Indiana came to the same conclusion.

Hawkins argues that Heinz was wrong to consider the color change to be a fictitious registration because there is no crime in painting a vehicle and not reporting it. He notes that Heinz testified the only reason he stopped Hawkins was for the color mismatch and suspecting the plates had been switched, but for no other suspicious driving behaviors or traffic infractions.

Based on the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court’s Terry v. Ohio decision, police have a right to stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer “has reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the office lacks probable cause.” That right to search has been extended to traffic stops, but in both cases, courts have been clear that an officer needs to have more than a “hunch” that a crime has been, or is about to be, committed.

Hawkins concluded that Heinz only had a hunch that his mismatched vehicle color was a sign the SUV was stolen. The vehicle was registered to Yvonne Hawkins, a relative of Justin Hawkins, and Heinz had no facts to suspect criminal activity that would have allowed him to pull over the SUV to investigate, Hawkins concludes.

Mismatch and Experience is Enough, Prosecutor Argues
When Ohio’s Fifth District Court adopted the position of Florida, Arkansas, and the federal court, it rejected rulings from state courts in Georgia, Indiana, and Idaho, the Fayette County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office explains. The Twelfth District chose to follow Georgia, Indiana, and Idaho cases where there was a color mismatch. In those cases, the courts believed that experienced law enforcement officers, acting on their reasonable beliefs about car theft, were justified in making the stops, the prosecutor explains. The office urges Ohio to follow the same rule.

The prosecutor notes that Yvonne Hawkins purchased the white SUV in January 2016, five months before Heinz made the stop. Because the vehicle was registered as white and was now black, Heinz did have a reason to believe that the plates were switched. The only way to verify that the black SUV Hawkins was driving was actually the white SUV his relative registered was to pull it over and inspect the vehicle registration numbers, the prosecutor explains. It was during this stop that Heinz learned of Hawkins’ outstanding warrant, and he fled, committing the felony that led to the prison sentence, the prosecutor notes.

The prosecutor asserts in the cases followed by the Twelfth District, those courts concluded the officer “was entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience and training.” The prosecutor argues the court reasoning in those cases is relevant in this case because the Twelfth District gave weight to Heinz’ training, and experience, and knowledge that plate switching to conceal car theft was an issue in his city. The prosecutor also maintains that in the Fifth District case, there was no testimony from the arresting officer that he relied on his training and experience when he pulled over a driver for mismatched colors. The prosecutor concludes that officers don’t have the “luxury” of knowing if a vehicle with mismatched colors is legal or not until a stop is made and the identifications numbers are verified, and it is permissible to stop a vehicle if an officer believes a law has been broken.

- Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing the State of Ohio from the Fayette County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office: John Scott, 740.335.0888

Representing Justin Hawkins: Shannon Treynor, 740.845.1889

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These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.

Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.