Court News Ohio
Court News Ohio
Court News Ohio

Tuesday, June 2, 2020

City of Centerville v. Michael P. Knab, Case No. 2019-0873
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)

In re A.M., Case No. 2019-0923
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)

In re Complaint of Direct Energy Business LLC v. Duke Energy Ohio Inc., Case No. 2019-1058
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Toledo Bar Association v. Thomas A. Yoder, Case No. 2020-0228
Lucas County

Can City Receive Restitution as ‘Victim’ under ‘Marsy’s Law’?

City of Centerville v. Michael P. Knab, Case No. 2019-0873
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)

ISSUE: Does a municipality qualify as a “victim” under the Ohio Constitution’s “Marsy’s Law,” and is it entitled to restitution when it is harmed by the commission of a crime?

In April 2018, Michael Knab called 911 to report to the Centerville Police Department that there was an active shooter at his home and someone had been shot. The majority of Centerville’s police department responded to the call. At the scene, they were informed by Knab’s mother and a man staying at the home that there was neither an active shooter nor an injured person. Police were informed Knab may have taken methamphetamines and had been acting paranoid.

During a search of the home, the police confirmed there were no firearms on the property and no signs that a gun had been discharged. They found drug paraphernalia, syringes, a meat cleaver, a machete, unknown pills, and ammunition. Police charged Knab with making a false report and improper use of a 911system.

Knab was found guilty in Kettering Municipal Court of both charges. As part of his sentence, he was ordered to pay $1,375 in restitution based on the calculations of Centerville officials for the lost man-hours spent by officers who were taken off their normal roles to respond to the scene.

Knab appealed his conviction and sentence to the Second District Court of Appeals. The Second District affirmed his conviction in May 2019, but vacated the restitution order. The appeals court found the city doesn’t meet the definition of  “victim” under Ohio law and the city did not experience any “economic loss” that would allow it to be compensated under the state’s restitution statute, R.C. 2929.28(A)(1).

Centerville appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that under the “Marsy’s Law” amendment to the Ohio Constitution, passed by voters in November 2017, the city was a victim and is entitled to restitution. The Court agreed to consider the argument that a municipality could qualify as a victim, but declined to review the claim that Centerville suffered an economic loss from its response to Knab’s emergency call. To comply with state directives during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court will hear the appeal via videoconference.

Bill of Rights Expands Definition of Victim, City Asserts
The city argues the appeals court looked only to state statutes and prior Ohio case law to find the definition of a crime “victim.” The city notes that the passage of Marsy’s Law added a series of victim rights guarantees to Article I, Section 10 of the state constitution.

Article I, Section 10a(A)(7) states crime victims are entitled to “full and timely restitution from the person who committed the criminal offense.” Article I, Section 10a(D) states that victim “means a person against whom the criminal offense or criminal act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the offense or act.” And Article I, Section 10a(E) states that the provisions of Marsy’s Law “shall be self-executing and severable, and shall supersede all conflicting state laws.”

The city maintains that Ohio law has consistently recognized corporations to be legal “persons” for the purpose of enforcing laws, and that as a municipal corporation, it qualifies as a person under Marsy’s Law. The city notes the state restitution law doesn’t define “victim,” and the Second District relied on other cases where the definition of “victim” in R.C. 2930.01(H)(1) was used to determine if an entity qualified for restitution.

Centerville argues Marsy’s Law states it supersedes all conflicting law, and any statute that wouldn’t include the municipality is in conflict and can’t be used. The city notes the appeals court indicated that prior to Marsy’s Law, municipalities were considered victims for certain crimes, such as embezzlement of public funds, vandalism, and destruction of public property, but weren’t victims for efforts to fight crime.

The city notes the constitution now states victims include those “directly and proximately harmed” by the offense, and that it proved to the trial court it was financially harmed by Knab’s false report of an active shooter. The city maintains that state lawmakers could curtail the definition of victim in Marsy’s Law, but would have to explicitly state that municipalities are excluded from the right to collect restitution.

‘Persons’ Are Humans, Offender Argues
Knab argues the drafters of Marsy’s Law clearly indicated that the law defines “persons” as individual human beings. Knab is joined by victims right advocates who collectively argue through amicus curiae briefs that when viewed in context with the rest of the state constitution, the crime victim provisions are directed to assist people injured by crime. Allowing cities to claim restitution would act as an additional tax on those convicted of crimes and potentially harm the ability of individuals to receive compensation, the victim advocates assert.

Knab explains that Centerville is authorized by the state constitution to act as a municipal corporation and can exercise all the powers of local self-government. Those powers include establishing a police force to enforce state and local laws, and the power to impose taxes to finance the city’s operations, including its police force. He maintains the city already is being compensated for the time police and 911 dispatchers are paid to respond to citizen calls, and that the city admitted no overtime or additional compensation was paid to address the matter.

Knab maintains Ohio law distinguishes public corporations, such as a city, from private corporations, and the Supreme Court has ruled public corporations aren’t entitled to all the protections afforded by the Ohio Constitution. He also notes the proponents of the passage of the constitutional amendment  stated it would guarantee “crime victims and their family members” a voice in the judicial process and “dignity, respect, and justice.” He asserts the city doesn’t need a “voice in the judicial process,” as it already has one through the police force and city prosecutor. The law focuses on the benefits to human victims of crime, he concludes.

The broader structure of the Ohio Constitution treats municipalities as the government, and the purpose of the constitution is to restrict government powers to only those enumerated in the constitution, Knab asserts. He notes that throughout state law and sections of the constitution, the law distinguishes municipal corporations from private corporations. Even if corporations were considered persons under Marsy’s Law, cities would still be excluded from claiming to be victims, he maintains.

Knab concludes the city was not victimized by his actions, and didn’t suffer any harm that would qualify for restitution.

Friend-of-the Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus brief supporting Knab’s position was submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation. Knab’s position is also supported by a brief jointly filed by Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Community Legal Aid Services, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Legal Aid Society of Columbus, Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio, Legal Aid Society of Western Ohio, Ohio Alliance to End Sexual Violence, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Southeastern Ohio Legal Services.

Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing City of Centerville: Scott Liberman, 937.223.1201

Representing Michael P. Knab from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Patrick Clark, 614.466.5394

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Did Juvenile Court Take All Steps Required by State Law before Permitting Agency to Take Custody of Child?

In re A.M., Case No. 2019-0923
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)

ISSUE: Must a juvenile court “fully” analyze the mandatory factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) regarding a child’s best interest before terminating the rights of the child’s parent?

A 16-year-old gave birth to a child, identified in court documents as A.M., in November 2016. At that time, the mother was in the custody of Hamilton County Job and Family Services. She entered foster care in 2013 after nine years of moving between relatives and a neighbor because of her parents’ substance abuse issues and absence.

While in the county agency’s care, A.M.’s mother had to meet certain requirements, such as attending school and therapy. In December 2016, the agency obtained interim protectives orders for A.M. because of various incidents, including her mother’s expulsion from school and leaving her foster home without permission. A.M.’s father also had assaulted her mother.

The agency filed another complaint in 2017, and A.M. was placed in the agency’s temporary custody in September. A.M.’s mother turned 18 that year and had secured a job and a place to live in Dayton, while A.M. was moved among several foster homes, the mother’s brief to the Court states. Due to additional issues, the agency asked for permanent custody of A.M., and a Hamilton County Juvenile Court magistrate approved the request in September 2018. The mother objected, but a judge in the juvenile court upheld the decision.

Mother Questions Whether Juvenile Court Considered Child’s Best Interest
A.M.’s mother appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, raising issues whether the juvenile court took the steps required by state law before taking permanent custody of A.M. The First District disagreed, affirming the juvenile court ruling.

The mother appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case to review how juvenile courts must show they have met the statutory requirements for determining the child’s best interest when granting permanent custody to a children services agency. To comply with state directives during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court will hear the appeal via videoconference.

Law Lists Factors Courts Must Consider for Terminating Parent’s Rights
A court must follow the process in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) to determine whether to end a parent’s custody of a child and to give permanent custody to a children services agency. As part of that process, a court must determine whether the step is in the child’s best interest and must find one of five conditions listed in the statute.

For the best-interest part of the evaluation, the court must consider certain factors described in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1):

“(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, …; (b) The wishes of the child … with due regard for the child’s maturity; (c) The custodial history of the child …; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) apply in relation to the parents and child.”

Court Decision Didn’t Adequately Discuss Best-Interest Factors, Mother Asserts
A.M.’s mother argues that the magistrate’s decision didn’t give an analysis, discussion, or conclusion about the (D)(1)(a) factor – the child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents.

The mother stresses that the caseworker and A.M.’s guardian ad litem each informed the court about the bond A.M. has with her mother. The mother states that she suffered trauma while in foster care, was making progress in therapy, and consistently visited her child in 2018. She also maintains that the magistrate made a decision based on outdated information because the agency repeatedly filed its reports months late.

The mother’s brief argues some state appeals courts have concluded that an analysis and discussion of each factor is necessary before permanent custody can be taken from a parent. In this case, the juvenile court didn’t make clear in its ruling that it considered each of the mandatory best-interest factors, so it’s not known if all the evidence was taken into account, the brief states. It maintains that the law must require juvenile courts to state in writing how they considered each factor in the law.

“Each time the court renders a decision lacking discussion of the best interest factors, Ohio families are permanently separated without a clear understanding of whether their interaction and efforts were considered,” the brief argues.

A.M.’s mother also contends she has the ability to complete her case plan requirements for reunifying with her child if she were given additional time.

Law Mandates Consideration, not Specific Discussion, of Factors, Agency Argues
Hamilton County Job and Family Services notes the law states that courts must “consider” the factors in the law. The agency maintains that courts must clearly convey that they have considered all of the best-interest factors, but they don’t need to specifically discuss each one in their decisions.

Also, the record in this case demonstrates the magistrate referenced and made findings regarding each of the factors, the agency argues. Specifically, the magistrate addressed the (D)(1)(a) factor when it concluded that A.M.’s mother didn’t make the required lifestyle changes and was inconsistent in her visits with her child.

The agency adds that the focus in a permanent custody hearing is on the child’s best interest, not the parent’s. A.M.’s mother had more than two years to prove she could parent A.M. suitably and could give the child a stable, permanent home, but she did not, the agency maintains. Its brief notes that A.M. was thriving in her foster home at the time of the hearing, and acknowledges that A.M.’s mother has faced many challenges in her life and her history “evokes sympathy.” The agency concludes, however, that it tried to keep A.M. in her mother’s care, but placing A.M. in the agency’s permanent custody so she can be adopted is now in the child’s best interest.

Guardian ad Litem Advocates for Child’s Removal
The guardian ad litem (GAL) for A.M. also submitted a brief, which identifies the aspects of the magistrate’s decision that the GAL believes supports each of the best interest factors. In backing the agency’s request for permanent custody so A.M. can be adopted, the GAL notes the child has spent most of her life under the agency’s care and she needs a secure and permanent placement.

Father Doesn’t Submit Arguments
A.M.’s father didn’t file a brief in this case, waiving his participation in the Court’s oral arguments .

Kathleen Maloney

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing A.M.’s mother: Cynthia Daugherty, 513.484.9486

Representing the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services from the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: Nicholas Varney, 513.946.3162

Celia Klug, guardian ad litem: 513.999.5297

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Did Energy Company Provide Inadequate Service by Reporting Inaccurate Usage Data?

In re Complaint of Direct Energy Business LLC v. Duke Energy Ohio Inc., Case No. 2019-1058
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio


  • Does the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio have jurisdiction over a dispute about overpayments or underpayments to a regional transmission organization, or do such disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission?
  • Does R.C. 4905.22 entitle a competitive retail electric service provider to “adequate service” from a utility acting as a meter data management agent?
  • Were the inaccurate data supplied in this case isolated and inadvertent such that it didn’t constitute inadequate service?
  • Does a rule in the Ohio Administrative Code invalidate a clause in a federal tariff that limits a utility’s liability for its actions as a meter data management agent?

Duke Energy Ohio is a public utility that provides electric services directly to customers. It also allows other companies, called competitive retail electric service (CRES) providers, to use Duke Energy Ohio’s transmission facilities to buy electricity from the wholesale market and sell it to retail customers. Duke Energy delivers the electricity to CRES customers through Duke’s distribution system.

Under a “certified supplier tariff” approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), Duke acts as a meter management data agent (MDMA). As part of its responsibilities as an MDMA, Duke must provide accurate usage or load data for CRES suppliers to the regional transmission organization so that the regional organization can correctly charge the suppliers. (The regional transmission organization for Ohio is the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, referred to as PJM. The organization operates an electric grid covering more than 12 states.)

Direct Energy Business, which serves more than 180,000 commercial and industrial customers in the United States and Canada, is a CRES supplier in Ohio. SunCoke Energy became Direct’s customer beginning in January 2013. Before that, SunCoke had been a Duke customer.

SunCoke pays Direct for electricity to power an industrial plant in Middletown, Ohio. Duke, as the MDMA, facilitates Direct’s purchase of power from PJM to sell to SunCoke. Because of SunCoke’s metering configuration, a manual calculation was required to determine its electricity usage.

Duke Reports Inaccurate Usage, Leading to Millions in Overcharges
From January through July 2013, Duke in its role as the MDMA reported erroneous usage data for SunCoke to PJM, which led PJM to overcharge Direct. Through a PJM settlement process, Duke was able to correct the error for the March through July 2013 overcharges. However, overcharges of $1.6 million for January and February couldn’t be corrected because of a PJM deadline for correcting these issues.

Direct filed a complaint with the PUCO in June 2014, alleging that Duke’s erroneous metering of SunCoke’s usage led to the overcharges. After the parties were unable to resolve the dispute, the PUCO held a hearing in June 2017 and issued its ruling in April 2019. The commission found that Duke knew a manual calculation was needed to correctly calculate SunCoke’s usage and that Duke failed to provide adequate service to Direct as the MDMA from January through July 2013.

Duke appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which is required to hear the appeal from the PUCO. To comply with state directives during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court will hear the case via videoconference.

State Complaint Not Allowed, and Error Was Inadvertent, Duke Energy Asserts
Duke argues that Direct could seek reconciliation of this error only through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Duke’s obligations to report Direct’s energy data to PJM falls under PJM’s federal tariff, which is overseen by FERC, Duke contends. The company maintains that Direct is “forum shopping” in an attempt to recover a greater amount in damages through the PUCO.

Duke also maintains that its actions as the MDMA weren’t a regulated service under Ohio law that could be determined to be adequate or inadequate. Duke argues it is required as a public utility to provide adequate service to consumers, but Direct wasn’t a consumer. In addition, Duke’s state tariff shouldn’t open a door for the PUCO to review technical data errors because the PJM federal tariff governs those issues, the company states.

But, if it were appropriate for the PUCO to look into whether Duke’s service to Direct was adequate, this case involving SunCoke’s bill was an isolated inaccuracy that wasn’t sufficient for the PUCO to conclude that Duke provided inadequate service, the company contends. It adds that Direct had access to all the data and could have detected and addressed the error sooner.

In addition, Duke argues, the PUCO-approved tariff states that Duke must be “held harmless” for its acts as an MDMA. Although the commission determined that its administrative rules don’t allow clauses that eliminate a utility’s potential negligence in providing services, Duke counters that the rule doesn’t apply and the PUCO can’t determine negligence anyway.

Should the Court uphold the PUCO’s decision, Ohio public utilities that act as MDMAs will be subject to “draconian penalties” for inaccurate data it reports to PJM, Duke concludes.

PUCO Oversees State Tariff, and Error Continued for Seven Months, Commission Argues
The PUCO notes that Duke submitted its certified supplier tariff for commission approval, which Duke received. The state tariff explains that Duke, as the MDMA, must maintain meters and associated equipment, provide accurate meter readings to CRES providers, and report aggregate load and usage data to PJM.

Although the state tariff references a federal tariff, that reference doesn’t make the state tariff a federal matter subject to federal enforcement only, the PUCO argues. Instead, the commission’s brief maintains, the federal and state systems work as a “collaborative scheme.” The brief states that FERC regulates wholesale rates and sales of electricity, while the states handle all other electricity sales, so there is no conflict that would preempt Ohio law.

The law in Ohio requires utilities to provide adequate service that is just and reasonable, and permits complaints about service that doesn’t meet these standards. While Duke states it isn’t required to follow these laws because Direct isn’t a “consumer,” the PUCO counters that the relevant statute allows “any person, firm, or corporation” to make a complaint. Direct was permitted to file a complaint against Duke, the commission maintains.

Duke’s state tariff specifically requires the company to report hourly electricity load and usage data to PJM on Direct’s behalf, but those data were inaccurate – a fact Duke doesn’t dispute. The PUCO notes that Duke knew reporting of SunCoke’s usage required manual calculations because Duke performed the calculations when it was SunCoke’s supplier before January 2013. Because Duke failed to conduct the necessary calculations, the PUCO determined Duke’s service was inadequate. 

The commission adds that the clause in Duke’s supplier tariff limiting Duke’s liability for its actions as the MDMA is unenforceable under a PUCO rule that prohibits such clauses. This clause gives Duke too much power because the company already has a monopoly on supplying electricity in its service area, the commission states. The PUCO concludes that the clause didn’t exempt Duke from providing adequate service to Direct.

PUCO Could Hear Complaint, and Duke Ignored Problem, Direct Energy Maintains
The Court permitted Direct to intervene in the case. In its brief, Direct maintains that this dispute involves the Ohio tariff and that the commission has the authority to hear Direct’s complaint and interpret the state tariff. Duke hasn’t cited any language in the federal tariff that describes its obligations for reporting usage data for CRES providers, Direct states, because those obligations arise from the state tariff.

Direct also argues that the partial remedy it received for the overcharges through the PJM settlement process doesn’t prohibit the PUCO from granting further relief on issues within its purview.

Direct notes that Duke’s failure to make the required adjustment to SunCoke’s energy usage – which Duke calls an “isolated inadvertent oversight” – occurred in January, February, March, April, May, June, and July of 2013. Direct adds that it discovered the error and the cause, yet Duke delayed in addressing the problem.

Kathleen Maloney

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing Duke Energy Ohio Inc.: Rocco D’Ascenzo, 513.287.4320

Representing Public Utilities Commission of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Jodi Bair, 614.644.8599

Representing Direct Energy Business LLC: Mark Whitt, 614.224.3911

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Suspension Proposed for Lucas County Lawyer Who Disparaged Magistrate and Opponents

Toledo Bar Association v. Thomas A. Yoder, Case No. 2020-0228
Lucas County

The Board of Professional Conduct suggests a Lucas County attorney receive a two-year suspension, with one year stayed, for several ethical rule violations, including repeatedly calling a juvenile court magistrate a liar, and consistently making disparaging comments about opposing parties.

Thomas A. Yoder of Holland objects to the board’s findings. In a 112-page response to the board’s report to the Ohio Supreme Court, Yoder states that he “categorically” denies that he said or wrote anything false about the magistrate, an opposing attorney, and two women engaged in legal disputes with his clients. He notes that he has a 42-year career in the Toledo legal community with no prior disciplinary record, and asserts the charges against him result from two cases that “turned toxic because of some extremely bizarre circumstances and some very strange people.”

The Toledo Bar Association, which brought the complaint against Yoder, supports the board’s recommendation.  The bar association states that Yoder’s objections and his other submissions in the proceedings “reflect a lack of insight and loss of professional acumen and skills.”

To comply with state directives during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court will hear the matter via videoconference.

Custody Dispute Leads to Conduct Charges
The bar association charges stem from two matters Yoder handled -- a case involving the custody of three minors and a land contract dispute.

Yoder represented the maternal grandparents who sought custody of the children because their daughter was allegedly suffering from a substance abuse addiction. Codi Dowe, a cousin to the children’s father, and a licensed nurse, also sought custody. Nedal Adya, a Lucas County juvenile court magistrate, presided over the custody dispute. Adya conducted an emergency custody hearing, removed the children from the grandparents’ home, and placed them with Dowe.

Eight of the charges of professional misconduct against Yoder are derived from his written reactions to Adya’s decision and written interactions with Dowe and the birth parents. In one statement, Yoder writes that “rather doing what a normal, competent magistrate would have done, Magistrate Adya then states what I believe to be an absolute lie.” The statement added that Adya “intentionally lied.” Yoder also wrote that he didn’t need to tolerate Adya’s “abuse…taunts, threats, and lectures.”

He also wrote that Dowe “exhibits bizarre visions of paranoia” and “is clearly out of touch with reality.” He sent letters to the Ohio and Michigan nursing boards, requesting they investigate her and consider her ability to function as a registered nurse.

Attorney Assails Opposing Lawyer and Client
In the other legal matter, Steven and Lisa Thomas were purchasing a home through a land installment sale contract that a client of Yoder’s prepared himself using a form he found online. The Thomases were making payments to Yoder’s client, then later to Yoder, who was acting as a trustee for his client. The couple became concerned that their payments weren’t being applied to the mortgage, taxes, and property insurance, and they hired attorney Fan Zhang to assist them.

Yoder’s written interactions with Zhang and the couple led to four more charges of professional misconduct by Yoder. Yoder accused Zhang of prolonging the dispute in order to bill the couple for more fees and told him to stop sending “silly letters” to impress his clients. He suggested that Zhang bring another attorney to mediation because in his “humble opinion” Zhang didn’t understand the lawsuit he filed.

He wrote that Lisa Thomas is a “very ignorant, troubled woman and a liar.” In another statement, he called her an “idiot,” and stated, “I’m still solving the problem created when 3 half wits sat around a kitchen table and filled out a land contract.”

The bar association added complaints about Yoder’s behavior based on the subpoenas he sent to witnesses scheduled to appear at Yoder’s disciplinary hearing. In subpoenas to Dowe’s parents, and the Thomases, he wrote that they would have to testify under oath and would be subject to perjury. He noted that Dowe would have to respond to “intentionally lying” in juvenile court and that the Thomases would have to justify the “lies and allegations” they made to the bar association. In both subpoenas he suggested the couples retain lawyers.

Panel Considered Matter
The three-member board panel that conducted Yoder’s disciplinary hearing reported that Yoder spent a good deal of time arguing his actions in the legal cases were correct. The panel found Yoder wasn’t devoting much time to addressing his conduct and his disparaging statements about the magistrate and other parties in the case.

The panel concluded that Yoder violated eight rules, and dismissed several other charges. Infractions included engaging in undignified and discourteous conduct degrading the magistrate; knowingly making false statements in a legal proceeding about the magistrate and Dowe; and making false statements about Zhang and Lisa Thomas.

The panel found Yoder also broke the rules against professional misconduct to gain advantage in a civil matter when he made unwarranted allegations about Dowe to the nursing boards, and made comments about Dowe “that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, harass or burden” her.

Based on the panel findings, the board recommends Yoder be suspended for two years with one year stayed with the condition that he commits no further misconduct. The board suggests that for Yoder to be reinstated, he submit to an evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program and comply with any recommendations from that evaluation.

Lawyer Objects to Charges
Yoder concedes he may have expressed a “bad attitude” toward Adya and the parties in the cases. But he argues he didn’t make any false statements about the matters in which he was involved. He requests that the Court dismiss the case.

In his objections, Yoder provides details on the cases and statements made by individuals in the matters. He argues that his reputation has been tarnished by two simple cases that became very complicated because of errors made by the magistrate and his opponents.

Bar Association Supports Suspension
The bar association asserts that Yoder’s lengthy and disorganized objections don’t comply with Court rules and further reflect that Yoder needs time away from the practice of law to reflect upon his lack of compliance with Court practices.

The bar association maintains the panel went to great length to allow Yoder to argue his case and refute any of the charges of misconduct against him. The panel found the evidence indicates that the other participants in the matter provided more credible versions of the events, and the bar association maintains the charges against Yoder are warranted.

Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Representing Toledo Bar Association: Robert Bahret, 419.248.2600

Thomas Yoder, representing himself: 419.865.5515

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