Wednesday, February 7, 2024
State of Ohio v. Dimitrius Macklin, Case No. 2023-0539
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Tommy Glover, Case No. 2023-0654
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Brian P. Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corporation, et al., Case No. 2023-0809
Third District Court of Appeals (Marion County)
After Juvenile Court Transfers Case, Is Indictment on More Charges Allowed?
State of Ohio v. Dimitrius Macklin, Case No. 2023-0539
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: In a case transferred from a juvenile court to adult criminal court, does the Supreme Court of Ohio ruling in State v. Burns (2022) allow a grand jury to indict on additional offenses as long as they are “rooted in” the offenses sent by the juvenile court?
BACKGROUND:
In 2020, a complaint was filed in Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court against Dimitrius Macklin. The complaint alleged that Macklin committed aggravated murder, murder, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault, and that he had a weapon illegally. These offenses would be felonies if committed by an adult.
The complaint was based on a shooting that occurred on Aug. 3, 2017, in Cleveland. When police arrived at the scene, they found Hesham Kamel on the ground. He was conscious and bleeding from gunshot wounds. He was taken to the hospital and died in surgery.
The police investigation revealed that Kamel traveled from Willoughby to Cleveland after coordinating a vehicle sale and purchase via an online marketplace app. Kamel planned to trade his silver sedan and pay some money for a Nissan he found on the app. It was during the meeting that he was shot.
One of the suspects that police identified was Macklin, who was 17 years old at the time of the shooting. The Cuyahoga County prosecutor asked the juvenile court to bind over Macklin to the adult criminal court. The juvenile court held a hearing in August 2020 and found there was no probable cause to support the allegations of aggravated murder or having a weapon illegally. However, the court determined the other offenses were supported by probable cause. The case was transferred to criminal court.
Indictment in Criminal Court Includes Additional Charges
In September 2020, the grand jury for the criminal court indicted Macklin on counts of murder, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault – the offenses found to have probable cause by the juvenile court. Macklin also was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.
In connection with the shooting, three men also were indicted. They agreed to plead guilty to certain counts and testified at Macklin’s trial. They said they and Macklin decided to rob someone by setting up a fake car sale through the online app. One of the defendants, Michael Butler, testified that they used a fake photo for identity verification and posted a random image of a car, claiming it was for sale. A meeting was arranged with Kamel to take place on a Cleveland street.
At the meeting location, Kamel wasn’t cooperating with being frisked, Butler said. Macklin shot Kamel, hitting him in the finger. Macklin got into Kamel’s car and, through the window, shot Kamel in the chest. The others fled. Macklin drove the vehicle away and picked the men up elsewhere. The group abandoned the vehicle, and police found it the next day.
The jury acquitted Macklin of aggravated murder and one of two aggravated robbery counts. Macklin was convicted for the other offenses and for firearm specifications. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison.
Macklin appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which in a Dec. 8, 2022, opinion overturned the conspiracy conviction. The Eighth District determined that Macklin shouldn’t have been tried on counts that weren’t transferred by the juvenile court – specifically, aggravated murder and conspiracy.
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
Parties Debate Recent Supreme Court Rulings
The Supreme Court issued two decisions in 2022 on juvenile bindovers that are discussed in this case. In February 2022, the Court ruled in State v. Smith that when a juvenile court finds no probable cause that a child committed a criminal act, then an adult criminal court has no authority to re-charge or prosecute the juvenile on that charge. On Dec. 23, 2022, the Court decided State v. Burns. That ruling stated that a juvenile can be charged with offenses in adult court that weren’t presented in juvenile court if the new charges are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint.
State Asserts That Indicting on Additional Charges Allowed
The Cuyahoga County prosecutor argues that the state could seek to indict Macklin on aggravated murder in criminal court because that allegation and the allegation of murder were for the same act. The juvenile court had found probable cause for the murder offense, and the aggravated murder charge in criminal court was rooted in the murder charge, the prosecutor contends. Even though the Supreme Court hadn’t yet decided Burns in 2020, indicting Macklin for aggravated murder in criminal court aligns with Burns, the prosecutor maintains.
The prosecutor contends that the allegation of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery also can be part of the indictment because that offense was rooted in the aggravated robbery charge. The juvenile court found probable cause for aggravated robbery.
The prosecutor also points to R.C. 2151.23(H). The statute gives a criminal court “jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally had been commenced in that court … including, but not limited to, … jurisdiction to accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction … against the child for the commission of the offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the conviction is for the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the commission of another offense that is different from the offense charged.”
The prosecutor argues that if the criminal court can enter a judgment for “another offense that is different from the offense charged,” then the court can’t be limited to hearing and deciding a case on only the offenses transferred by the juvenile court. The prosecutor’s brief contends that law “clearly conveys a clean slate” for the grand jury and the criminal court after the transfer.
The state notes that the Court has received briefs and heard oral arguments in two other cases with similar legal issues –State v. Taylor and State v. Williams.
Man Contends That Charges Not Transferred Can’t Be Considered
Macklin states that the Eighth District decided his case on Dec. 8, 2022, before the Supreme Court ruled in Burns. The Eighth District followed the Court’s earlier ruling in Smith, which held that a criminal court doesn’t have jurisdiction over charges in a transferred case unless the juvenile court found probable cause to believe the acts were committed, Macklin notes.
He disagrees with the state’s interpretation of R.C. 2151.23(H). The statute addresses what can be done with the “offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case for criminal prosecution,” which is limited to those charges where the juvenile court found probable cause, Macklin maintains.
He contends that the prosecutor wants to apply the “rooted in” language from Burns when that case wasn’t available to the Eighth District at the time of its decision in this case. If Burns applies to his case, then changes to state law enacted after the Eighth District’s decision must also be considered, Macklin maintains. R.C. 2152.022 took effect on April 3, 2023, and states that the “case” transferred by the juvenile court in a bindover consists only of the offenses for which probable cause was found, Macklin argues. That law restores the standard set in Smith, he asserts.
He reasons that after the Smith and Burns rulings, the General Assembly chose to examine the issues raised in those cases and decided to write a law. Macklin contends that the legislature could have put the “rooted in” language of Burns into the statute but chose not to carry that concept forward. Instead, the legislature clearly defined the meaning of “case” in transferred cases as those found to have probable cause by the juvenile court, he notes.
Attorney General Files Brief on Issues
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The Court has granted the attorney general's request to participate in the oral argument during the time allotted to the prosecutor.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Daniel Van, dvan@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing Dimitrius Macklin from the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office: Francis Cavallo, fcavallo@cuyahogacounty.us
Was 60-Year Prison Sentence Appropriate for Robbery and Kidnapping Crime Spree?
State of Ohio v. Tommy Glover, Case No. 2023-0654
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUES: When imposing consecutive sentences, must a trial court consider whether the entire prison term is necessary to protect the public and whether consecutive sentences are proportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct?
BACKGROUND:
In 2020, Tommy Glover committed a string of robberies and kidnappings in two Cincinnati-area communities. On two occasions, he forced a man to drive to various ATMs and withdraw cash. He forced two college students at gunpoint to drive to ATMs and withdraw money. He robbed a woman at gunpoint and forced her to drive around for about 10 minutes. He robbed a man at gunpoint, taking his phone and car. Glover was indicted on six counts of aggravated robbery and five counts of kidnapping, each with gun specifications of one or three years.
Glover was convicted of the crimes. A presentence investigation found Glover was 23 years old at the time of the offenses. He lived with his mother in Toledo and traveled back and forth to Cincinnati to visit his children. He had no prior felony convictions but had one juvenile adjudication in Toledo, which was labeled “safe school assault.” Glover turned down a plea bargain for the robberies and kidnappings that would include a 15-year prison sentence. At sentencing, the assistant prosecutor handling the case recommended a 20- to 25-year sentence, and the victims recommended a range from 20 years to the maximum sentence, which could have been up to 102 years.
The trial judge conducted a required analysis under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and determined that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and punish Glover and that the sentence wasn’t disproportionate to his conduct. The judge also made the finding required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that Glover committed two or more offenses that were so great or unusual that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. In addition, the court found his crimes were committed during a course of conduct, and his juvenile assault charge indicated he had a criminal history, which are also findings that supported imposing consecutive sentences.
The judge then sentenced Glover to seven years for each of the six aggravated robbery counts and three years for each firearm specification. The judge directed that each of the firearm specifications be served consecutively for a total of 18 years, and the six robbery counts be served consecutively for a total of 42 years All other counts were run concurrently with the 60-year sentence.
Glover appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. The appeals court stated that under state law, it could vacate or modify the trial court’s sentence if the trial court sentence wasn’t supported by the evidence. The appeals court noted that Glover didn’t physically harm his victims, and others who committed similar crime sprees received far less prison time. The appellate court reduced Glover’s sentence to 25 years in prison.
The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Trial Court Sentence Appropriate, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor’s office explains that the First District’s actions were based on the precedent of a Supreme Court of Ohio decision. However, after the appeals court ruled on the matter, and while the prosecutor’s appeal of Glover’s sentence was pending, the Supreme Court established new standards for imposing consecutive sentences in its 2023 State v. Gwynne decision. Under a prior Supreme Court decision, trial courts were directed to look at the “aggregate” or total prison sentence imposed after issuing consecutive sentences. The prosecutor notes that the trial court was to determine if that total sentence was necessary to protect the public and wasn’t disproportionate to the seriousness of the crimes. Under the Gwynne decision, the Court ruled that a trial court isn’t obligated to assess the total sentence, but rather determines whether each sentence imposed is appropriate.
The prosecutor notes that Glover was sentenced for the robberies with gun specifications. Each gun specification carries a mandatory three-year term. Under state law, the trial court had to impose, at minimum, two sentences for the gun specifications that would total six years of mandatory prison time, the office asserts. The prison time for each robbery count ranged from three to 11 years. The trial judge picked seven years, in the middle of the range. The trial court then explained in detail that Glover showed no remorse for his actions, had a criminal history, and caused serious emotional damage to his victims. The office asserts that the trial court made all the necessary findings required by state law, and no aspect of Glover’s sentence for each count was disproportionate to his crimes.
The appeals court wrongly determined that the trial court was required to consider the aggregate sentence, the prosecutor maintains. The appeals court also focused on the amount of time Glover was sentenced to serve and how that sentence was greater than others who have committed murder, and others who have physically harmed their victims, the prosecutor argues. The prosecutor maintains that the appeals court ignored aspects of the law that required it to consider the impact on the victims and the need to protect the public from a dangerous criminal. The trial court conducted a complete assessment and issued a sentence that was authorized under the law, the office concludes.
Reduced Sentence Justified, Defendant Maintains
Glover notes that Gwynne was a divided opinion without a clear majority. He argues that the Supreme Court’s past and current precedent on interpreting Gwynne are both missing key points of the law. He maintains the best way to read the law is to impose the sentences in a “recursive” fashion.
Under the recursive approach, a trial court seeking to impose consecutive sentences first determines how many years in prison is appropriate for each offense. Then, the trial court considers the first two sentences it seeks to run consecutively -- for example, two 10-year terms. At that point, the judge determines if 20 years is necessary to protect the public and isn’t disproportionate to the crimes. If yes, the trial court runs all the other sentences concurrently. If no, the trial court then adds a third consecutive sentence and considers if that creates a total sufficient sentence. The trial court continues in this fashion until it reaches an appropriate number or has run all the sentences consecutively, he explains.
Glover explains this recursive approach fulfills the General Assembly's goals when it revised criminal sentencing laws. He argues lawmakers required judges to impose a sentence for each crime but also to consider limiting the total sentence to only what is necessary to protect the public and punish the offender.
The trial court is also charged with ensuring the sentence isn’t disproportionate to the crimes committed, he notes. He argues the Gwynne decision essentially eliminated that consideration. Glover examined several sentences issued in Ohio to other offenders who committed similar crime sprees. For those who didn’t harm victims, the offender’s average sentence was 27 years, and for those who harmed at least one victim, it was 33 years. He argues that his 60-year sentence is disproportionate to those of similar offenders and is also far longer than many who have murdered their victims. He maintains the appeals court appropriately concluded that the trial court’s sentence wasn’t supported by the evidence and properly reduced his sentence to 25 years.
Attorney General’s Office to Share Oral Argument Time
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor’s position. The Court has permitted the attorney general to share oral argument time with the prosecutor.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus brief supporting Glover’s position was jointly submitted by the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office, the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office, and the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: Paula Adams, Paula.Adams@hcpros.org
Representing Tommy Glover from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Kimberly Burroughs, Kimberly.Burroughs@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@OhioAGO.gov
Do Time Limits to Decide Worker’s Additional Injury Claims Apply to Courts?
Brian P. Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corporation, et al., Case No. 2023-0809
Third District Court of Appeals (Marion County)
ISSUES: Does the five-year limit to receive coverage for an additional condition from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation include the time that a worker’s appeal of a denial of coverage is before a court?
BACKGROUND:
Brian Caldwell was employed by Whirlpool Corporation when he suffered a hernia during the course of his employment. A Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC) claim was initiated in April 2015, and the company paid Caldwell for temporary and permanent partial disability. The last payment for the injury and Caldwell’s medical costs was issued by Whirlpool to Caldwell in January 2017.
In December 2019, Caldwell asked the Ohio Industrial Commission, which considers BWC appeals, to amend his claim to cover a lower back injury. Caldwell didn’t request treatment or compensation from Whirlpool at the time he filed his amended claim. An Industrial Commission district hearing office and a staff hearing officer denied Caldwell’s request, and the commission informed Caldwell in June 2020 that it wouldn’t hear his appeal of the staff officer’s denial. Under R.C. 4123.512, Caldwell had 60 days to appeal the commission’s decision to a common pleas court.
Within the deadline, Caldwell filed his appeal in Marion County Common Pleas Court. A trial was scheduled for May 2021. A month before the trial, Caldwell voluntarily dismissed his appeal and refiled his complaint in April 2022. Whirlpool asked the trial court to grant summary judgment in the company’s favor. The company argued that under a different law, R.C. 4213.52, Caldwell had five years from the last payment of medical benefits or compensation to seek additional coverage for an existing injury. The company maintained that time expired in January 2022, five years after the last Whirlpool payment to Caldwell.
The trial court agreed with Whirlpool while noting that the law seemed “fundamentally unfair.” Caldwell appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
Caldwell appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. BWC is named as an appellee in all workers’ compensation lawsuits. The bureau requested the Court to reclassify it as an appellant to join Caldwell in arguing that the lower courts had misinterpreted the law.
Deadline Law Doesn’t Apply to Court’s Timeline, Bureau Asserts
Caldwell and the BWC filed separate briefs but make similar arguments. The bureau maintains that the lower courts wrongly applied the time limits imposed in R.C. 4213.52 to the time a trial court has to consider the case. R.C. 4213.52 states, “The jurisdiction of the industrial commission and the authority of the administrator of workers’ compensation over each case is continuing,” and that any modification “shall be made within five years from the date of the last payment of compensation.” The bureau asserts that the five-year limit applies only to the actions of the Industrial Commission or BWC.
In Caldwell’s case, the commission did act within five years of the last payment when it rejected Caldwell’s request for additional coverage in 2020. Then Caldwell used R.C. 4123.512 to appeal the decision to the common pleas court. At that time, the five-year clock ceased to run, BWC maintains. The bureau notes that nothing in R.C. 4213.52 indicates that a court is under the five-year time limit to decide whether additional coverage should be granted. Once the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case, the timeline to determine a case is set by court rules, BWC argues.
The bureau explains that jurisdiction over an Industrial Commission decision appeal is directed by R.C. 4123.512. That law requires an appeal to be filed within 60 days of the rejection of the coverage. That law states that “jurisdiction is perfected” by filing the appeal with the court within 60 days, the bureau notes. Nothing else is required, BWC argues, and nothing tells the court that it must proceed within the five-year deadline. BWC notes no one is disputing that Caldwell appealed the case within 60 days of the commission’s denial and that the date he appealed was less than five years from the last payment.
Once the appeal was filed with the trial court, Caldwell could use a “savings statute” that allowed him to voluntarily dismiss his case and refile it. The fact that the refiling occurred more than five years after the last compensation payment to Caldwell is irrelevant, the bureau argues. There is no binding law on the court to wrap up the case before the five-year time limit is reached, BWC concludes.
Caldwell adds that because he filed his appeal within the time he was directed to do so, a court nullifying his right to seek additional compensation violates his due process rights under the U.S. and Ohio constitutions.
Caldwell explains that when the laws governing requests for additional coverage by injured workers are read in context, it is clear that R.C. 4123.512 and R.C. 4123.52 work in concert. He explains that once a commission decision is appealed to the trial court, the court will decide only if the injured worker is entitled to coverage. The court doesn’t decide how the worker is compensated but rather directs the Industrial Commission to proceed with the matter as if the worker’s initial administrative appeal to the commission was successful instead of denied. When read in context, state law applies the five-year limit only to the Industrial Commission and BWC, he concludes. The five-year clock stops while the trial court considers the matter, he notes. He maintains that the trial court’s decision can be appealed to an appellate court and the Supreme Court, and that process could take years. The time limit in R.C. 4123.52 doesn’t govern how long it takes the courts to determine how the Industrial Commission should have initially ruled, he concludes.
Five Year Limit Is Absolute, Company Asserts
The five-year time limit in R.C. 4123.52 governs the time for the injured worker to act. It operates as a set time to seek additional coverage, whether through the administrative appeals process or the courts, Whirlpool asserts. The company notes the Third District denied Caldwell’s claim based on the precedent set in another recent Whirlpool case, Chatfield v. Whirlpool Corp., which the Third District decided in 2021.
The company notes that Caldwell, by his own actions, delayed his appeal until after the five-year deadline passed. The company argues R.C. 4123.52 isn’t the only law that sets a firm deadline, but is one of several provisions in state law that limits the time that state agencies can modify or adjust claims. R.C. 4123.52 is written to bring finality to a claim, the company asserts. The Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction to act on a claim expires five years after the last payment, the company maintains, and a court’s decision to direct the Industrial Commission to act on a claim would be ineffective if it were rendered after five years.
The company maintains nothing in either R.C. 4123.52 or R.C. 4123.512 tolls or extends the time the Industrial Commission can consider additional coverage for an injury. The law states that the commission has five years to act from the time of the last payment and has continuing jurisdiction over the claim for those five years. Had the General Assembly wanted the filing of an appeal to a common pleas court to extend that time period, lawmakers could have included that in the law, Whirlpool concludes.
Friend-of-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Whirlpool’s position was submitted by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Brian P. Caldwell: Chelsea Rubin, chelsea@fultonlaw.com
Representing Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Michael Hendershot, michael-hendershot@ohioago.gov
Representing Whirlpool Corporation et al.: Mark Barnes, mbarnes@bugbeelawyers.com