Tuesday, June 3, 2025
State of Ohio v. Tavonte Turner, Case No. 2023-1242
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Nathan Gault et al. v. Clerk, Medina County Court of Common Pleas et al., Case Nos. 2024-0757 and 2024-0999
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Medina County)
Olentangy Local School District Board of Education v. Delaware County Board of Revision et al., Case Nos. 2024-0814 and 2024-0815
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Delaware County)
In the Matter of the Complaint of Ohio Power Company v. Nationwide Energy Partners LLC, Case No. 2024-0207
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Can Teen Plead Guilty to Adult Charges Not Addressed First in Juvenile Court?
State of Ohio v. Tavonte Turner, Case No. 2023-1242
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- In a juvenile bindover case, can a common pleas court accept guilty pleas to charges arising in adult court for which probable cause wasn’t first found in juvenile court?
- When a juvenile faces charges in adult court for the offense that was the basis for the transfer from juvenile court, can the juvenile face charges for another offense different from the one charged?
BACKGROUND:
In August 2020, Tavonte Turner’s mother was involved in an altercation in a Cleveland neighborhood. The next day, Turner, who was 16, returned to the location with her. Ring camera footage displayed Turner chasing down 34-year-old Joseph Owens and shooting him. Once Owens fell to the ground, Turner shot him in the head, killing him. The video also showed Turner firing at an unknown person who survived the gunshots.
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office filed a five-count complaint against Tuner in juvenile court. He was charged with aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. Because he had a prior adjudication involving a gun and was prohibited from having or using a firearm, he was also charged with illegally having a weapon (called “having weapons while under disability”).
The case required a mandatory bindover to adult court. The juvenile court conducted a two-day hearing to determine which charges had probable cause to pursue. The juvenile court found probable cause for the aggravated murder and murder charges related to killing Owens and the improper handling of a firearm, but made no finding for having weapons while under a disability. The juvenile court did find probable cause that Turner had a gun on him or under his control while committing murder.
After the case was transferred, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Turner in July 2021 on 12 counts. This included an attempted murder charge related to the unknown person Turner shot at, which wasn’t a charge Turner faced in juvenile court. The indictment also included two counts of having weapons while under a disability, charges for which no probable cause was found in juvenile court.
Juvenile Enters Plea Agreement and Challenges Charges
Nearly a year later, in May 2022, Turner pleaded guilty to three charges – murder, attempted murder, and having weapons while under a disability. At his sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated the factual basis for the charges was that as a 16-year-old, Turner chased Owens with a gun, shot him to death, and then attempted to murder another person by firing the weapon at the individual. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison, to run consecutively with a three-year firearm specification.
Turner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The Eighth District vacated a portion of his sentence. The Court found the trial judge inappropriately attempted to fashion a 25-year to-life sentence by running an 18-years-to-life murder sentence consecutively to a seven-year attempted murder sentence. The Eighth District found Turner couldn’t be convicted of attempted murder or weapons under a disability in adult court because no probable cause for those charges was found in juvenile court before the case was transferred. The appeals court let stand Turner’s 18-years-to-life sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.
The prosecutor’s office appealed the Eighth District’s decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Court Could Accept Plea Deal for Charges Solely in Adult Court, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor argues the Eighth District has misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s 2022 State v. Smith decision regarding juvenile bindovers and the cases following Smith. Those cases allow for adult convictions of charges “rooted in the acts” in which the juvenile court found probable cause, the office maintains. The prosecutor notes this is the first case before the Supreme Court since Smith in which a juvenile convicted in adult court appealed a conviction, and the prosecutor argued the juvenile waived his right to appeal a guilty plea.
The prosecutor argues that under R.C. 2151.23(H), the common pleas court has the authority to “hear and determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally had been commenced in that court.” The common pleas court isn’t limited to only considering the charges for which the juvenile court found probable cause, but rather can hear cases and take pleas to any charge related to the “act” that was the basis for the transfer. In this case, the office explains, the “act” was the shooting and killing of Owens that was captured on the Ring video. Caught in the footage was Turner’s act of attempting to murder another victim, the prosecutor notes. While prosecutors didn’t complete the process of presenting evidence in juvenile court about Turner having weapons while under disability, the juvenile court did find he had a gun when he killed Owens and that his juvenile record included an adjudication that barred him from possessing a firearm, the office notes. The grand jury had the right to indict, and the common pleas court had the right to hear the adult charges of attempted murder and having weapons while under a disability because they are related to the act that led to the bindover, the prosecutor asserts.
The prosecutor notes the Eighth District considered the attempted murder of the unnamed suspect to be a separate incident, even though it happened within seconds of Turner shooting Owens. The prosecutor argues that Supreme Court decisions have found acts taken by a juvenile days after the crime that formed the basis of the transfer were still considered to be “rooted” in the transferred offense. Turner’s illegal use of a gun and attempted murder are rooted in the charged offense and are charges that Turner could plead to in adult court, the office argues.
The Eighth District also found that as a juvenile tried in adult court, Turner didn’t waive his right to appeal his conviction even though he pleaded guilty to three charges. Turner maintained he couldn’t be charged with attempted murder and having the gun because no probable cause was found in juvenile court. The prosecutor argues the juvenile court bindover hearing was a preliminary hearing. What transpired in a juvenile court hearing doesn’t limit what charges are brought in an adult court once the case is transferred. Turner was indicted in adult court for attempted murder and having a gun, and pled guilty to the charges. By doing so, he waived his right to appeal them, the prosecutor concludes.
Prosecutor Stretching Law, Offender Asserts
Turner maintains that the prosecutor makes technical arguments regarding jurisdiction to circumvent the bindover laws and the Supreme Court’s decision. He notes the prosecutor only presented in juvenile court charges related to the death of Owens and conceded at the probable cause hearing the office didn’t present sufficient evidence of having weapons while under a disability. After the Court’s bindover decision in Smith, state lawmakers amended R.C. 2152.022(A) to make clear that the only charges that can be heard in adult court are charges contained in the complaint and for which probable cause was found, Turner asserts.
Because the prosecution never presented anything about a second victim in juvenile court, the adult court grand jury couldn’t produce new charges related to acts not even discussed in juvenile court, Turner argues. The adult court’s jurisdiction over a minor is limited to the acts the juvenile court found were supported by probable cause, Turner argues, and the transfer doesn’t open the door for the prosecutor to seek any charges it wants in adult court. If that were so, the General Assembly could have amended the law after Smith to clearly state that authority existed, he asserts. However, lawmakers took the opposite approach and wrote the statute in a way that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant for any acts for which no probable cause was found. Without first finding probable cause for attempted murder and illegal gun possession in juvenile court, the charges weren’t properly before the adult court, Turner concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Daniel Van, dvan@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing Tavonte Turner from the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office: Rick Ferrara, rlferrara@cuyahogacounty.us
Is $1 Computerization Fee Charged Per Page or in Total for Providing Complete Record?
Nathan Gault et al. v. Clerk, Medina County Court of Common Pleas et al., Case Nos. 2024-0757 and 2024-0999
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Medina County)
ISSUE: To fund technological advances and the computerization of a clerk of court’s office, does the “service” referred to in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) authorize a per-page fee for making a complete record, or limit the fee to $1 per record?
BACKGROUND:
Nathan Gault was a party in a divorce case in Medina County. The case was finalized in October 2015. The Medina County clerk of courts sent Gault bills for court costs in October 2017 and October 2019. For a copy of the complete record in the case, the bills charged him two fees – a per-page fee based on R.C. 2303.20(H) and an additional computerization fee under R.C. 2303.201(B)(1).
In October 2020, Gault filed a lawsuit against the county for a proposed class of individuals, arguing he and the other class members were overcharged for the computerization fee. He alleged that he was overcharged by more than $500 for a copy of his case record and that the overcharges to the class members amount to more than $500,000.
R.C. 2303.20(H) sets the first fee, stating the clerk shall charge “[o]ne dollar for each page, for making complete record, including indexing.”
R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) allows the clerk to charge an additional fee to fund technological advances or implementing computerization in the office. The statute in part permits a fee “not to exceed one dollar each for the services described in divisions (B), (C), (D), (F), (H), and (L) of section 2303.20 of the Revised Code ….”
Trial Court Concludes Clerk Calculated Correct Fee
A visiting judge for the Medina County Common Pleas Court rejected Gault’s claims in April 2023 and concluded that the clerk correctly calculated the fees. The court found that the additional $1 computerization fee is charged per page, meaning the fee to obtain a complete record would be $1 per page under R.C. 2303.20(H) and $1 per page under R.C. 2303.201(B)(1), for a total of $2 per page.
Gault appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court in April 2024. The Ninth District determined that the fee statutes have different wordings. The computerization fee permits an additional fee of $1 for the “service” in R.C. 2303.20(H) of making the complete record, not a $1 computerization fee per page, the Ninth District concluded. At the county’s request, the Ninth District certified that its decision conflicts with rulings from the Fifth District Court of Appeals and Second District Court of Appeals.
The county appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case. The Supreme Court also agreed to review the conflict among the appellate courts on the issue.
County Argues Law Allows $1 Computerization Fee for Each Page of Record
The county notes that the “services described in divisions (B), (C), (D), (F), (H), and (L)” of R.C. 2303.20 include fees for “each undertaking,” “each writ,” “each name,” “each page,” and “each certificate.” In division (H), a county clerk imposes a fee of $1 for each page of making a record. The county argues the additional fee in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) for computerization must be read through the language in R.C. 2303.20(H). The computerization statute allows an additional $1 fee for the “service” of making “each page” of the record, the county contends.
In the Second District and Fifth District decisions, the courts dealt with division (F) of R.C. 2303.20. That division states that the clerk shall charge “[t]wo dollars for each page, for entering on journal, indexing, and posting on any docket.” Both appellate courts ruled that the “service” described in R.C. 2303.20(F) is for each page, so the computerization fee of $1 would be charged in the same way, “for each page, for entering on journal, indexing, and posting on any docket.” The county argues the same approach applies for each page of a complete record under division (H).
The county also quotes the bill analysis from the Legislative Service Commission (LSC) about the relevant legislation. The bill analysis describes several amendments and states that R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) allows an additional fee for computerization “not to exceed $1 for each page for making complete record, including indexing.” (Text underlined for emphasis by county in its brief.) The bill analysis makes the General Assembly’s intent clear, the county maintains. The county’s brief concludes that the Ninth District’s $1 limit on the computerization fee for making a copy of a complete record “dramatically underfunds technology in a way that it could never fund any meaningful computerization or modernization of the clerk’s office.”
Man Contends Fee Limited to $1 Total for Making Complete Case Record
Gault agrees that R.C. 2303.20(H) clearly allows clerks to charge up to $1 per page to make a copy of the record. He counters, though, that the additional computerization fee in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) is limited to no more than $1 for the “service” of making the complete record. He maintains that the General Assembly knows how to create a law with a charge that is “per page,” as the language regarding the main fee in R.C. 2303.20(H) demonstrates. However, the General Assembly didn’t use the “per page” language for the computerization fee in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1), he argues.
He notes that another division of R.C. 2303.20 authorizes a fee of “[t]wo dollars for issuing each writ, order, or notice, except subpoena.” Gault explains that the $1 computerization fee is allowed on top of the $2 for every writ provided. However, division (H) uses different language, assessing a fee for making a “complete record.” An additional fee of $1 for computerization is allowed under R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) to be added to the main fee assessed for making the complete record, Gault argues.
The decisions from the Second District and Fifth District, which conflict with the Ninth District, concluded that the computerization fee depends on the number of pages, Gault maintains. “But that would require rewording the statute, which is something a court may not do,” his brief argues.
Gault also maintains that the LSC bill analysis misquotes the actual statute. Although the analysis states that R.C. 2303.201(B)(1) allows “an additional charge not to exceed $1 for each page for making complete record, including indexing,” the statute itself says “not to exceed one dollar each for the services” in the specified divisions of R.C. 2303.20, Gault notes. Given the actual wording in R.C. 2303.201(B)(1), there is no license for the clerk to charge more, “[e]ven if the collected money is going for the good of the government,” his brief concludes.
Additional Briefs Filed Regarding Fees
Former Ohio Sen. Tom Patton filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Gault’s arguments and the Ninth District’s analysis. Patton was a cosponsor of House Bill 197, which enacted the relevant computerization fee language that took effect in March 2013. He states that the $1 computerization fee wasn’t tied to pages but to the service of providing them. Each time the clerk provides the service of making the complete record, the computerization fee is limited to no more than $1, the senator’s brief maintains.
An amicus brief also supporting Gault’s positions was submitted by the Ohio Public Defender’s Office.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2024-0757 and 2024-0999).
Contacts
Representing the clerk of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas et al.: John McLandrich, jmclandrich@mrrlaw.com
Representing Nathan Gault: Patrick Perotti, pperotti@dworkenlaw.com
Can School Boards Appeal Property Tax Decisions Under General Administrative Appeals Law?
Olentangy Local School District Board of Education v. Delaware County Board of Revision et al., Case Nos. 2024-0814 and 2024-0815
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Delaware County)
ISSUES:
- Does R.C. 2506.01 create an independent statutory right permitting appeals of all final decisions of administrative bodies and political subdivisions?
- Are appeals allowed under R.C. 2506.01 if neither R.C. 5717.01 and R.C. 5717.05 prohibit such appeals?
BACKGROUND:
The Olentangy Local School District Board of Education filed complaints with the Delaware County Board of Revision challenging the values of certain properties owned by Northport Place and PSLC Enterprises in tax year 2022. The school board maintained that the value of the properties should be higher.
The board of revision dismissed the complaints for reasons separate from the issues in this case. The school board appealed the administrative agency’s decisions to the Delaware County Common Pleas Court. Changes to state law in 2022 had eliminated a school board’s right to appeal these tax decisions to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). Specifically, R.C. 5717.01 prohibits a school board from appealing board of revision decisions if the school board doesn’t own or lease the property with the disputed tax value.
In court, the school board argued it could appeal there based on R.C. 2506.01, which states that “every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located ….”
In August 2023, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeals because the school board didn’t own the properties. The court also found that R.C. 2506.01 requires a party to identify another statute that authorizes an appeal and that the provisions in R.C. Chapter 5717 didn’t provide that authority to the school board.
The school board appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The appeals court had 39 appeals pending on this legal issue, the school board states. The Fifth District upheld the trial court, concluding that R.C. 2506.01 didn’t offer a separate, independent avenue for the school board to pursue an appeal.
The school board appealed the decisions on the Northport Place and PSLC Enterprises properties to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the cases. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals for briefing and oral argument.
School Board Argues R.C. 2506.01 Permits It To Appeal Board of Revision Decisions
The school board’s brief emphasizes the use of “any” and “every” in R.C. 2506.01(A), which allows appeals to a common pleas court of “every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision.” The board adds that R.C. 2506.01(B) explains that “[t]he appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law.”
The school board cites several Court decisions, arguing precedent establishes that R.C. 2506.01 creates its own separate right to appeal all final decisions made by administrative bodies and political subdivisions in Ohio. The school board also notes that R.C. 5717.01 only prohibits a school board’s appeal to the BTA. In R.C. 5717.05, property owners are permitted to appeal to a county common pleas court. However, neither of those laws prohibits a school board from appealing under another statute, the school board contends.
In the school board’s view, the Fifth District focused on the General Assembly’s supposed intent when prohibiting certain appeals to the BTA instead of relying on the actual words in the statutes, which don’t explicitly ban appeals under R.C. 2506.01. The right to appeal spelled out in R.C. 5717.01 isn’t exclusive, which is demonstrated R.C. 5717.05’s language offering property owners another appeal avenue: “As an alternative to the appeal provided for in section 5717.01 of the Revised Code, ….” If the General Assembly wanted to prohibit school board appeals through any other statutes, it could have included such language in R.C. 5717.01 and R.C. 5717.05, the school board asserts. It notes that legislature has done that in a statute involving appeals of board of township trustee decisions.
Property Owners Respond That School Boards Cannot Appeal Under R.C. 2506.01
Northport Place and PSLC Enterprises agree that R.C. 2506.01 explains which orders or decisions can be appealed to a common pleas court, but counter there is no separate, independent right to appeal under that law. They contend that the standing to pursue those appeals requires a party to identify another statute that authorizes the appeal. They also note that R.C. 2506.01(C) defines “final order, adjudication, or decision” as “an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person ….” However, a school board isn’t a person, and it cannot establish standing to appeal under the statute, the property owners maintain.
The property owners assert R.C. Chapter 5717 provides the exclusive remedies in real property tax cases. They also argue that R.C. 5717.01, which prohibits school board appeals to the BTA, and R.C. 5717.05, which allows property owners to appeal to common pleas courts, conflict with the more general right described in R.C. 2506.01. State law mandates that the more specific provisions in R.C. Chapter 5717 prevail when there is a conflict, the property owners contend.
The property owners state that before the 2022 legislative changes, Ohio was one of only three states that allowed school boards to participate in real property tax valuation matters. Even before the new restriction on school board appeals to the BTA in R.C. 5717.01, school boards that weren’t the owners of the relevant property could appeal only to the BTA, while property owners could appeal to the BTA or in court, the property owners note. They contend that school boards didn’t have a right to appeal in court before the 2022 restrictions were placed in R.C. 5717.01, and those rights were in no way expanded by or after the legislation.
Attorney General Files Brief, Will Argue Before Court
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Northport Place and PSLC Enterprises. The attorney general also will participate in the oral argument, sharing time with the property owners.
Tax Auditor and Board Won’t Participate
The Delaware County Auditor’s Office and Delaware County Board of Revision didn’t file merit briefs in the case and will not participate in arguments before the Court.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2024-0814 and 2024-0815).
Contacts
Representing Olentangy Local School District Board of Education: Kelley Gorry, kgorry@richgillislawgroup.com
Representing Northport Place LLC and PSLC Enterprises LLC: Nicholas Ray, nmray@vorys.com
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov
Must State Regulators Treat Electric Submetering Company as a Utility?
In the Matter of the Complaint of Ohio Power Company v. Nationwide Energy Partners LLC, Case No. 2024-0207
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
ISSUE: Did the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio incorrectly apply R.C. 4905.03(C) when it determined that an electric submetering company is not “engaged in the business of supplying electricity” and isn’t subject to commission oversight?
BACKGROUND:
In its 2020 In re Complaint of Wingo v. Nationwide Energy Partners LLC decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) exceeded its authority when it made up a test rather than follow state law when determining that a “submetering” company was operating as an unregulated public utility. The Supreme Court directed the PUCO to reassess whether Nationwide Energy Partners (NEP) should be regulated as an “electric light company” under R.C. 4905.03(C).
In Wingo, the Court explained that submetering was developed originally to allow an apartment or multi-residential complex owner to divide a common master bill so residents pay their fair shares of utilities used. The Court stated submetering is now a big business, with resellers such as NEP providing submetering services for multiple properties and landlords. The resellers profit largely by purchasing public utility services, such as natural gas and electricity, at the wholesale price, which is less than the resale price the companies charge to individual consumers in housing complexes.
After the case was remanded to the PUCO, the apartment renters who brought it voluntarily dismissed it, and the PUCO took no further action.
Power Company Objects to Mass Conversion of Apartment Complexes
Just months before the Wingo decision, in October 2020, NEP submitted a request to the Ohio Power Company, which does business as AEP Ohio, to convert five Columbus apartment complexes with more than 1,000 existing units to a “master meter service” for the complex. Instead of AEP Ohio providing service to each individual unit in the complex, AEP would provide electricity to the master meter, and NEP would provide service to each tenant.
AEP responded to NEP after the Wingo decision and stated that it was evaluating whether it was legal for AEP to engage in business with NEP. In June 2021, AEP denied the request, arguing NEP was acting as an unlawful public utility. AEP also informed NEP that it was proactively filing a complaint with the PUCO against NEP so the commission could decide the matter, given that the Wingo case was dismissed.
The PUCO had previously concluded NEP wasn’t a regulated utility. It ordered AEP to cooperate with NEP to convert the five apartment complexes and allow NEP to provide the submetering services. AEP contested the order. In 2023, the PUCO again ruled that NEP is an agent of the landlord, who is authorized to submeter its property, and that NEP isn’t a public utility. The PUCO stated it followed the Court directive from Wingo and interpreted state law when making its decision.
AEP appealed the ruling to the Court, which is required to hear this type of appeal.
Conversion Reveals Submetering Company Is Utility, Power Company Argues
AEP argues that instead of following the Supreme Court’s directive to determine if NEP is a utility by following the language in R.C. 4905.03(C), the PUCO has reverted to old case law and is making up its own definitions of who is a utility customer. AEP explains that under court decisions that are nearly 100 years old, the PUCO has allowed for a “landlord exception.” In those cases, a landlord established a master meter with the public utility and then installed submeters so each tenant paid their fair share of the utility used.
In this case, converting existing AEP customers in the apartment complexes to NEP customers reveals that the landlord exception isn’t applicable in all cases. While NEP insists it is just acting as an “agent” of the landlord, and the landlord is controlling the activities, AEP argues the agreements reveal that isn’t the case. NEP is paying fees to the landlord for the right to control and bill for the electricity used by the tenants. Those tenants were AEP “consumers,” and now they are NEP “consumers,” under R.C. 4905.03(C), AEP asserts. The utility argues that the PUCO should define both the landlord and the tenants as “consumers” under these arrangements. NEP is “engaged in the business of supplying electricity” to consumers under the statute, AEP asserts.
AEP rejects the idea that NEP just facilitates the long-standing practices of landlords to submeter properties. When it initiated the complaint, NEP had 150 commercial accounts with AEP and represented 1.75% of the customers in the AEP Ohio territory. AEP indicated that NEP was one of the top 10 users of AEP Ohio territory electricity and was arranging to resell the power to tenants. NEP must be treated as a utility and be subjected to the same PUCO regulations as AEP if the company wants to operate in Ohio, AEP argues.
Landlord Assisted by Submetering Company, Commission Maintains
The PUCO abided by the Wingo decision directive to apply the language of R.C. 4905.03(C) to determine whether NEP was acting as a utility, the commission notes. The commission explains that long-established case law considers a landlord as the “consumer” when a master meter is installed, and submeters are used to measure the tenants’ utility use. The PUCO determined that the owners of the five apartment complexes hired NEP to act as their agent and the landlords remained customers of AEP.
NEP isn’t engaging in the business of supplying electricity, the commission asserts, and NEP carries out the lawful activities of allowing landlords to submeter their properties. The landlords are purchasing electric service, and the tenant leases at the apartment complexes permit the landlord to “secure and resell” electricity to the tenants. NEP facilitates the transactions through installing and maintaining electric distribution equipment and supports the landlord with billing and customer service. NEP doesn’t become a utility by managing the private operations between landlords and their tenants, the commission concludes.
Services Provided to Landlords, Company Asserts
The Court permitted NEP to intervene in the case and argue on its own behalf. NEP notes the landlords, not NEP, are AEP’s customers of record. The landlords take title to the electricity, own the electric infrastructure installed at the apartments, and secure leases with tenants that provide for submetering. NEP argues the company does nothing landlords cannot legally do for themselves.
The company notes that PUCO rules require AEP to provide master metering service to landlords and offer them the choice of installing separate metering for each apartment. NEP then carried out the wishes of the landlord to arrange for the submetering of the apartment complexes, which is all permitted by the law. AEP failed to prove NEP “supplies” electricity to consumers, which would qualify it as a utility, the company notes. AEP supplies electricity to a landlord, and NEP assists the landlord in ensuring tenants receive power and pay for their share, the company argues. This follows well established rules allowing NEP to act as an agent of the landlords and doesn’t qualify them as a utility that can be regulated by the PUCO, NEP concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting AEP Ohio’s position was submitted by Duke Energy Ohio. Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy also filed an amicus brief supporting AEP Ohio.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the 2024-0207 case docket.
Contacts
Representing Ohio Power Company: Steven Nourse, stnourse@aep.com
Representing the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Amy Botschner O’Brien, amy.botschnerobrien@ohioago.gov
Representing Nationwide Energy Partners LLC: Michael Settineri, mjsettineri@vorys.com
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