Tuesday, October 28, 2025
State of Ohio v. Joseph McAlpin, Case No. 2024-0749
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
One Church v. Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company, Case No. 2024-1329
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
In re application of Oak Run Solar Project LLC, Case No. 2024-1477
Ohio Power Siting Board
State of Ohio v. Diamond King, Case No. 2024-1608
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Did Trial Court Properly Consider New Trial Requests From Man on Death Row?
State of Ohio v. Joseph McAlpin, Case No. 2024-0749
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- Must a trial court first decide whether to approve a request for leave to file a motion for a new trial before issuing a decision on a new trial motion?
- Can appellate courts decide a trial court motion that wasn’t addressed in the trial court decision that was appealed?
BACKGROUND:
In April 2019, a jury convicted Joseph McAlpin on charges related to the 2017 robbery and murder of a couple who owned a Cleveland used-car dealership. The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court sentenced McAlpin to death.
On Aug. 20, 2019, McAlpin, who was representing himself, filed a motion for a new trial, asserting he had newly discovered evidence. He stated that location data from his Google account placed him somewhere else besides the car dealership at the time of the murders and that the information was concealed by the prosecutor.
When his motion was docketed on Aug. 20, it was 126 days after the April 17 verdict. That was past the 120-day deadline in court rules for criminal cases for filing the request. When the Cuyahoga County prosecutor opposed it as untimely, McAlpin’s brief maintains that he explained that he asked the prison for his motion to be mailed to the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Court on Aug. 12, which was 118 days after the verdict and before the deadline. However, the prison didn’t process the mail until Aug. 14, his brief states.
About six months later, in February 2020, McAlpin filed a request for leave, or permission, to file a delayed motion for a new trial, noting that his new trial motion had been submitted after the deadline.
Offender Asks Supreme Court To Order Trial Court To Rule on Motion
When McAlpin hadn’t received a decision on the motion, he asked the Supreme Court of Ohio on May 12, 2021, for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge to rule on the request for leave. The trial court was notified of the mandamus action. On May 25, it denied McAlpin’s motion for a new trial in one sentence and didn’t rule on the motion for leave.
Following the trial court action, the prosecutor asked the Supreme Court to dismiss McAlpin’s mandamus action because the trial court’s May 25 denial made the request for a writ moot. The Court dismissed the case in July 2021.
He appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which ruled that the denial of the motion for a new trial also resolved the motion for leave.
McAlpin appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Trial Court Had To Rule on Request for Leave First, Offender Maintains
McAlpin’s arguments rely on two Supreme Court decisions – State v. Bethel (2022) and State v. Hatton (2022). In both cases, the Court noted that a trial court must first grant leave, or permission, for a party to file a motion for a new trial, then the court can consider the merits of a separate motion for a new trial. Until a trial court grants permission allowing a new trial motion to be filed, the motion for a new trial cannot be considered by the trial court, the Court stated in Bethel.
McAlpin notes that both the August 2019 and February 2020 motions were pending with the trial court when it issued its July 2021 decision denying the new trial motion. He asserts that the order in which the court decided the motions didn’t depend on the order the motions were filed, since both requests were pending with the court for 15 months. Because he had never been granted leave to file a request for a new trial, the trial court couldn’t yet deny the new trial motion, he argues.
He also contends that the Eighth District’s decision was improper when finding that the trial court intended to deny the motion for leave when rejecting the request for a new trial. Nothing in the record shows that the trial court conducted the required legal analysis to implicitly deny the leave motion when rejecting the new trial motion, McAlpin maintains.
Motion for New Trial Couldn’t Be Filed Before Requesting Leave From Court, State Counters
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office notes that McAlpin filed his motion for a new trial, then filed a motion for leave six months later. The prosecutor argues McAlpin was required by court rules for criminal cases to first request leave from the trial court, then, if permitted, file the motion for the new trial. Unlike in the Hatton case, McAlpin filed his new trial motion months before he filed a request for leave from the court to consider that motion, the prosecutor maintains. When an untimely motion for a new trial is filed before obtaining leave to file that motion, the new trial motion isn’t properly before the court and is appropriately denied on procedural grounds, the prosecutor argues.
The prosecutor contends it is unclear how Bethel and Hatton help McAlpin since they reiterate that leave must be granted first before a court can consider a new trial motion. McAlpin didn’t seek permission first, failing to follow the process, the prosecutor notes. The prosecutor maintains it is only because the trial court delayed its ruling on the new trial motion that McAlpin was able to file the motion for leave while the other was still pending. His view that the motions “can be filed haphazardly in any order” is unsupported by the criminal rules, the prosecutor’s brief contends.
The prosecutor adds that the date McAlpin sent his motion through the U.S. mail isn’t relevant because there is no longer a “prisoner’s mailbox rule” in Ohio. A document is considered filed when it is filed with the clerk of court, not when it is placed in a prison mail system, the prosecutor argues.
The prosecutor also notes that McAlpin asked the Eighth District to review the trial court’s supposedly implicit denial of the motion for leave when it rejected the new trial request. The Eighth District considered that claim and ruled the implicit denial was appropriate because McAlpin didn’t prove he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the new evidence – a requirement for him to prevail in his request for a new trial. McAlpin can’t now complain that the appellate court considered what McAlpin asked it to review, the prosecutor maintains.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Joseph McAlpin from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Renee Severyn, renee.severyn@opd.ohio.gov
Representing State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Kristen Hatcher, khatcher@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Can Property Owner Seek Additional Insurance Coverage After Accepting Damages Payment?
One Church v. Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company, Case No. 2024-1329
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: Once a property owner agrees to engage in a “binding” appraisal and accepts an insurance provider’s full payment of the appraisal award, can the property owner seek more money for additional hidden damages not discovered during the appraisal process?
BACKGROUND:
In 2016, One Church acquired several properties in Franklin County to operate a church and related activities. The property consisted of seven buildings and was insured by Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company (BMIC), which specializes in insuring church properties.
In May 2019, One Church notified BMIC that its building sustained wind damage from a windstorm in February. BMIC indicated there was no record of storms in the area around the date of the reported incident, and One Church stated that this was the date it noticed interior water staining on some of the buildings.
BMIC hired an engineer from Haag Engineering to inspect the property. The report listed many areas of damage and deterioration, but little that was a result of wind damage. The Haag report provided to BMIC identified wind damage to 42 shingles, which led to a leak in the locker room. Based on the report, BMIC paid One Church $3,192 for the damages and closed the claim.
One Church refused the payment and invoked the binding appraisal process in the policy. Under the provision, One Church and BMIC would each hire an appraiser who would jointly assess the property. If those appraisers agreed on a damage amount for the loss, that would be the amount awarded to One Church. If they didn’t agree, a third appraiser would be hired to break the tie.
After a thorough inspection by the two appraisers, they agreed the buildings suffered $313,271 in damages, plus One Church would be paid an additional sum for the depreciation of the buildings. BMIC paid One Church $351,461 and closed the claim.
In August 2020, One Church used the insurance proceeds to begin repairs. It reported that after removing layers of the building roofs, it discovered another $206,663 in damages that were hidden and not discoverable during the appraisal process. It requested BMIC to reopen the claim and pay for the additional damages. The amount the church was seeking fell within the policy's coverage limits.
BMIC refused, stating the appraisal process was conducted through an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process, in which the agreement bound both parties. BMIC stated that One Church agreed that the money paid after the appraisals were submitted was the full payment for the claim.
Matter Goes to Court
When BMIC refused to reopen the claim, One Church filed a lawsuit in Franklin County Common Pleas Court in February 2021, seeking a declaratory judgment that the BMIC policy covered the additional damages. The church also claimed BMIC acted in bad faith. The trial court agreed to divide the two issues and would first consider the policy dispute.
In November 2021, BMIC filed for a judgment on the pleadings, stating that the policy's language indicates that One Church invoked the binding appraisal provision, resulting in the church receiving the amount determined by appraisers representing both One Church and BMIC. The parties agreed not to conduct discovery to delve deeper into each other’s arguments until after the trial judge ruled on the request for judgment on the pleadings.
No action was taken in the case until May 2023, when the trial court ruled in favor of BMIC and dismissed the case. One Church appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which, in April 2024, reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the matter to the court for further proceedings.
BMIC appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Church Bound to Appraisal Agreement, Insurer Argues
BMIC explains the case was decided by the trial court at a very early stage, when the company requested a judgment on the pleadings. While pleadings are simple statements of the legal issue prompting the lawsuit, BMIC maintains that One Church still had to plead with “particularity” what BMIC did wrong and why the church was entitled to sue for more money.
BMIC notes the Tenth District ruled the two appraisers made a “mistake” in determining the loss was only worth $351,461, and the appeals court described the appraisal as an “initial appraisal.” BMIC noted that in One Church’s pleading in the trial court, it never mentions the word “mistake” and never claimed BMIC made a mistake until after the appeals court issued its decision. If any mistake was made during the appraisal, One Church bears responsibility for it, BMIC argues. The insurer notes that One Church has full access to its own property, and its appraiser was responsible for dedicating as much time as needed to determine the full extent of the damages. BMIC argues the damage might have been “hidden” during the appraisal, but was not unknowable. The damage could have been identified had One Church invested the time in examining the layers of roofing underneath the surface to determine the extent of the damage, BMIC asserts.
Because the appraisal process is binding, One Church must accept $351,461 as full payment, the insurer argues. BMIC maintains that One Church doesn’t get the benefit of using an ADR process, such as binding appraisal, to avoid litigation costs, and then turn around and sue for more money. BMIC notes the trial court found the policy language expressly made the appraisal process binding, and that allowing One Church to seek additional damage would violate the contract.
BMIC concludes that its decision to pay $351,461, despite its investigation supporting a payment of only $3,192, was reasonable and based on an appraisal agreed upon by both parties.
Claim Can Be Reopened, Church Argues
One Church notes BMIC sought to end the lawsuit at its earliest stages by seeking a judgment on the pleadings. By doing so, the Court must assume all allegations made by One Church are true, including that the additional damages were undiscoverable. Because the lawsuit ended in the trial court before discovery had taken place, BMIC is in no position to argue whether the additional damages were discoverable or not, One Church argues. Those facts should be developed in the trial court, which is what the Tenth District ruled when it sent the case back, the church asserts.
One Church rejects BMIC's claims that reopening the case would obliterate the use of the appraisal process as an ADR option. One Church asserts that BMIC's ridiculously low initial offer, which was increased by more than 100 times, forced the church to enter the appraisal process. Even though the church didn’t specifically use the word “mistake” in its lawsuit, its explanation of the dispute suggests that there was a mistake by both appraisers, as they only included in their report what was discoverable at the time, One Church maintains. The church stated that once it received the claim check from BMIC, it could then begin the repairs. However, it was only after the extensive removal of the roofing that the additional $206,663 in damages was discovered.
One Church argues those additional damages are related to the windstorm that led to the claim. The church asserts there is no language in the policy that prevents reopening the claim to pay for additional damages, especially since the amount they seek is within the policy limits.
One Church maintains that instead of dismissing the case on the pleadings, the trial court should have allowed for discovery and the presentation of evidence of the damages that the appraisers failed to include in their report.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting BMIC’s position was submitted jointly by the American Property and Casualty Insurance Association, the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and the Ohio Insurance Institute. The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys also filed an amicus brief supporting BMIC, as did Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing One Church: Stephen Lane, steve@stevelanelawoffice.com
Representing Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company: Richard Garner, rgarner@cruglaw.com
Did Solar Energy Project’s Application for Approval Meet Siting Board Requirements?
In re application of Oak Run Solar Project LLC, Case No. 2024-1477
Ohio Power Siting Board
ISSUE: Did the Ohio Power Siting Board violate its own regulations when it approved the application of the Oak Run Solar Project in Madison County?
BACKGROUND:
In September 2022, Oak Run Solar Project applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Ohio Power Siting Board to construct a large solar farm near the community of Plumwood in Madison County. The project will cover more than 4,000 acres and generate 800 megawatts of electricity. Additionally, the project will include a 300-megawatt battery energy storage system (BESS), as well as transmission lines, access roads, and other operational facilities.
The Oak Run facility, working with Ohio State University, will be the largest “agrivoltaics” project in the United States. Within eight years, the land will also be home to 1,000 sheep and row crops, enabling the property to be used simultaneously for farming and solar-powered electricity generation. The company has purchased 42 parcels of private land covering parts of Monroe, Somerford, and Deercreek townships. The trustees of the three townships and the Madison County Board of Commissioners voted to oppose the project.
Oak Run entered into a stipulated agreement with the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy, the Ohio Environmental Council, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 683, and neighboring landowner Jon Boeckl. After conducting a hearing, the siting board issued a 131-page opinion in March 2024, approving the project with 46 conditions that must be met for Oak Run to operate.
The county commissioners and the township trustees appealed the board’s approval to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which must hear this type of appeal.
Siting Board Ignores Rules To Permit Solar Facility, Opponents Argue
State lawmakers have given the siting board significant discretion to craft rules for regulating new utility providers, the opponents note. But the board must follow the rules it adopted, and in this case, the board allowed Oak Run to loosely comply, they argue. The local governments opposing the plan maintain that Oak Run submitted an inadequate application, which left many project details to be determined at a later date. The board approved the application with 46 conditions, which require Oak Run to fully implement commitments as the project is being constructed and when it becomes operational. The local governments claim that because the board reviewed Oak Run’s incomplete application, they were at a disadvantage because they couldn’t fully assess Oak Run’s proposal. The board violated the rules by allowing Oak Run to proceed through the siting process with an incomplete application, and the Supreme Court should remand the case to the board, the local governments argue.
The local governments name four main issues in their appeal. They maintain Oak Run failed to adequately address the visual impacts of the project on the nearby area, failed to assess the potential harm to wildlife, didn’t articulate how it would prevent soil erosion into critical waterways, and didn’t address the risk of fires and toxic gases from the battery energy storage systems.
The opponents note the project includes two BESS, each occupying up to 11 acres. Each BESS holds 328 battery containers and 92 transformers. They are about 30 feet long and 8 feet high. The local governments point to the risk of lithium batteries catching fire and releasing toxic fumes. The townships are concerned about the potential of fires from the project site and their ability to extinguish them. Oak Run has confirmed that there is no effective way to extinguish a fire in the battery storage units, and they must burn themselves out. The fire department’s only option is to prevent the fires from spreading to other areas, and Oak Run hasn’t provided an emergency response plan or ensured there is available water and equipment to deal with a BESS fire, the local governments assert.
Project Approval Appropriate, Board Maintains
The siting board notes the facility will add low-cost electricity to the state’s needed energy supply for decades and will have a positive impact on the area’s economic development. The board estimates Oak Run will generate $8.2 million annually in additional tax revenue, and the innovative agrivoltaics program addresses the need for large-scale utility projects that don’t result in a significant loss of farmland.
The board notes the approval process is fluid and stresses that Oak Run cannot operate unless it meets all the conditions in the agreement reached with the board and the parties who negotiated the final approved plan. The board rejects all of the local governments’ contentions that the board sidestepped its rules to approve the project, noting that all the issues raised by the local governments have been or will be addressed.
The board notes that Oak Run will work with the adjacent residents on visual screening. Because of the flat topography and the vegetation and structures that will be placed on the grounds, the facility will be indistinguishable from the surrounding landscape from a distance of more than a mile, the board asserts. The board also found that Oak Run provided the required study on wildlife, as required by the rules, and that the local governments misstated the requirements for pre-construction approval of soil erosion and its impact on water. The board notes that Oak Run is required and plans to seek Ohio EPA permits for any impacts the construction of the facility may have on waterways. The board argues it will ensure Oak Run complies with regulations regarding water imposed by federal, state, or local agencies that enforce water standards.
Regarding the BESS, the board notes that local governments conceded during the approval process that public exposure to lithium is unlikely if the facilities are well-maintained, and Oak Run committed to incorporating several fire protection measures. Conditions imposed by the board require the facility to provide local emergency responders with training and proper firefighting equipment to respond to an emergency at a BESS. The board also notes Oak Run is required to collaborate with local authorities to ensure sufficient water resources for firefighting needs.
Facility Met All Requirements, Owners Assert
The Court permitted Oak Run to intervene in the case and argue on its own behalf. Oak Run notes that within eight years, approximately 70% of the farmable project area, or around 4,000 acres, will be dedicated to crops and livestock, and its facilities will be consistent with its agricultural surroundings.
Oak Run supports the siting board’s approval of the certification with conditions and notes it will have an architect, licensed by the Ohio Landscape Architect Board, work with each neighboring landowner to address the visual impact of the facility. It notes there are no structures within 250 feet of a facility boundary line and that only seven residences are within 350 feet of the project. Another 22 residences are located between 500 and 1,500 feet from any project equipment, and the landscape is situated in a way that will make the project relatively indistinguishable from the surrounding area.
Oak Run notes that the two BESS facilities are located and designed to prevent a fire at one BESS from spreading to the other, and that the BESS poses nearly no danger to the area. Each BESS is situated in the center of the project area and is approximately one mile away from the nearest neighbor. The BESS represents the minimal adverse environmental impact on the area, which is the standard the board uses to determine whether to approve new technology, the owners argue. Oak Run points to the conditions in the certificate that require several steps to ensure the BESS poses a minimal risk to the surrounding area.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Oak Run Solar Project was submitted by John Boeckl, a neighboring resident who is not participating in the project. The Ohio Chamber of Commerce and the Ohio Business Roundtable jointly submitted an amicus brief supporting Oak Run, as did the Ohio Environmental Council.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Madison County Board of Commissioners et al.: Jack Van Kley, jvankley@vanklay.law
Representing the Ohio Power Siting Board from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Ambrosia Wilson, ambrosia.wilson@ohioago.gov
Representing Oak Run Solar Project LLC: Christine Pirik, cpirik@dickinsonwright.com
Can Prosecutor Appeal Judge’s Decision To Overturn Jury’s Guilty Verdict?
State of Ohio v. Diamond King, Case No. 2024-1608
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Can a prosecutor appeal a trial court’s judgment of acquittal that overturns a jury’s verdict finding a defendant guilty of a crime?
BACKGROUND:
In October 2023, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Diamond King on counts of strangulation, domestic violence, and endangering children. The charges were based on a confrontation King had with her 15-year-old daughter regarding the girl’s cleaning of her room.
During King’s trial, her daughter testified that her mother began strangling her and then ordered her to grab the cord from a broken vacuum cleaner. The girl indicated she knew her mother wanted the cord to whip her. She fled the house and asked someone in the neighborhood to call 911. She was taken to a hospital where a physician observed bruising on the neck and old bruises and scars on her arms and legs.
During the trial, King’s attorney cited Rule 29 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows a criminal defendant to ask a judge to acquit the defendant of charges. The attorney requested King be acquitted of the charges against her. The trial judge denied the request. After King’s attorney presented her defense, the trial court indicated it would again consider King’s Rule 29 request for acquittal, but would defer until the jury considered the case.
The jury found King not guilty of strangulation and domestic violence. Of the four counts of endangering children, the jury found King not guilty of two and guilty of two. After the jury announced its verdict, the trial judge asked King’s attorney if the jurors should be polled to verify their decision, and the attorney requested that the polling be conducted. The jury affirmed its verdict.
The trial court reconvened the next day. The judge acknowledged the jury had found King guilty of two counts, then ruled that under Rule 29(B), the court was acquitting King of the two guilty charges and ruling that King was not guilty of any of the charges.
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Citing the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 1987 State v. Yates decision, the appeals court ruled that the prosecutor couldn’t appeal the trial judge’s decision to acquit King, and the appeals court dismissed the case.
The prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Law Allows Appeal, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor’s office argues that Yates was wrongly decided and should be overturned. The ruling determined that a judge’s decision in a criminal case is a “final verdict.” The prosecutor argues the jury’s decision is the “final verdict” and the judge’s decision is a “final judgment” in a case. R.C. 2945.67(A), a law enacted in 1978, states that a prosecutor can ask a court’s permission to appeal “any other decision” in a criminal case, “except the final verdict.”
The prosecutor outlines the history of criminal law in the United States and explains that the judicial system has always recognized that a jury’s declaration of not guilty cannot be challenged. However, for centuries, courts have permitted challenges to trial procedural rulings, such as motion to suppress the evidence or dismissals of portions of an indictment, the prosecutor notes. The office points to several dictionaries that define “verdict” as the ruling of a jury. The prosecutor maintains a “final verdict” is issued when the jury deliberates, reaches a decision, announces the decision in open court, and if requested to be polled, the jurors confirm their decision.
The verdict reflects the jury’s decision on the facts and determines whether a defendant is guilty or innocent, the prosecutor maintains. The final verdict is the jury’s ultimate conclusion of its work, the office notes. Following a guilty verdict, a judge issues a sentence. This is the court’s “final order,” the prosecutor maintains. And in cases like King’s, the judge’s final order conflicts with the jury’s final verdict. The criminal rules allow for a judge to modify a jury’s verdict, the prosecutor notes. Under Yates, a judge’s modification has been determined to be a “final verdict,” the prosecutor explains. This is wrong, the office argues, and the order isn’t a verdict. Because the order isn’t a “final verdict,” it should be appealable, the prosecutor argues. The prosecutor maintains that the General Assembly, when enacting R.C. 2945.67(A), didn’t envision that a trial judge’s overturning of a guilty verdict and setting a defendant free couldn’t be challenged.
The office notes the justification for courts to believe the judge’s action to acquit a defendant can’t be appealed is because it would violate the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. and Ohio constitutions. Double jeopardy prevents the prosecution of a defendant after a jury’s acquittal, the prosecutor explains, and that is because the jury considered the guilt or innocence of the defendant. But a judge’s acquittal, based on the court’s view that the prosecution failed to prove its case, isn’t the same as a jury’s acquittal, the office asserts. There is no double jeopardy violation for seeking to uphold the jury’s guilty verdict because the prosecution isn’t attempting to try the defendant again, the prosecutor explains. King doesn’t face double jeopardy because the prosecutor doesn’t want to try her again; the office is only asking for an appeals court to uphold the jury’s two guilty verdicts, the prosecutor concludes.
Judge’s Ruling Can’t Be Appealed, Mother Argues
The Yates decision is a constitutionally sound ruling that has stood for nearly 40 years, King notes, and the prosecutor’s parsing of words doesn’t reflect what the General Assembly enacted in R.C. 2945.67(A). The law doesn’t distinguish a judge’s final verdict from a jury’s final verdict, King explains. For instance, in a bench trial, when there is no jury, a judge’s ruling of guilt or innocence would be a final verdict, she argues. The prosecutor’s office supports its argument using cases involving a jury, but that doesn’t mean the courts have concluded that only jury verdicts are final verdicts. King asserts.
King notes that seven years before R.C. 2945.67(A) was adopted, a federal law was enacted that allowed prosecutors to appeal a directed verdict of acquittal, which is the same issue in this case. In Yates, the Court explained that Ohio lawmakers didn’t follow the same path as Congress and distinctly stated that a “final verdict” couldn’t be appealed. King also notes that in 2012, a bill was introduced in the General Assembly to overrule Yates and permit a prosecutor to appeal a judge’s order of an acquittal. Lawmakers didn’t pass the bill, nor have they attempted to overturn Yates since.
King argues there is no need to overturn Yates, and the use of Rule 29(B) to overturn a jury’s verdict is rare and only arises in unusual circumstances. The fact that a prosecutor disagrees or is dissatisfied with a trial court’s decision to use its discretion to acquit isn’t the basis for overturning the precedent set by Yates and the many cases that have followed the ruling, King concludes.
Attorney General’s Office To Participate in Oral Argument
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor’s position. The attorney general was permitted to join the case and will share oral argument time with the prosecutor’s office.
Other Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
Another amicus brief supporting the prosecutor was submitted by the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office and the Logan County Prosecutor’s Office each submitted briefs supporting the Cuyahoga County prosecutor.
The Office of the Ohio Public Defender submitted a brief supporting King.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Daniel Van, dvan@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing Diamond King from the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office: Francis Cavallo, fcavallo@cuyahogacounty.us
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.