Wednesday, October 29, 2025
State of Ohio v. Danny Lee Hill, Case No. 2024-0352
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Trumbull County)
State of Ohio v. Albert Fontanez, Case No. 2024-1464
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
In the matter of the application of Columbia Gas of Ohio Inc., Case No. 2024-1548
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
State of Ohio v. Michael Jones, Case No. 2024-1768
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Could Appeals Court Direct Trial Court To Reopen Death Penalty Case?
State of Ohio v. Danny Lee Hill, Case No. 2024-0352
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Trumbull County)
ISSUE: May a court of appeals grant a motion to reopen a postconviction relief proceeding based on the merits of the trial court’s ruling?
BACKGROUND:
In 1985, Danny Lee Hill and an accomplice abducted 12-year-old Raymond Fife. They sexually assaulted, strangled, and burned the child. He died two days after the attack. Hill was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1986. Hill was 18 years old at the time of the murder, and during trial proceedings, he was described as intellectually disabled.
At the time of his conviction, states weren’t barred from executing persons with intellectual disabilities. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids the execution of the intellectually disabled. The high court directed states to develop their own standards for determining if an individual was intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Ohio developed a three-part test in a 2002 court decision. In 2003, Hill challenged his death sentence. He filed for postconviction relief in Trumbull County Common Pleas Court. The trial court received three separate evaluations of Hill. All three experts agreed that Hill has subaverage intellectual functioning. An assessment by an expert for the state found that Hill didn’t meet the standard that would make him ineligible for a death sentence. An expert hired by the court agreed. An expert hired by Hill found his level of disability forbid the state from executing him.
After an 11-day hearing, the trial court denied Hill’s petition. He appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Standard for Death Sentences Changes
In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court determined new standards were needed to consider whether someone is ineligible for the death penalty. In 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio developed a revised standard that complied with the high court’s decision.
Following the rulings, Hill was again evaluated by the state’s expert. Under the new standards, the clinician ruled that Hill is intellectually disabled. Hill then used Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure to request “relief from judgment ” and asked the trial court to reopen his postconviction relief petition and grant him a hearing. He asked the court to evaluate his eligibility for the death sentence under the new standards.
The trial court ruled that the state has a particular process that must be followed under R.C. 2953.23 concerning postconviction relief. The court stated that a Rule 60(B) motion couldn’t be used to reopen his case. The trial court ruled that his request could be recast as a second postconviction petition. The court noted state law has specific requirements to allow for a second and successive postconviction relief requests. The trial court held that Hill didn’t meet the requirement, and the trial court didn’t evaluate the evidence regarding Hill’s intellectual disability. The court dismissed the case.
Hill appealed to the Eleventh District, which found Hill could use the Rule 60(B) motion to reopen the postconviction appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office appealed the Eleventh District’s ruling to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Appeals Court Wrongly Reopened Case, Attorney General Asserts
The attorney general’s office notes that Hill has made several unsuccessful efforts in both state and federal courts to overturn his death sentence. The office notes that the General Assembly has established the process for challenging a criminal conviction through a civil proceeding. R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 outline the procedures for postconviction relief requests. The attorney general notes the laws state those are the exclusive remedies for challenging a criminal conviction or sentence.
The state argues Hill is attempting to circumvent the rules outlined in state law to seek postconviction relief for a second time, having previously failed to secure it through his 2003 petition. The attorney general explains that by labeling his motion as a request to overturn the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case, Hill is disguising the fact that he wants to reopen the case to challenge the trial court’s decision not to consider the merits of his argument that he can’t be executed. The state asserts Hill can’t do that. Hill can only use the procedures outlined in the law, and when he attempted to do so, the trial court rejected it, the attorney general notes.
The attorney general argues that, according to precedent and the Ohio Constitution, Hill can’t invoke the civil rules to circumvent the requirements of state law. The office maintains the Eleventh District’s decision allows the civil rules to expand the rights of a defendant by more than the law allows. A rule can’t be broader than a statute governing a court proceeding, the attorney general asserts, and the trial court shouldn’t be required to reopen Hill’s case.
The state notes that in some instances, a Rule 60(B) motion can be used to reopen a postconviction relief proceeding. However, this is only allowed when errors appear to have been made during the proceedings. Hill isn’t claiming a procedural error occurred, but rather wants to reargue the merits of the case and whether the court should have granted his petition, which is not permissible, the attorney general argues.
Appeals Court Authorized To Reopen Case, Defendant Maintains
Hill initially argues that the Supreme Court should dismiss the case as improvidently accepted and find the Court shouldn’t consider the case until the trial court conducts further proceedings. He maintains that the Eleventh District’s decision isn’t a final order and that the Court shouldn’t act until the trial court rules on the Rule 60(B) motion.
If the Court does consider the merits of the case, Hill argues the appeals court was within its rights to have the trial court reconsider his motion to reopen the case. Hill claims the trial court wrongly transformed his motion to reopen into a second postconviction petition. Instead, the motion is narrow and only requires the trial court to reconsider its ruling to dismiss the case, he explains. If the trial court grants the motion, Hill, following the process outlined in state law, can then argue he has met the requirements for postconviction relief.
Hill argues the attorney general reads state law to entirely remove the right of death penalty defendants to file a second postconviction relief petition while allowing non-death penalty defendants to do so. He also argues the cases cited by the state to reject reopening cases involved defendants who were directly trying to overturn their criminal convictions. Hill maintains he isn’t asking for that, but rather only for the court to reopen his appeal so he can argue that under the newer legal standards, he can’t be sentenced to death.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the attorney general’s position was submitted by the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Representing Danny Lee Hill: Calland Ferraro, Calland_Ferraro@fd.org
Did Trial Court Comply With Rules When Accepting Guilty Plea?
State of Ohio v. Albert Fontanez, Case No. 2024-1464
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Is a guilty plea invalid if the trial court fails to tell a defendant that the plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt?
BACKGROUND:
Albert Fontanez was indicted in Cuyahoga County on 18 charges across five cases. The alleged offenses took place between July 2021 and July 2022, and the charges included felonious assault, robbery, and theft.
The Cuyahoga County prosecutor and Fontanez discussed a possible plea. At a pretrial hearing in June 2023, Fontanez initially rejected the prosecutor’s proposed plea. After talking with his attorney during a recess, though, Fontanez decided to plead guilty to nine counts.
Before accepting the plea, the judge formally asked Fontanez several questions. The questions included whether Fontanez understood that he had a right to trial by jury and the burden of proof was on the state to prove he committed the crimes. Fontanez said he understood, and the court accepted his guilty plea and scheduled sentencing for a few weeks later.
At the sentencing hearing, Fontanez was given the chance to speak. He apologized for his actions and asked for forgiveness. The judge asked if he had anything to say about the offenses. Fontanez responded, “I don’t agree to all the circumstances and how they happened exactly how the victims say they happened, but I’m willing to take fault for my part in it 100 percent.” He also said “that’s not my character. That’s not how it happened.” The court explained that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt.
Trial Court Declines Defendant’s Request To Withdraw Plea
Fontanez responded by asking to withdraw his plea. The court held a hearing on the request and denied it. The court sentenced Fontanez to 10 years in prison.
Fontanez appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. He argued he didn’t understand the effect of his guilty plea and the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw it. The three-judge panel of the Eighth District reviewed the discussion, known as a colloquy, between the judge and Fontanez before the trial court accepted his plea. The panel stated that only a “complete failure” by the trial judge to comply with Rule 11(C) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure would justify vacating the plea.
The Eighth District panel determined that although the trial court didn’t expressly tell Fontanez when he said he was pleading guilty that the plea constituted a complete admission of guilt, the omission was a minor failure, and not one involving a constitutional right. The panel concluded that his plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
The panel also found that the decision conflicted with other Eighth District decisions. As a result, en banc review was granted, in which all Eighth District judges considered the Fontanez case. Seven of 11 judges ruled that “where a trial court does not explicitly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt during a Rule 11 colloquy but the court otherwise complies with the rule and the defendant does not assert actual innocence, we may presume that the defendant understood that his guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt.”
The Eighth District determined that its decision, however, conflicts with rulings from the Fifth District Court of Appeals and the Second District Court of Appeals. The issue was certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to review the conflict across appellate courts.
Offender Argues Trial Court Didn’t Follow Rule for Accepting Pleas
Rule 11(C) prohibits a trial court from accepting a guilty plea unless it first takes certain steps. Among them, the trial court must inform the defendant of the effect of a guilty plea and ensure that the defendant understands the significance.
Fontanez contends that the trial court failed to inform him of the effect of his guilty plea as required by the rule. He believes the Eighth District should have applied the Supreme Court of Ohio decision in State v. Dangler (2020), in which the Court noted its struggle with how best to review colloquies to ensure that pleas are knowing and voluntary. Fontanez argues Dangler requires his plea to be vacated because he wasn’t fully informed of the effect of his admissions of guilt. “It’s a right that goes to the heart of fundamental fairness and is critical to the entire framework of guilty-plea proceedings,” his brief states. Dangler also explains that he doesn’t need to show he was prejudiced when a trial court completely fails to comply with a portion of the colloquy requirements in the criminal rule, he maintains.
His brief asserts that no one can know the precise impact the trial court’s omission had on Fontanez’ decision to plead guilty. The trial court must conduct a complete colloquy, as required by the criminal rule, and a plea must be vacated when there is a complete failure to meet those requirements, the brief concludes.
State Counters That Offender Understood He Was Admitting Guilt
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office explains that after Dangler, a defendant still must show prejudice unless 1) the trial court failed to explain the constitutional rights a defendant waives by pleading guilty or 2) the trial court completely failed to comply with a portion of Rule 11(C).
The prosecutor maintains that the alleged problem with the colloquy didn’t involve a constitutional right. In addition, the prosecutor notes, the trial court asked Fontanez if he committed the acts described in each count he pled guilty to. He responded that he was guilty of the offenses. The trial court didn’t completely fail to advise Fontanez that his guilty plea was an admission of guilt or fail to ensure that he understood the effect of his plea, the prosecutor maintains. Also, when a defendant enters a guilty plea and doesn’t claim actual innocence, the defendant is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted guilt, the prosecutor argues.
In the circumstances in this case, Fontanez must show he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to comply with the rule, the prosecutor asserts. Nothing in the record indicates that he wouldn’t have pled guilty if he had been told the plea constituted complete admissions of guilt, the prosecutor concludes.
Attorney General Submits Brief, Will Join Oral Argument
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The office notes that Dangler changed the way courts must approach Rule 11 claims, but it didn’t undermine the “foundational premise” of the Supreme Court decision in State v. Griggs (2004). In that case, the Court ruled “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt.”
The Court will allow the attorney general’s office to participate in oral argument, sharing time with the prosecutor.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Albert Fontanez: Andrew Pollis, andrew.pollis@case.edu
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Gregory Ochocki, gochocki@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Jaya Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Is Natural Gas Rate Increase in Public Interest and Supported by Evidence?
In the matter of the application of Columbia Gas of Ohio Inc., Case No. 2024-1548
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
ISSUES:
- Did the evidence support a Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) decision that a stipulation among parties regarding a Columbia Gas rate increase was in the public interest?
- Did the evidence in the rate case also support the PUCO decision that the stipulation didn’t violate any important regulatory principles?
BACKGROUND:
In June 2021, Columbia Gas of Ohio applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) to increase its rates for natural gas service, proposing a total rate increase of $221.4 million.
Customers are billed for the cost of the pipes for and the delivery of natural gas through two charges – fixed charges, which remain constant regardless of gas usage, and volumetric charges, which are based on actual usage. As part of the rate increase, Columbia Gas requested raising the fixed charge for residential customers from $36.15 per month in 2022 to $80 each month by 2027. The company also proposed increasing its spending on energy efficiency programs for customers who are low income as well as for those who don’t qualify as low income.
The PUCO staff analyzed the application. In their April 2022 report to the commission, the staff recommended that the PUCO reduce the total $221 million rate increase to a range between $35 million and $57 million. The staff also recommended denying an increase in spending on energy efficiency programs but allowing Columbia Gas to continue its current level of spending.
PUCO Staff, Company, and Several Other Organizations Reach Settlement
Several groups filed objection to the staff report. After negotiations, however, many of the parties agreed to a settlement, referred to in the case as the stipulation. Signing on to the stipulation were Columbia Gas, the PUCO staff, Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council, Industrial Energy Users-Ohio, Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy Group, Kroger Company, Ohio Schools Council, Interstate Gas Supply, Retail Energy Supply Association, and Ohio Energy Group.
Before the rate case, the fixed Columbia Gas charge for customers was $36.15 each month. The stipulation rejected the company’s proposed fixed charge of $80 per month by 2027. Instead, the parties agreed to per-year increases reaching $58.01 for the 2027 fixed charge.
The parties additionally agreed to eliminate the energy efficiency programs (also called demand-side management programs, or DSM) for households that aren’t low income.
Three Groups Register Opposition to Agreement
Three organizations filed testimony in November 2022 opposing the stipulation – the Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC), the Citizens’ Utility Board of Ohio (CUB), and Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy.
In January 2023, the PUCO issued its opinion and order approving the stipulation. When reviewing stipulations, the commission applies a three-part test:
(1) Is the settlement a product of serious bargaining among capable, knowledgeable parties?
(2) Does the settlement, as a package, benefit ratepayers and the public interest?
(3) Does the settlement package violate any important regulatory principle or practice?
The PUCO determined that the agreement appeared to be the product of serious bargaining among capable, knowledgeable parties and it benefits ratepayers and the public interest. As evidence of the benefit to the public, the opinion pointed to the lesser rate increase compared to the initial Columbia Gas application and to lower caps placed on riders than those proposed by the company. The opinion also stated the stipulation doesn’t violate any important regulatory principle or practice.
ELPC and CUB appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which must hear appeals of PUCO decisions.
Stipulation Not in Public Interest, Violates Regulatory Principles, Groups Maintain
ELPC and CUB note that the Supreme Court has explained it will overturn a PUCO decision that lacks evidence to support it. They maintain that the second and third prongs of the three-part test aren’t supported by the evidence in the record in this case.
The environmental and citizen groups argue the PUCO decision is unlawful because the stipulation isn’t in the public interest. The record instead shows that customers will have to pay higher fixed rates, while many will also lose the energy efficiency programs that help to conserve energy and lower their bills. ELPC and CUB contend in their brief that the higher fixed charge “unjustly requires low-use customers to pay for more than their fair share of Columbia’s costs.”
To support the claim that the stipulation doesn’t violate any important regulatory principles or practices, the PUCO relied on testimony, the ELPC and CUB note. However, they contend, the statements were from witnesses who provided no meaningful evidence to support the conclusions. The groups explain, for example, that there is a fundamental regulatory principle to encourage energy efficiency. But high fixed charges significantly reduce incentives for customers to reduce their consumption of natural gas by sending a price signal that usage doesn’t matter, the groups argue.
“The Stipulation allows Columbia to recover $58 per month through that fixed monthly charge regardless of how much or little gas they use — an exorbitant fixed charge that harms customers,” the ELPC and CUB brief concludes.
Stipulation Balances Customer and Company Interests, PUCO Argues
When evaluating the public interest prong of the test, the PUCO notes that it analyzes the stipulation in full, as a package, because it must balance the interest of customers in paying reasonable rates with a company’s interest in earning a reasonable return. The PUCO maintains that the ELPC and CUB focus on just two parts of the stipulation to argue it doesn’t benefit customers and the public.
However, PUCO staff testified that the reduction of the company’s proposed rate increase and the lower caps on riders benefit the public significantly, by saving them money. In addition, a Columbia Gas witness testified that the stipulation will provide funding to the company to promote the reliability and safety of natural gas service, the PUCO notes. It argues the stipulation is in the public interest and supported by the record and that the conclusion was reasonable based on the evidence.
The PUCO also contends that eliminating energy efficiency programs for non-low-income customers will save the company money, lowering rates and benefiting customers. In addition, the stipulation keeps the low-income energy efficiency program, striking the appropriate balance between protecting low-income customers and promoting market competition, the commission argues.
Its brief identifies several regulatory principles, including simplicity, public acceptance, fairness, economic efficiency, efficient use of energy, fairness in apportioning costs, and support for market competition. Witness testimony and PUCO precedent establish that the stipulation was consistent with these principles, the brief maintains.
Evidence Supported Rate Increase, Company Contends
Columbia Gas was permitted to intervene in the case. The company argues that much evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the stipulation on the whole benefits both customers and the public interest. Among the evidence, the company points to the reduction from the rate, revenue, and equity increases that were requested in its application; the retention of the low-income program; and the continuation of its infrastructure replacement program.
The company notes that the PUCO didn’t violate any regulatory principles. Instead, the commission relied on other evidence that supported the fairness and advantages of fixed rates and the inherent problems with rates structured on natural gas usage, the company contends.
Environmental Organization Submits Friend-of-the-Court Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting the positions of ELPC and CUB was submitted by the Ohio Environmental Council.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Environmental Law and Policy Center and the Citizens’ Utility Board of Ohio: Erica McConnell, emcconnell@elpc.org
Representing the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Julian Johnson, julian.johnson@ohioago.gov
Were Protective Sweep and Later Search of Alleged Drug House Constitutional?
State of Ohio v. Michael Jones, Case No. 2024-1768
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUES:
- Is an appeals court limited to reviewing only the evidence the trial court admitted into the record?
- Must law enforcement officers take steps to obtain a search warrant when they have a good faith belief that a valid exception to the warrant requirement authorized a search?
- Did the appellate court replace the standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with a lower standard?
BACKGROUND:
The Cincinnati Police Department received anonymous complaints from a community about drug activity at a Cincinnati residence. For a few weeks in spring 2020, officers from the police gang unit surveilled the house. They saw Michael Jones come and go from the house about 10 times. One day in May 2020, they observed Jones leaving the house and getting into the passenger side of a black van.
The officers followed the van and reported that it pulled up alongside a parked car, and something was exchanged between the vehicles. Jones had an open warrant for a felony, so officers contacted a uniformed officer in a cruiser to pull over the van. When the van stopped in a gas station parking lot, Jones got out and headed toward the gas station store. Police stopped and searched Jones, finding a digital scale, $1,000 in cash, a container or vial holding what police thought was drugs, three cellphones, and keys. The keys were checked later, and one worked on the front door of the house under surveillance. Jones was arrested. The substance was tested later and found not to be drugs. He denied any association with the house that police had been surveilling.
Police Visit House and Conduct Sweep
Several officers went to the house. They opened the door and announced their presence. WilliamGaston came to the door, and they talked on the front porch. He said he lived there, and that Jones occasionally stayed at the house on the third floor. Gaston said no one was home at that time. The police handcuffed him and conducted a protective sweep of the house to ensure their safety. They discovered a man on the second floor and saw a small safe in a third-floor room.
Police later secured a signed form from Gaston consenting to a search of the house. Police asked if he owned the house, and Gaston said he didn’t. Officers took the safe and obtained a search warrant to open it. They found about $6,000 in cash; four digital scales, one with drug residue; and several drugs, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and a heroin-fentanyl mixture. Also in the safe were copies of documents with Jones’ name, including copies of his Social Security card and birth certificate.
Jones was indicted on charges of drug possession, aggravated drug possession, drug trafficking, and aggravated drug trafficking. Jones challenged the search of the house, based on the consent of non-owner Gaston, and the search of the safe. Jones asked the court to suppress the evidence found. The hearing on the motion included evidence from police body cameras and testimony from Jones, Gaston, the homeowner, and two officers. The trial court denied the request to suppress the evidence.
The case went to trial. Defense counsel asked to play more of the bodycam recordings than were shown at the earlier hearing, and the judge allowed it. The jury convicted Jones on all charges. He was sentenced in December 2021 to prison for 22 to 24.5 years.
Man Appeals, Arguing Attorney Was Ineffective
Jones appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. Among his arguments, he asserted he was denied the effective assistance of an attorney and the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence. The First District reviewed the bodycam footage. The appeals court reversed the trial court based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The First District ruled that Jones’ attorney should have challenged the protective sweep and Gaston’s coerced consent to search the home. Those events led police to find and take the safe.
The First District returned the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing Jones’ new attorney to raise the constitutional issues at a new suppression hearing and to give the prosecutor a chance to respond. The First District stayed consideration of Jones’ other legal claims until the trial court ruled on the suppression issue.
The Hamilton County prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which ruled in July 2024 that the First District’s limited remand to the trial court failed to comply with the rules for deciding appeals. The Supreme Court returned the case to the First District for a judgment in accordance with the appellate rules.
Back at the First District, the court reversed Jones’ convictions based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and analyzed his other legal arguments. The appeals court ordered the case back to the trial court for a new hearing on the suppression of the evidence.
The prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
State Contests Review of Bodycam Videos and Other Parts of First District Decision
The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office asserts that the First District’s latest decision continues to rely on bodycam footage that wasn’t in the case record. According to the prosecutor, only two of 13 bodycam videos can be considered in the appeal because they were the only ones played at the hearing on the suppression motion. The First District had noted in its ruling that the other bodycam videos showed the officers approaching the house, opening the door, announcing their presence, entering the house, saying they had a search warrant, and sweeping the house. The prosecutor contends that the First District decision could not rely on evidence outside of the record.
In addition, the prosecutor believes an exception that allows illegally obtained evidence to be considered at trial is relevant in this case. The exception, called the inevitable discovery doctrine, applies if it is shown that the evidence inevitably would’ve been found during an investigation. The prosecutor maintains that discovering and seizing the safe was inevitable because of facts already known to police before they entered the house for the sweep and the subsequent search. Those facts include the anonymous community complaints about drug dealing at the house; Jones’ lies about his connection to the house; his possession of money, a scale, and cellphones when stopped in the van by police; and his prior drug and weapons convictions, the prosecutor notes. The officers had a good faith belief that they could search the house without a warrant, the prosecutor asserts.
The prosecutor also maintains that the First District departed from the correct standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In the prosecutor’s view, the court failed to assess whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different if the motion to suppress the evidence had been granted.
Man Argues Bodycam Footage Shown at Trial, Officer Search Not in Good Faith
Jones contends that the state’s claim that the bodycam footage was outside the record was first raised in its request for the First District to reconsider its initial decision. The court found the issue wasn’t properly before it, so the issue is forfeited in this appeal, Jones maintains.
He also notes that two videos were presented at the suppression hearing, and multiple other videos were shown at the trial. All of the videos are part of the case record and can be considered by a court deciding whether the trial attorney was ineffective, Jones argues. He asserts that the videos proved his attorney should have challenged the legitimacy of the protective sweep of the house, the voluntariness of Gaston’s later consent, and his authority to consent to the search of the third floor. Jones notes that under the law, Gaston couldn’t approve a search of a co-tenant’s private bedroom.
Jones rejects the state’s claim that the evidence in the safe would have been inevitably discovered. First, there was no probable cause for a warrant to search the house because police received only anonymous complaints about drug-dealing at the house and because officers saw one alleged drug transaction by Jones a mile from the house – an event that didn’t corroborate the anonymous complaints about the house, his brief argues. It maintains that officers conducted a sweep of the house without reason and falsely told Gaston that they were there on a search warrant, when they didn’t have one. Then, while Gaston was handcuffed, they asked for consent to search the house, noting to him that it would speed up the process if he consented, the brief states. These actions establish that the state didn’t act in good faith, the brief concludes.
Regarding the standard for reviewing the ineffective assistance claim, Jones maintains that the language of the First District decision makes it clear that the appeals court used the correct reasonable-probability standard.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: Philip Cummings, philip.cummings@hcpros.org
Representing Michael Jones from the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office: David Hoffmann, dhhoffmann@hamilitoncountypd.org
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