Tuesday, November 18, 2025
State of Ohio v. Quentin Fips, Case No. 2023-1001
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Carol A. Seymour, Case Nos. 2024-1658 and 2024-1732
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
In the Matter of the Application of Fountain Point Solar Energy LLC, Case No. 2025-0075
Ohio Power Siting Board
State of Ohio v. Daniel G. Thoen, Case No. 2025-0093
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Knox County)
Could Traffic Stop Continue if There Was Doubt About Whether Headlight Wasn’t Working?
State of Ohio v. Quentin Fips, Case No. 2023-1001
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: During a valid traffic stop where an officer learns of a possible unrelated crime, must the officer abandon an investigation of that possible crime if the person was stopped based on a reasonable mistake?
BACKGROUND:
At approximately midnight on a December 2018 evening, Linndale Police Officer Garron Rose stopped a vehicle driven by Quentin Fips because the officer thought the vehicle had a headlight that wasn’t working. Rose was wearing a body camera that recorded the encounter, and an officer in training was also there.
After stopping Fips, Rose approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and told Fips he was pulled over because one of his headlights was out. Fips seemed surprised and said, “My headlight [is] out?”
Rose asked Fips for his driver’s license. Fips responded that he didn’t have it on him, but said he had a license and insurance, and gave his name.
Fips then asked which headlight was out and pointed Rose to a dashboard display indicating that both headlights were working. Rose looked and responded, “Aah.” While Rose and Fips were talking, the trainee officer walked to the front of the vehicle and looked at the headlights. Rose asked for Fips’ Social Security number and full name. Fips provided the information, and Rose told him to “just hang tight for a minute.”
Seconds later, the trainee officer said, “The headlight[’s] on.” Rose responded, “It wasn’t on, right?” The trainee replied, “It was the fog light that was out.” A few seconds after that, the trainee added “or the fog light was on, the headlight was out.” Rose responded, “Oh.” He contacted police dispatch and gave them Fips’ information to check.
Check With Dispatch Reveals Warrant and That License Hadn’t Been Reinstated
Dispatch informed Rose that Fips had a warrant for a weapons offense and had failed to reinstate his driver’s license. Rose returned to the vehicle, asked Fips to exit, and did a pat-down search of him. Rose handcuffed Fips, who asked, “You said my front headlight was out?” Rose replied, “Yes. You know you got a warrant out of Parma, right?” Fips denied knowing about the warrant and asked more questions about it. Rose said he would get more information and placed Fips in the police cruiser.
In a second bodycam video, a third officer arrived on the scene. Rose is heard saying that the warrant, “supposedly for a weapons offense,” was being verified. The trainee officer remarked, “I don’t understand the headlight.” Rose replied, “Yeah, his headlight was out and then I pull him over and his headlight is on.”
The officers searched Fips’ vehicle, including the center console, glove box, and trunk. They found a digital scale, a gun box, and gun cleaning supplies. No weapons were found.
The briefs filed in the case state that the bodycam videos don’t show the police finding drugs. But other parts of the record in the case indicated that police saw a plastic bag sticking out from the center console. It contained a white powder, later confirmed to be 47 grams of cocaine.
After the search, the warrant for the weapons offense was confirmed by police dispatch.
In Trial Court, Driver Argues Evidence Should Be Excluded
In February 2019, Fips was indicted on one count of drug trafficking and one count of drug possession. He asked the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to suppress the evidence found after the traffic stop, arguing the stop was illegal because both headlights were working, and the evidence found was “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
The trial court rejected the request, finding that Rose had an “objective reasonable belief, even though mistaken, that a traffic violation had occurred.” Fips also failed to provide a valid driver’s license or identification, which permitted the officer to conduct a check of Fips’ record, the trial court determined.
Fips pled no contest to the charges. The trial court imposed a five-year prison sentence.
Fips appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which in July 2023 reversed the trial court on its refusal to exclude the evidence from the vehicle search. The lead opinion explained that the initial traffic stop was reasonable based on the belief that a headlight was out. However, once learning that his belief was likely mistaken, the officer’s continued detention of Fips violated his constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, the lead opinion determined.
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case and held it for decisions in the consolidated cases of State v. Dunlap and State v. Lewis, which were subsequently decided in 2024. The Supreme Court lifted the hold on this case, and it moved forward for briefing on the issue.
Officer Can Hold Driver To Investigate Suspicion of Another Crime, Prosecutor Argues
The prosecutor contends that when Fips couldn’t provide his driver’s license, the traffic stop evolved into a check on his license status in addition to the stop’s initial purpose. Rose discovered that the initial traffic stop may have been based on a reasonable mistake regarding the headlights only after he learned that Fips may have been driving without a license, the prosecutor maintains. “Police officers should not be expected to ignore evidence of criminal activity they discover during the lawful execution of their duties,” the prosecutor’s brief states.
The prosecutor asserts that the Court ruling in Dunlap applies to this case. The lead opinion in Dunlap stated that the mission of a lawfully initiated traffic stop includes asking the driver for a driver’s license and doing a warrant check. Whatever the timeline of events in this case, the prosecutor argues, the police officer’s check on Fips’ driver’s license didn’t violate his constitutional rights.
When an officer initiates a legal traffic stop, and new information is presented that leads to reasonable suspicion of another unrelated crime, the officer can investigate the new crime, the prosecutor contends. The prosecutor maintains that further investigation is permitted even if the initial reason for the traffic stop is later called into question.
Officer Couldn’t Continue Detention When Reason for Stop Was in Doubt, Driver Maintains
Fips notes that the prosecutor and attorney general, who filed an amicus curiae brief, argue Rose had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on Fips not producing a physical driver’s license during the stop. However, Fips contends, failing to produce a physical driver's license isn’t a reasonable suspicion for continuing to detain a driver. Fips notes that Ohio law allows drivers to provide either their license or satisfactory proof that they have a driver’s license. It must be determined whether providing his name and Social Security number and his willingness to do so constituted satisfactory proof that he was licensed, Fips maintains.
Fips also points to the Supreme Court of Ohio ruling in State v. Chatton (1984), which was cited by the Eighth District. In Chatton, the Court determined that when an officer’s reasonable suspicion for a traffic violation has been dispelled, the driver can no longer be detained to determine the validity of a driver’s license.
In his case, Fips states that Rose saw the dashboard headlight indicators and heard the trainee officer’s observations that the headlights were both working but, despite his possible mistake, Rose still extended the traffic stop by calling dispatch for the license and warrant check. Rose decided not to check on his reason for the traffic stop despite the doubts raised, Fips notes. The reason for the stop – a supposed non-working headlight – was over before Rose called dispatch, Fips contends, and the traffic stop shouldn’t have gone on any longer. Fips reasons that the officer’s choice not to check the headlights wasn’t reasonable and violated his constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
State Attorney General Submits Brief, Will Participate in Oral Argument
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus brief supporting the Cuyahoga County prosecutor. The attorney general will also participate in oral argument, sharing the prosecutor’s time.
The attorney general contends that when a police officer initiates a lawful traffic stop, the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment permits the officer to verify that the driver has a valid license and to check for outstanding warrants. These steps are allowed even if the initial basis for the traffic stop is mistaken, the attorney general argues.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Owen Knapp, info@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing Quentin Fips from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Timothy Hackett, timothy.hackett@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Jaya Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Can Substantial Factor Test Be Used To Prove Cause of Overdose Death?
State of Ohio v. Carol A. Seymour, Case Nos. 2024-1658 and 2024-1732
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUES:
- When a multiple-drug overdose leads to charges of involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs, may a court use a “substantial factor” test to determine if the defendant’s actions caused the death?
- In multiple-drug overdose cases, if a trial court applies a “but for” test to find that a defendant’s actions caused a death, is it required to find the defendant’s actions alone caused the death, or can it consider actions by others that contributed to the death?
BACKGROUND:
In 2019, Robby Alsey lived in the basement of his mother’s house. He had become addicted to heroin after he took painkillers for a hernia surgery more than 20 years earlier. Alsey attempted suboxone treatment to end the heroin addiction, but stopped. Alsey asked Carol Seymour to drive him to meet a drug dealer to get him suboxone. Alsey instead purchased a small amount of heroin for $15. Seymour considered herself a “go between” for drug users and dealers, and managed her own addiction by often taking a portion of the drugs sold for arranging a sale.
Because Alsey bought only a small amount of heroin, he refused to give any to Seymour. But Seymour accepted antifreeze for her vehicle as payment. She drove Alsey back to his home. About an hour later, Alsey’s mother discovered him lying on his bedroom floor. He did not have a pulse. First responders unsuccessfully attempted life-saving measures. They discovered heroin and drug paraphernalia near his body.
Seymour was indicted for involuntary manslaughter, corrupting another with drugs, and trafficking in heroin. She agreed to a bench trial.
Evidence of Cause of Death Debated
A forensic pathologist testified at Seymour’s trial and ruled that the cause of Alsey’s death was the ingestion of a combination of drugs. He found heroin, kratom, Ritalin, and Benadryl in Alsey’s system. The doctor testified that the heroin, kratom, and Benadryl acted similarly in suppressing Alsey’s respiratory and central nervous systems. The Ritalin, a stimulant, acted with the other drugs to make their suppressive effects stronger. The pathologist testified it wasn’t possible to single out which of the four drugs was more responsible than the others for causing Alsey’s death, nor was it possible to determine which of the four drugs was the primary cause of death. The pathologist noted it was rare for Ritalin or Benadryl at the level in Alsey’s body to cause overdoses, but he did have a level of kratom that was capable of causing an overdose. The doctor noted the heroin entered Alsey’s system within five hours of his death, and the amount of heroin in Alsey was typical of a heroin overdose death. But the doctor couldn’t say if heroin alone was the cause.
The trial judge found Seymour guilty on all three counts. The judge merged the sentences for involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs and sentenced her to four years in prison. The judge imposed a 10-month prison sentence for trafficking in heroin to run concurrently with the four-year sentence. Seymour appealed the involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs convictions, which the trial court stayed pending her appeal. She served her 10-month sentence for trafficking in drugs.
In a 2-1 decision, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed her convictions. The Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Tenth District also noted its ruling conflicted with a Third District Court of Appeals decision. The Supreme Court agreed to consider Seymour’s appeal and the certified conflict, and consolidated the cases.
Heroin Substantial Factor in Overdose Death, Prosecutor Argues
The Tenth District’s decision in this case conflicts with the Third District’s 2019 State v. Carpenter decision, the Franklin County prosecutor explains. The two state appeals court decisions split on whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 Burrage v. United States decision should determine how a trial court decides the “cause” of an overdose death when multiple drugs are found in the victim’s body.
The prosecutor explains that Ohio criminal law uses the same tests as civil law to determine whether someone is liable for the death of another. In determining causation, the traditional test for the actual cause of death is known as the “but for” test, where the prosecution must prove that the harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s actions. The prosecutor notes this doesn’t mean the state has to prove the defendant’s actions actually caused the death, but only that it wouldn’t have occurred without the defendant’s action.
In a case of a multiple drug overdose, it is difficult to determine exactly what caused the death or if just one of the drugs was the cause, the prosecutor notes. For these types of cases, courts have developed alternatives to the “but for” test, one known as the “substantial factor,” or “contributing factor,” test.
Courts have split in how they apply the substantial factor test, the prosecutor explains. In some, the courts use an “independently sufficient” cause standard, meaning there may be more than one factor that led to the death, but if one cause by itself could lead to the death, then it is sufficient to convict the defendant. The other test is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, even if the factor alone couldn’t be proven to cause the death.
The prosecutor notes that Seymour was convicted of involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A) and corrupting another with drugs under R.C. 2925.02(A)(3). Both laws required proof that the defendant’s actions “caused” death or injury to the victim. The prosecutor notes the Tenth District ruled that the wording of the law required the “but for” test to prove cause and that the prosecutor failed to prove that ingesting heroin was the cause of Alsey’s death. Because the evidence didn’t prove that heroin was the cause, the Tenth District ruled that Seymour couldn’t be convicted.
The prosecutor notes the law doesn’t state which causation test should be used. The office maintains that in some form, Ohio has used the substantial factor test to prove a person was responsible for death or injury of another. The office maintains that if the “but for” test was used in Seymour’s case, then the court had to find that not one of the four drugs caused Alsey to overdose. The prosecutor notes it would be absurd to find that he died from an overdose, but that no drug caused it.
Even if the pathologist couldn’t find that heroin alone caused Alsey’s death, the heroin was a substantial factor in how he died, or at least when he died, the prosecutor maintains. Involuntary manslaughter applies to both causing a death or hastening a death, the office explains. Seymour’s role in supplying Alsey with heroin, which combined with other drugs to kill him, was enough to prove that she is guilty of the crime, the prosecutor asserts.
The Carpenter case is similar to Seymour’s, and the Third District found the substantial factor test was applicable and could be used for an involuntary manslaughter conviction in a multiple-drug overdose case. The Third District rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Burrage, the prosecutor explains, noting the main criticism of the test was that “substantial” isn’t defined and is too problematic for a jury to determine what constitutes a substantial factor. The prosecutor notes “substantial” is used in several Ohio laws, and juries can determine what it means in the same way they are asked to determine what is “reasonable” or “foreseeable” when deciding cases. The evidence indicates heroin was a substantial factor in Alsey’s death, and the trial court rightly determined that it was enough to establish Seymour’s guilt, the prosecutor concludes.
No Proof Heroin Caused Death, Supplier Argues
Seymour notes the Tenth District agreed with the Burrage decision in finding that asking the jury to define what constitutes a “substantial factor” is too indefinite and can lead to widely disparate outcomes. The U.S. Supreme Court expressed concerns about using such standards for criminal cases, in which a person can be imprisoned, as opposed to civil lawsuits where the wrongdoer is most likely asked to pay financial compensation, Seymour explains.
The language of the statutes for involuntary manslaughter, R.C. 2903.04(A), and corrupting another with drugs, R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), call for the traditional “but for” standard and require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions caused death or injury, Seymour notes. In cases of multiple-drug overdoses, Ohio courts have mainly used the “independently sufficient” cause standard, as a substitute for the “but for” standard. The Tenth District noted that the pathologist testifying in Seymour’s case couldn’t say the heroin alone would have caused Alsey’s death. Seymour argues that means it would fail the independently sufficient test and she couldn’t be convicted of the crimes.
The Tenth District refused to follow the Third District’s Carpenter decision, noting few courts have agreed to allow the lower “substantial factor” test to be used in criminal cases, while it is often used in Ohio for civil cases. Seymour points to a number of cases and legal publications that have moved away from supporting the substantial factor test because the term is not sufficiently defined.
Seymour also disagrees with the prosecutor’s other argument that even if a court must use a “but for” test in a multiple-drug overdose, it doesn’t require the prosecution to prove that the drug alone caused the death. Seymour argues this is the standard under Ohio criminal law, and the prosecutor was unable to show that Seymour’s role in supplying Alsey with heroin caused his death.
Attorney General Supports Prosecutor
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus curiae supporting the prosecutor’s position. The Court will allow the office to participate in oral arguments, and it will share time allotted to the prosecutor.
Additional Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief also supporting the prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. The Office of the Ohio Public Defender filed an amicus brief supporting Seymour.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2024-1658 and 2024-1732).
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office: sgilbert@franklincountyohio.gov
Representing Carol A Seymour: George Schumann, gmschuma@franklincountyohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Did Siting Board Properly Evaluate Whether Solar Project Is in Public Interest?
In the Matter of the Application of Fountain Point Solar Energy LLC, Case No. 2025-0075
Ohio Power Siting Board
ISSUES:
- Did the Ohio Power Siting Board properly weigh the testimony of a Bokescreek Township trustee and a letter from a Logan County School District superintendent?
- Did the board properly consider public opposition to the project?
- Did the board fail to address public safety concerns resulting from a conflict of interest and an inability to enter a first responder agreement?
BACKGROUND:
Fountain Point Solar Energy applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board in April 2022 to build a solar-powered electric facility that would generate 280 megawatts of electricity. The initial project plan located the facility in three townships in Logan County. Fountain Point later removed two townships – Rushcreek and Perry – from the project, leaving Bokescreek Township.
The facility would occupy 2,141 acres within a 2,768-acre project area on private property secured by Fountain Point through agreements with property owners.
In September 2024, the siting board approved the Fountain Point application and agreed to issue a certificate for the project’s construction, operation, and maintenance, subject to 44 conditions.
A group called Citizens Against Fountain Point was a party in the proceedings. The group appealed the project’s approval to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which must hear the appeal of a siting board decision.
Citizens Group Argues Board Didn’t Properly Consider Opposition and Public Safety Issue
To approve a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need, the board must make several findings under state law. One of those criteria is that the project serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity. That factor is the basis of the challenge from the citizens group.
Larry Mouser, one of the three Bokescreek Township Trustees, testified in support of the project. The citizens group alleges that the board gave Mouser greater weight in its analysis of whether the project served the public interest because he was a public official. However, Mouser said he was only testifying as an individual, not in his official capacity, the citizens group states. The group also maintains that the board gave similar unwarranted weight to a letter from the Benjamin Logan Local School District Superintendent John Scheu.
The citizens group also asserts that no local government in or around the project area has taken an official action or passed a resolution in support of the Fountain Point project. The Bokescreek Township Trustees couldn’t form a quorum to consider the issue because two trustees have conflicts of interest based on their lease agreements with Fountain Point. The group adds that the Logan County Commissioners and 13 townships in Logan County submitted letters opposing the project. The citizens group maintains that the board claims that project opposition wasn’t unanimous only because certain Bokescreek Township trustees couldn’t vote given their conflicts of interest. However, the group contends, there was unanimous opposition to the project.
As one of the project conditions for public safety, Fountain Point must enter into an agreement with local first responders and submit an emergency response plan to handle any emergencies related to the facility. However, the citizens group argues, two Bokescreek Township trustees can’t take official actions related to the project, such as entering into local first responder agreements, because of their conflicts of interest.
Board Contends It Considered Opposition, Concluded Project Benefits Serve Public
The siting board maintains that it gave proper weight to Mouser’s testimony and Scheu’s letter. The board noted that Mouser wasn’t speaking on behalf of the board of trustees, but that his testimony could be given more weight because he spoke from both an individual’s and a trustee’s perspectives. The board argues that Scheu’s letter stated that it was submitted on behalf of the five school board members. Both the testimony and the letter were evidence demonstrating that local government opposition to the project was not overwhelming or unanimous, the board argues. The board adds that it has the authority to decide the weight to give witnesses in making its decisions.
Regarding the opposition to the project, the board explains that it gathered and summarized government opposition, public hearing testimony, and public comments. Mouser’s testimony conveyed support for the project based on revenue benefits for the school district, county, and township. The Benjamin Logan School District, the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, a state representative, and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce president also expressed support for the project. In its order, the board noted that most comments and testimony opposed the project. However, the board concluded that the evidence opposing the project was outweighed by testimony and public comments supporting the project, which included job creation and clean energy generation. The board found that the project serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
The board disagrees that it’s a conflict of interest for the Bokescreek Township Trustees to execute their public duties by entering into a first responder agreement with Fountain Point. The board notes that Fountain Point also doesn’t have to enter into the agreements with any specific township, and might look elsewhere. The board also refuses to speculate on the conflict-of-interest claim before any agreement is made and submitted.
Solar Project Provides Arguments
The Supreme Court permitted Fountain Point to intervene in the case, and it filed a brief. Fountain Point describes the lengthy process the board goes through when evaluating a proposed project. Fountain Point also notes that the process prevents small community factions who don’t want a project to proceed from blocking projects that benefit the local community and the state as a whole.
The citizens group improperly asks the Supreme Court to usurp the board’s role by reweighing evidence and second-guessing the board’s conclusions when all of the concerns have already been thoroughly analyzed by the experts, Fountain Point maintains.
Groups Submit Additional Briefs, Supporting Solar Project
Several organizations filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the Fountain Point project:
- MAREC Action and Utility Scale Solar Energy Coalition of Ohio. MAREC Action is a coalition of over 50 utility-scale solar, wind, and battery storage developers, wind turbine and solar panel manufacturers, and public interest organizations. Utility Scale Solar Energy Coalition of Ohio represents more than 30 large-scale solar developers, manufacturers, and industry leaders.
- Ohio Environmental Council, a statewide environmental and conservation organization.
- Ohio Chamber of Commerce, a business advocacy organization of more than 8,000 businesses.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Citizens Against Fountain Point LLC et al.: Kevin Dunn, kdd@planklaw.com
Representing the Ohio Power Siting Board from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Janet Gregory, janet.gregory@ohioago.gov
Representing Fountain Point Solar Energy LLC: Christine Pirik, cpirik@dickinson-wright.com
Does Double Jeopardy Apply Once Guilty Plea Is Accepted?
State of Ohio v. Daniel G. Thoen, Case No. 2025-0093
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Knox County)
ISSUES:
- If a trial court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea and the state seeks to dismiss the case before sentencing, does double jeopardy apply when the case is refiled?
- If a trial court erroneously accepts a guilty plea, is there a “manifest necessity” for the state to be able to dismiss and reindict the case?
BACKGROUND:
In March 2023, Daniel Thoen was charged in Mount Vernon Municipal Court with one count of rape of a child under the age of 13. The accusation involved Thoen’s 4-year-old granddaughter. The case for the felony offense was transferred to the Knox County Common Pleas Court.
After negotiations with the Knox County Prosecutor’s Office, Thoen agreed to plead guilty in April 2023 to a bill of information containing the rape charge. The trial court formally discussed with Thoen the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and explained the maximum penalty for the rape offense. Based on the written plea, the court stated that Thoen could face a minimum prison time of three to 11 years with a maximum that would be 50% more than the minimum imposed.
The court accepted Thoen’s plea and found him guilty of rape. Sentencing was scheduled for May 25, 2023.
State Seeks To Dismiss Case Because of Errors
On the day before the scheduled sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked to dismiss the bill of information based on errors and to file a new one. It was explained that under Ohio law, the penalty for the rape of a child under age 10 is a prison term of 15 years to life, and bills of information can only be used for criminal offenses not punishable by death or life in prison. The court found that the case had to be considered by the Knox County grand jury. The grand jury’s subsequent indictment alleged one count of rape of a person under 13 years old and also under 10 years old.
Thoen asked the trial court to dismiss the indictment, alleging that it violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. He contended that his original guilty plea barred a subsequent trial. The court disagreed. Thoen waived his right to a jury trial and opted for a bench trial in September 2023. The court found Thoen guilty as charged, sentenced him to 15 years to life, and classified him as a tier III sex offender.
He appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the conviction and sentence. The Fifth District determined that jeopardy didn’t “attach” when Thoen pled guilty because there was no finality in the plea or the negotiated sentence.
However, the Fifth District added, even if jeopardy had attached when Thoen pled guilty, his one trial for this offense wasn’t barred because “there was a manifest necessity to proceed by indictment” given that the prosecutors incorrectly filed the charge in a bill of information. The trial court also was required by Ohio law to impose a life sentence, even though that wasn’t stated in the bill of information or part of the plea, the Fifth District ruled.
Thoen appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
Guilty Pleas Are Similar to Jury Verdicts, and Jeopardy Attaches, Offender Contends
Thoen explains that the double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. and Ohio constitutions are prohibitions against multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Among the wrongs the constitutional provisions protect against is a second prosecution for the same offense following a conviction for the offense, he notes.
Because the trial court accepted his guilty plea in the first case in April 2023, he couldn’t be tried for the same offense, Thoen maintains. Guilty pleas act as a substitute for trial and carry binding legal consequences once accepted, he asserts. He contends that when a court accepts a guilty plea, it’s the functional equivalent of a jury verdict. In addition, Thoen argues Ohio courts have consistently ruled that jeopardy applies when a trial court unconditionally accepts a guilty plea. Reaffirming those rulings would help to ensure the finality and fairness of guilty pleas in the criminal justice system, he suggests.
He argues the Fifth District also wrongly determined that it was “manifestly necessary” for the state to dismiss the case and indict him. Thoen counters that the standard doesn’t apply to guilty pleas or when prosecutors make strategic missteps and procedural oversights – as in his case. Once a guilty plea is accepted, remedying an error through dismissal or reindictment violates constitutional protections against double jeopardy, Thoen concludes.
Pleas Aren’t Final, Aren’t Like Verdicts or Court Judgments, State Counters
The Knox County prosecutor argues that although a conviction invokes double jeopardy protections, a legally defective plea cannot be considered a conviction. The prosecutor contends that a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea doesn’t carry the same expectation of finality as a jury verdict or a court judgment and sentencing entry. In addition, finality can’t be expected from a plea that can’t be implemented under the law, the prosecutor maintains. Had Thoen been sentenced to the correct prison term under Ohio law, he could have prevailed in an appeal that argued his plea wasn’t made knowingly because the proper sentence wasn’t presented and explained, the prosecutor adds.
Correcting a plea that is contrary to law isn’t prosecutorial overreach, the prosecutor maintains. Instead, dismissing the case was manifestly necessary because Thoen couldn’t be prosecuted through a bill of information given that his rape charge had to impose a maximum sentence of life in prison, the prosecutor contends. The state had to present the case to a grand jury and request that Thoen be indicted for the offense, the prosecutor maintains.
State Attorney General Files Brief, Will Argue in Case
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Knox County prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The Supreme Court has agreed to allow the attorney general to participate in oral argument for this case, sharing time allotted to the prosecutor.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Daniel G. Thoen from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: R. Jessica Manungo, jessica.manungo@opdohio.gov
Representing the State of Ohio from the Knox County Prosecutor’s Office: Charles McConville, prosecutor@co.knox.oh.us
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Jaya Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.