Wednesday, November 19, 2025
Bethel Oil and Gas LLC et al. v. Redbird Development LLC et al., Case No. 2024-1696
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Washington County)
State of Ohio v. Timothy D. Bradley, Case No. 2024-1715
Seventh District Court of Appeals (Belmont County)
State of Ohio v. Marc Johnson, Case No. 2024-1759
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
State of Ohio v. Nelson Reillo, Case No. 2024-1769
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Must Lawsuits Explain How Probable the Alleged Actions Caused Damages?
Bethel Oil and Gas LLC et al. v. Redbird Development LLC et al., Case No. 2024-1696
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Washington County)
ISSUE: Does Ohio’s pleading standards include a “plausibility requirement,” which explains how damages are not just possible, but probable, given the facts known at the time the case is filed?
BACKGROUND:
Robert and Sandra Lane own 1,471 acres of property in Washington County and 2,317 acres in Athens County. Robert Lane operates Bethel Oil & Gas. Redbird Development operates injection wells that dispose of the fluids used in hydraulic fracturing (fracking) during the drilling process for natural gas and oil. In August 2020, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) reported that significant quantities of injection waste fluid from the Redbird #4 injection well were found in a number of producing gas wells located in sandstone formation beneath the surface. Those formations historically contain little to no water, the department noted.
ODNR reported that four wells owned by Bethel in Washington County contained waste fluid from Redbird #4. In May 2022, Bethel and the Lanes filed a 47-page, 132-paragraph complaint in Washington County Common Pleas Court against 16 businesses, including Redbird, which operates injection wells in Washington County. Bethel alleged negligence and other claims by the waste disposal operators, stating that they damaged current operations and threaten future development of oil and gas production due to the total impact of improperly managed waste fluid injections below the surface.
Redbird and the other disposal well operators requested that the trial court dismiss the case. The disposal well operators argued that Bethel failed to allege sufficient facts to give them notice of the claims against them, and the complaint failed to define the property the operators allegedly damaged, when it was damaged, and who actually caused the damage.
Bethel requested permission from the court to amend the complaint to address the objections raised by the disposal companies. The court denied the request and dismissed the case. Bethel appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, which ruled that under the state’s current pleading standards, Bethel had presented sufficient information to proceed with the case. The Fourth District remanded the lawsuit to the trial court for further proceedings.
Redbird and some of the other operators appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Operator Seeks New Standard for Seeking Damages
Redbird Development filed a brief jointly with injection well operators Dean Patrick III and Hall Drilling. The “Redbird” parties explain that Rule 8(a) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure was modeled after the same numbered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The rules require that when initiating a civil lawsuit, the plaintiff must present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” In 1957, a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreted the rule to allow a complaint to proceed unless there was no conceivable set of facts that could support a claim. Redbird notes Ohio adopted this same “no set of facts” standard in 1975 and has used it to determine if a civil lawsuit can proceed if a party seeks to dismiss the case.
Redbird notes that in 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court heightened the standard for pleading. Federal courts now use a “plausibility standard,” which requires that the pleading contain enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Redbird explains this standard requires a complaint to contain enough facts to reasonably infer the defendant is liable for the alleged damage.
The Fourth District indicated Ohio still follows the “no set of facts” rule and that Bethel provided enough information to proceed against the disposal well operators. Redbird argues the Supreme Court in recent rulings has indicated it should apply the “plausible” standard adopted by the federal courts. If the Court did so, then Bethel’s case should be dismissed, the company argues.
Redbird maintains that Bethel cited damages to only four wells, and they are located within 166 acres of a single Washington County township. Without describing the location of the Bethel property and all its wells, Bethel’s lawsuit alleges that all the disposal operators in the area are causing harm to all of its property. Redbird asserts that the complaint does not contain facts that link to the broad and widespread damages alleged by Bethel based on an ODNR finding of contamination in four of Bethel’s wells caused by one of Redbird’s injection wells. Redbird argues that Bethel goes to great lengths to state that damage on a massive scale is possible, but only provides speculation and no facts that it is plausible.
By following the federal courts, Ohio could prevent cases like Bethel’s where widespread damages are alleged with little facts to support it, Redbird argues. If cases like this are not dismissed at the pleading stage, then defendants are required to engage in discovery that could be costly and time-consuming just to determine if the alleged damage was likely caused by the defendant’s actions, Redbird concludes.
Other Injectors Claim Damages Can’t Be Linked to Them
Briefs were filed by other disposal well operators named in the case. K&H Partners and Tallgrass Operations filed a joint brief. Deeprock Dispoal Solutions, Deeprock Disposal Operating, Brian Chavez, and Christyann Heinrich-Chavez filed a joint brief as did Diversified Production, Nuverra Environmental Solutions, and Heckman Water Resources. These operators joined Redbird in urging the Court to adopt the heightened pleading standard and to dismiss Bethel’s case. The operators note that none of them were cited by ODNR with contaminating Bethel’s property. They argue the claims made by Bethel are too speculative and remote to hold them liable for any damages.
Pleading Standard Sufficient, Well Owners Assert
Bethel notes that for 50 years, the current pleading system has worked, and the disposal well operators want to change it to prevent “shotgun” pleadings where numerous potential defendants are named. Bethel asserts the disposal companies ignore the fact that the simple pleading standard recognizes that plaintiffs, when filing their complaints, frequently do not know all of the facts or have the related evidence until they are allowed to engage in discovery.
The rule as it stands is fair, and Bethel argues the state has adopted other civil rules that prevent the abuse of the civil lawsuit process. The rules encourage cases to be decided on the merits, and not allow trial courts to dismiss cases at their earliest stages because of the limited information a party in the case has obtained.
Bethel also maintains that Redbird and the other operators are mischaracterizing its complaint, which articulates how the disposal practices in the region are potentially destroying the mineral rights of landowners and possibly contaminating oil and gas reserves in the region. The matter needs to proceed further, especially since the potential damage isn’t visible on the surface, but is happening deep beneath the ground, the drilling company states.
Bethel notes the Fourth District understood that its complaint contained both current and future damages the company faces because of the cumulative effect of all the disposal operations. Bethel maintains that while water from Redbird was discovered in its wells, it isn’t known whether the pressure on the formations below the surface caused by other disposal wells forced the Redbird well to overflow. The complaint contained details explaining how it was and can be harmed, the company asserts.
Even if the Court were to adopt the plausibility standard, Bethel argues it shouldn’t be applied retroactively to dismiss its case. The company should be allowed to at least amend its complaint, noting the trial court didn’t permit it. And if the plausibility standard were adopted and applied retroactively, Bethel still maintains it made a case to show it’s plausible the named disposal companies caused the damage or will cause damage unless the operations are curtailed.
Attorney General Supports Heightened Pleading Standard
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed a amicus curiae brief supporting the disposal operators, but states it takes no position on how the lower courts applied the pleading standard to the case against them. The Court granted the attorney general’s request to share oral argument time with the disposal well operators. The attorney general argues that the Court should find Ohio rules require a plausibility requirement in its pleadings.
Further Friend-of-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus brief supporting the K&H Partners and Tallgrass Operations was submitted jointly by Ohio Business Roundtable and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce. The Associated Builders and Contractors of Central Ohio and the Associated Builders and Contractors of Ohio jointly presented a brief supporting the position of all the disposal well operators. The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys also filed an amicus brief in support of all the disposal well operators.
A joint brief supporting Bethel’s position was submitted by American Association for Justice and the Ohio Association for Justice. The City of Massillon also filed an amicus brief supporting Bethel.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Bethel Oil and Gas LLC et al.: Geoffrey Brown, gbrown@bordaslaw.com
Representing Redbird Development LLC et al.: Clay Keller, ckkeller@jacksonkelly.com
Representing DeepRock Disposal Solutions et al.: Brandon Abshier, babshier@reminger.com
Representing Diversified Production et al.: Steven Silverman, ssilverman@babstcalland.com
Representing K&H Partners et al.: Chad Ziepfel, cziepfel@taftlaw.com
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Was Self-Defense Claim Adequately Explained to Jury?
State of Ohio v. Timothy D. Bradley, Case No. 2024-1715
Seventh District Court of Appeals (Belmont County)
ISSUE: Must a new trial be conducted because a judge failed to advise a jury on how the concept of self-defense applies to both a charge of felonious assault and a charge of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure?
BACKGROUND:
In 2024, Timothy Bradley had moved to Martins Ferry, where he was remodeling two houses he owned. He met Zachary Burch, who was working for a subcontractor performing home remodeling projects for Lowe’s. Bradley asked Burch if he would work on the side, helping him with remodeling projects. Burch was scheduled to assist Bradley with installing a bathroom vanity. That morning, Burch went to Bradley’s home, but had forgotten his keys. Bradley wasn’t there. Burch couldn’t contact Bradley, so he went home and went back to sleep. Burch awoke to text messages from Bradley, stating he had been fired. Burch texted that he was going to the house to remove his tools and wanted to be paid the $1,300 that he was offered for the job.
Both men regularly carried firearms. Bradley had been a firearm instructor before moving to Ohio and had a license to carry a concealed weapon. Burch open-carried his gun and was openly displaying a pistol around his waist when he arrived at Bradley’s home. Bradley said Burch had told him of other occasions where he pulled his gun on others and threatened to shoot them. When Burch arrived, the front door was open, and Bradley was there. He walked in, took the air compressor he owned, and put it in his car. He then returned to retrieve other tools. The tense interactions between the men could be partially viewed and heard from security cameras on a neighboring home.
Bradley stated that he had warned Burch not to come back into the house with his gun. Burch disregarded the directive and, in vulgar terms, told Bradley to leave him alone while he was removing his tools. He indicated he would shoot up the house or burn it down if Bradley didn’t allow him to get the tools. Bradley was in the living room, and the lights were off when Burch returned for the tools. Bradley shot at Burch six times. Burch couldn’t be seen on video carrying his gun when entering the house, but was holding it when he left after he had been shot. He ran to a neighbor’s front porch for help. Bradley told investigators that while in the house, Burch went for his gun and that he fired because he feared for his life.
Bullets from the shooting crossed the street and lodged in two neighboring homes. One was believed to be unoccupied, and the other belonged to Jessi House, who was at home with her son at the time. House, who was a nurse, went outside after hearing the gunshots and threw her hands up in disbelief when she saw Bradley standing on his porch and Burch injured. She rendered aid to Burch. Two of the bullets entered House’s home through the front door, one landing in her dining room and another behind a couch.
Bradley was indicted on three counts, including felonious assault for shooting at Burch. He was charged with two counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure or habitation, one count for the home whose owner the police couldn’t locate or identify, and one count for the shots into House’s residence.
Self-Defense Instructions Discussed
In a pretrial hearing, Bradley notified the trial judge that he intended to claim self-defense. The prosecutor, Bradley’s defense attorney, and the judge agreed to jury instructions that would be given for self-defense.
At the trial, Bradley’s attorney argued Bradley acted in self-defense. The jury found Bradley not guilty of felonious assault but guilty of the two firearm discharge offenses. Because each charge carried a three-year firearm specification, the trial judge sentenced Bradley to four years in prison for each discharge offense and three years for using a firearm. The sentences were set to run concurrently for a total of seven to nine years in prison.
Bradley appealed the firearm discharge convictions to the Seventh District Court of Appeals. The Seventh District discussed the requirement that discharge offenses under R.C. 2923.161 necessitate the state proving that a person “without privilege to do so” discharged a firearm into an occupied structure where a person resides. The Seventh District vacated the conviction based on the home where police didn’t locate the owner, finding it was not clear whether Bradley could justify hitting the house with bullets when he shot at Burch.
The Seventh District found the jury should have received a more specific instruction regarding the shots fired at House’s residence. The court found the jury may not have understood the concept of “transferred intent” and that the self-defense claim could also be applied to the firearm discharge charges. The intent could transfer from Bradley aiming at Burch to hitting the houses accidentally across the street, the Seventh District explained. The appeals court ordered a new trial based on the charge of shooting into House’s home.
The Belmont County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
New Trial Unwarranted, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor notes the Seventh District stated that neither it nor the Supreme Court of Ohio has ever addressed the issue of whether the concept of transferred intent applies to a claim of self-defense. The prosecutor explains that the issue has been raised in two prior cases from Hamilton County and in other states, but no trial court in Ohio has been directed by a higher court to provide a transferred intent jury instruction in a self-defense case.
The Seventh District explained the theory of transferred intent in a shooting case, finding that a shooter, who misses his intended target but hits an unintended target, is guilty of shooting the unintended target. The intent to hit the intended target is transferred to the intent to hit the unintended target, and the shooter can still be held responsible, the appeals court wrote.
Bradley insists that this same logic applies to self-defense, but the prosecutor disputes it. Bradley claims that if he was not guilty by reason of self-defense for shooting at Burch, then he should also not be guilty of shooting at the home, the prosecutor notes. The trial court didn’t discuss the issue of transferred intent with the jury because neither Bradley’s defense attorney nor the prosecutor requested the instruction. Bradley didn’t object to the failure to provide the instruction after the jury convicted him, and only raised the issue in his appeal to the Seventh District, the prosecutor notes.
Because Bradley only raised the issue on appeal, the Seventh District could only order a new trial if it found there was “plain error” by the trial court. The prosecutor explains that plain error is a rare finding by an appeals court and must demonstrate that an obvious error occurred at trial and that the error significantly impacted the outcome of the trial. The prosecutor maintains the jury was told Bradley was claiming self-defense to all three charges, and the judge explained what the prosecution must prove to overcome a claim of self-defense. The prosecutor also notes that Bradley’s attorney argued before the jury that if Bradley had the right to act in self-defense when he shot at Burch, the same concept applied to the accidental shooting of the two houses across the street.
The prosecutor argues there is no evidence to suggest the trial court committed an error by not giving a further explanation of how self-defense applies to the firearm discharge counts. The office asserts the judge wasn’t required to present the theory of transferred intent when no one asked for it. The prosecutor maintains the Seventh District has only speculated about how the outcome might have been different if the juror received a different instruction, but asserts there is no reason to believe the jury didn’t consider the arguments at trial and the instructions given.
Jury Instruction Misleading, Shooter Asserts
Bradley notes that while no trial court has been ordered to give a transferred intent instruction in a case claiming self-defense, the unique facts of this case and the jury’s verdict demonstrate the need for it. Bradley points to the Seventh District’s decision and notes the appeals court found the jury instruction given was misleading. While the term “without privilege to do so” was noted, the trial court didn’t explain the term “privilege” and that, in Ohio law, self-defense is a “privilege” if the person establishes the right to use self-defense.
Bradley notes it was undisputed that the only shots he fired were while he was in his house. The jury must have accepted his argument that he acted in self-defense to acquit him, and that he established he had the privilege to fire at Burch from inside his house. Bradley asserts that “intent follows the bullet,” and that his intention to shoot at Burch was in self-defense. That same intent resulted in the bullets accidentally hitting the homes across the street, he explains. The trial court’s jury instruction didn’t adequately describe how the concept of intent and self-defense applied to the firearm discharge charges, he asserts. It does not make sense that they would acquit him of the assault charge and find him guilty of the firearm discharge offenses if they were adequately instructed on transferred intent and self-defense, he concludes.
Bradley argues that his case demonstrates that a transferred intent instruction should be granted and that such an instruction could clearly impact the outcome of the case.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Bradley’s position was submitted by the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Belmont County Prosecutor’s Office: Jacob Manning, jacob.manning@co.belmont.oh.us
Representing Timothy D. Bradley: Aaron Brockler, ajb@brocklerlaw.com
Is Person Who Pleads Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Eligible To Have Record Sealed?
State of Ohio v. Marc Johnson, Case No. 2024-1759
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUE: Can people who are found not guilty by reason of insanity apply to have their records sealed as a not guilty verdict under R.C. 2953.33?
BACKGROUND:
In May 2002, a Lucas County grand jury indicted Marc Johnson for burglary, aggravated burglary, and rape. The charges arose from an incident where Johnson was alleged to have entered the home of a 72-year-old Toledo woman and assaulted her.
Johnson was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered into treatment. In February 2003, the Lucas County Common Pleas Court found him competent for trial, and he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Following a bench trial held a few months later, the court found Johnson not guilty by reason of insanity. He was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric care facility.
In 2013, Johnson was released because he had reached the maximum time under state law for psychiatric confinement based on the offenses. The trial court ordered that affidavits be filed in the Lucas County Probate Court for possible civil commitment. According to the briefs from both sides in this appeal, the case record doesn’t explain what occurred in probate court.
Nine Years After Trial, Man Asks Court To Seal His Record
In late 2022, Johnson applied to the trial court to seal the record of his criminal case. Johnson testified at an April 2023 hearing that he lived with his sister and brother-in-law in Michigan and had earned a degree from a community college. He took medication for a mental illness and had been working at a restaurant for five years. The state objected to the sealing request, arguing the need to maintain the record of the serious offenses was critical, outweighing Johnson’s interests in having the records sealed and preserving public safety.
The trial court declined the record-sealing request, stating that Johnson “was not innocent of the offenses with which he was charged” and that, while Johnson had made strides since his release, the nature and gravity of the offenses weighed in favor of the state’s position.
Johnson appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals. On the record-sealing claim, a Sixth District majority ruled that individuals found NGRI are ineligible to have their records sealed based on what is now R.C. 2953.33. The Sixth District certified that other Ohio appellate courts have issued decisions in conflict with its ruling.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the conflict among the appellate courts.
Not Guilty Verdicts Encompass NGRI Verdicts, Which Can Be Sealed, Applicant Argues
Johnson notes the Sixth District ruled that an NGRI verdict doesn’t qualify for sealing under R.C. 2953.33 because it isn’t a “not guilty” verdict. He acknowledges that the legal concepts of NGRI and not guilty are different in some respects. However, an NGRI verdict is still a type of not guilty verdict, he contends.
Johnson maintains that the language of the statute clearly allows any individual who has been found “not guilty” to ask to seal the record. He contends that the Lucas County prosecutor even made that argument to the trial court, when it stated that the sealing statute “applies equally to those individuals who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity.”
In addition, the five case decisions that conflict with the Sixth District all ruled that someone found not guilty by reason of insanity has been found not guilty, and is eligible under R.C. 2953.33 to apply for sealing of their record, Johnson concludes.
Including NGRI Verdicts Broadens Statutory Language, State Counters
The Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office contends that considering NGRI verdicts to be a not guilty verdict for the purposes of sealing records in R.C. 2953.33 would improperly expand the language in the statute. The General Assembly didn’t specify NGRI as a disposition that qualifies for sealing, the prosecutor argues. And expanding the law to encompass NGRI would threaten public safety, the prosecutor asserts.
The prosecutor explains that an NGRI verdict means that the defendant committed the act but can’t be legally responsible because of mental illness. Other states have issued decisions denying sealing or expungement requests, concluding that an NGRI verdict doesn’t mean the defendant didn’t engage in the criminal activity or was found innocent of committing the crime, the prosecutor points out. NGRI verdicts are different than being found not guilty, and they shouldn’t qualify for sealing under R.C. 2953.33, the prosecutor maintains.
The prosecutor also contends that the rulings from the cases in conflict with the Sixth District failed to conduct a meaningful legal analysis of the sealing statute.– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Marc Johnson from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Craig Jaquith, craig.jaquith@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the State of Ohio from the Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office: Randy Meyer, rlmeyer@co.lucas.oh.us
Did Appeals Court Properly Review Rape Conviction?
State of Ohio v. Nelson Reillo, Case No. 2024-1769
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: When conducting a weight-of-the-evidence review in a criminal case, must an appeals court be confined to determining whether there is a clear conflict in the presented evidence, and only then determine whether the evidence supports one side of an issue over another?
BACKGROUND:
In 2023, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Nelson Reillo on two counts of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition. The charges were related to events in 2012, when Reillo moved in to live with his girlfriend, who had children. One of her children was an 8-year-old identified in court records as “E.C.” In 2020, E.C. was 17 years old and told a social worker with Akron Children’s Hospital that Reillo performed sexual acts on E.C. when E.C. was 8. Law enforcement followed up on the teen’s claims, and Reillo was charged with the offenses.
E.C. disclosed most of the details of the acts Reillo committed for the first time at his trial. E.C. was the primary witness against Reillo, and he didn’t testify in his own defense. He was found guilty of one of the two rape charges and of gross sexual imposition. He was sentenced to life in prison with eligibility for parole in 15 years and was designated a tier III sex offender.
Reillo appealed his conviction to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which ruled the convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appeals court remanded the case to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court for a new trial.
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Appeals Court Overstepped Its Role, Prosecutor Asserts
The Cuyahoga County prosecutor explains that in most appeals of criminal convictions, the defendant will argue that the conviction was against the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence. The appeals court conducts separate tests for each of these claims.
For sufficiency of evidence, the prosecution notes, the test is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” This standard gives deference to the findings of the jury or judge who heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, the office explains.
The state’s weight of the evidence test has evolved, the prosecutor argues, and now states, “The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts of evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
The prosecutor argues appellate courts are too broadly interpreting their power when conducting weight-of-the-evidence reviews and substituting their judgments for those of the trial courts, where a judge or jury actually heard the testimony and viewed the witnesses. The prosecutor asserts that once the appeals court agrees that the prosecutor has met the sufficiency of the evidence standard, the appeals court must accept the trial court's findings of guilt. The only way to reverse that decision is if the appeals court can point to some evidence in the record that conflicts with the evidence the trial court found was sufficient for guilt, the office argues. This can come from evidence impeaching a witness or testimony from a witness that conflicts with other evidence in the case, the prosecutor suggests, or when two separate witnesses offer completely different accounts.
The prosecutor argues the appeals court overturned Reillo’s conviction because of inconsistencies in E.C.’s testimony. But the appeals court didn’t point to any conflicting evidence presented in the case that would have tipped the verdict in Reillo’s favor. Since the prosecutor met the legal standard of providing sufficient evidence to prove Reillo’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based mostly on E.C.’s testimony, the Eighth District’s inquiry should have ended there, the office maintains.
Instead, the Eighth District set a new standard for weight-of-the-evidence review, where it’s not deferring to the findings of the trial court, but instead doing its own review of the evidence to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the prosecutor asserts. This approach is beyond the scope of the review, and the appeals court should grant more deference to the trial court findings, the prosecutor argues. If the Eighth District had conducted the proper review, it wouldn’t have overturned Reillo’s conviction, the prosecutor concludes.
Appeals Court Appropriately Assessed Evidence, Accused Argues
Reillo argues the prosecutor vastly overstates the appeals courts’ behavior in conducting manifest-weight-of-the-evidence reviews. The appeals courts caution in opinions that reversals based on manifest weight of the evidence are rare and are only granted in a small percentage of cases, Reillo observes. He argues the prosecutor’s position is to limit the manifest weight review to find that if there is no witness contradicting the prosecution’s witnesses, the appeals court must accept the state’s version of the events without question.
Reillo maintains the prosecutor is misinterpreting the appeals court’s requirement to defer to the trial court's findings. The deference is paramount when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, he notes. However, the manifest weight test assumes that jurors and judges make mistakes and the appeals court can take a broader view to ensure the trial was fair, he argues.
The problem with the prosecutor’s argument is that in many cases, such as this one, only a single prosecution witness will present the majority of the evidence at trial, Reillo notes. The prosecution’s position that there must be a contradiction from another source would be unworkable if the appeals court couldn’t consider the inconsistencies of the sole witness’ testimony. Reillo argues appellate courts are giving trial court findings the utmost deference, and only overturning their decisions when the record indicates a significant error that requires a reversal.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Reillo’s position was submitted jointly by the Cuyahoga County Public Defender and the Hamilton County Public Defender.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Owen Knapp, info@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing Nelson Reillo: Russell Bensing, rbensing@ameritech.net
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