Tuesday, January 6, 2026
State of Ohio v. Scott A. Wilson, Case No. 2025-0322
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Clermont County)
Wassim El-Hitti, M.D., et al. v. Americare Kidney Institute LLC et al., Case No. 2025-0333
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
In the matter of Circleville Solar LLC, Case No. 2025-0363
Ohio Power Siting Board
State of Ohio v. Amy Rodriguez, Case No. 2025-0066
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Did 16-Year Delay in Prosecution Violate Right to Fair Trial?
State of Ohio v. Scott A. Wilson, Case No. 2025-0322
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Clermont County)
ISSUE: Did the 16 years between the determination of cause of death and an indictment for involuntary manslaughter constitute a pre-indictment delay that violated the constitutional rights of the accused?
BACKGROUND:
In January 1985, Scott Wilson lived with his girlfriend, who had a six-week-old infant daughter. Wilson shook the child, which led to severe brain trauma. The child would remain bedridden for the rest of her life. Wilson was charged in Clermont County with felonious assault. A jury found him guilty of a lesser charge of assault under R.C. 2903.13(B), a misdemeanor, and concluded he recklessly caused the girl serious physical harm. He was sentenced to six months in jail and fined $1,000.
The child was under her grandmother’s care until the grandmother died in 2006. The young lady, then 22, was transferred to a nursing home where she died one month later. On behalf of Clermont County, Hamilton County Deputy Coroner Dr. Michael Kenny conducted an autopsy and concluded the woman died from the late effects of a blunt impact to the head. Attached to the autopsy was a neuropathology report from Dr. Greg Balko, a neuropathologist, who focused on the brain of the deceased. The Clermont County Coroner’s Office received the report from Hamilton County and conducted an inquest. The coroner referred the matter to the Clermont County Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecutor took no further action at that time.
Defendant Seeks to Seal Records Years Later
In 2022, Wilson applied to seal the records of his 1985 assault conviction. After looking through the application, Clermont County prosecutors opened the file on the case and noticed the autopsy report. The prosecutor’s office opened an investigation and was able to locate some, but not all, of the records from the time of the injury until her death. They did find witnesses with important information, including the victim’s mother, a nurse who was at the hospital when the injured infant was admitted in 1985, one of the lead investigators in the original case, and Deputy Coroner Kenny.
Wilson was indicted in 2022 for involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide. The prosecution argued the injuries Wilson caused to the victim as an infant subsequently led to her death in 2006. Wilson requested that the Clermont County Common Pleas Court dismiss the charges based on pre-indictment delay. He argued the delay between the time the matter was referred to the prosecutor after the woman died and the time of his indictment deprived him of his constitutional rights to a fair trial.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter in 2023, and Kenny testified. The trial court denied the request to dismiss the case. Wilson pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, and the reckless homicide charged was dismissed. He was sentenced to two years in prison. The trial judge stayed the sentence, pending the outcome of Wilson’s appeal.
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision not to dismiss the case based on pre-indictment delay.
Wilson appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Lack of Evidence, Witnesses Would Lead to Unfair Trial, Offender Asserts
Wilson asserts he pled no contest because he wouldn’t receive a fair trial in 2023, more than 16 years after the victim died. He maintains the majority of the evidence from his 1985 trial and the medical history of the victim have been destroyed or lost. He notes those involved in law enforcement and medical treatment have since died.
The death of Balko, the neuropathologist, is particularly troublesome to Wilson. Balko died in 2019, 12 years after issuing his report. Kenny testified that Balko was brought in on some cases by the coroner’s office because of his expertise. A neurologist hired by Wilson indicated that Balko didn’t provide a microscopic examination of portions of the brain that would indicate the impact of head trauma. Wilson argues that the inability to question Balko about why he didn’t conduct such an examination might raise questions about his thinking about the potential causes of death. Wilson argues the missing information deprives him of knowing whether the examining physician saw any other injuries or causes that might have led to the victim’s death.
Wilson notes the standard set by the Court for claims of pre-indictment delay requires a two-step process. The defendant must show how the missing evidence or testimony would minimize the impact of the state’s evidence and bolster the defense. If the defendant is able to establish actual prejudice caused by the delay, then the state must present evidence that its delay was justifiable. The Twelfth District ruled that Wilson never established that the missing evidence harmed his case. The appeals court noted that Balko’s death may have helped Wilson had he gone to trial because Wilson’s experts could have questioned Balko’s methods without Balko getting to respond to the questioning.
Wilson counters that he was harmed by the death because the doctor was unavailable to explain what he found during his examination and explain why he did not do the microscopic exam. Balko’s response could have bolstered Wilson’s claim that the injuries he caused the victim weren’t the cause of her death years later. Wilson asserts the burden should have shifted to the prosecutor. He maintains the prosecutor can’t provide a justifiable reason why the office waited 16 years to charge him with a crime.
Offender Failed to Explain How Missing Evidence Would Help, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor notes the Court in recent cases has explained that the accused cannot speculate about what missing evidence or testimony “could” have done to minimize the impact of the state’s evidence. While Wilson wouldn’t have to prove exactly what the missing testimony or evidence would reveal, he had to explain that it “would” have impacted the outcome, the prosecutor notes.
Wilson’s claim is based on the unavailability of Balko and other witnesses to the assault of the infant, the prosecutor notes. The jury did find Wilson guilty of the lesser charge of misdemeanor assault, but that conclusion indicated he caused serious physical harm to the child. The involuntary manslaughter law states no person shall cause the death of another as the proximate result of committing a misdemeanor, the prosecution notes. None of the information, missing or available, would change the fact that Wilson was convicted of a misdemeanor, meaning only the question of whether that harm led to the victim’s death remains, the office explains.
Kenny, not Balko, testified that the death of the victim was attributed to the injury caused by Wilson, the prosecutor notes. And Balko’s testimony is consistent with Kenny’s, the office argues, meaning it isn’t favorable to Wilson. Whether cross-examining Balko would have raised any reasonable doubt is speculative, the prosecutor asserts, and fails to demonstrate that the missing testimony actually prejudiced Wilson.
Should the Court find that the delay actually prejudiced Wilson, the prosecutor can make its case that the delay was justified, the office asserts. The prosecutor notes it didn’t just rely on the autopsy report presented to the former prosecutor in office in 2006, but also opened its own investigation. The office found medical records for the entire life of the victim and located Kenny, the doctor who determined the cause of death, to build their case against Wilson. The prosecutor maintains the standard of unjustifiable delay should be whether the delay was motivated by an attempt to gain a strategic advantage. That wasn’t the case, and the delay didn’t harm Wilson in a way that would violate his constitutional rights, the prosecutor concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Wilson’s position was submitted by the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association filed an amicus brief supporting the Clermont County prosecutor.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Scott A. Wilson: George Montgomery, george@montgomerylawoffice.com
Representing the State of Ohio from the Clermont County Prosecutor’s Office: Nicholas Horton, nhorton@clermontcountyohio.gov
Must Claims That Doctors Tried To Discredit Former Employer Be Heard in Two Phases?
Wassim El-Hitti, M.D., et al. v. Americare Kidney Institute LLC et al., Case No. 2025-0333
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- Are the claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition “tort claims,” under R.C. 2315.21, in which a plaintiff could receive compensatory and punitive damages?
- If breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition are tort claims, must a trial court divide a lawsuit into two separate phases, one to consider compensatory damages and the other to consider punitive damages?
BACKGROUND:
Doctors Wassim El-Hitti, Akhilesh Rao, and Saurabh Bansal were physician members of Americare Kidney Institute (AKI), a limited liability company. The doctors treat patients in hospitals, dialysis centers, and in AKI offices throughout northeast Ohio. Dr. Hany Anton served as AKI's chief executive officer when a wave of lawsuits was launched between 2017 to 2020. The litigation stemmed from a feud between Anton and the chief operating officer, Dr. Ronald Flauto.
A supermajority of physician members of AKI voted to remove Anton in 2020 as CEO. El-Hitti opposed the removal. El-Hitti and Bansal formed a competing medical practice named Cleveland Kidney Doctors. In November 2021, El-Hitti, Rao, and Bansal filed a lawsuit against AKI, alleging the company was perpetuating fraudulent billing practices. They claimed the fraud affected their professional reputations and requested that AKI release them from their non-competition clauses so that they could open their own medical practice. The doctors also alleged that AKI under Anton launched an investigation into the fraudulent billing practices, but that the new CEO halted the investigations and refused to release a report generated from the inquiry.
The company stated that while still employed at AKI, El-Hitti contacted the federal government about the billing practices. The company states the government never acted on the allegations. El-Hitti also hung a sign on his AKI office door identifying it as an office for Cleveland Kidney Doctors. AKI filed a counterclaim, alleging the doctors breached their contracts, breached their fiduciary duties as members of the LLC, and participated in unfair competition.
The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court dismissed the doctors’ claims against AKI. The trial court then prepared to consider AKI’s counterclaims. The doctors required the court to divide, or “bifurcate,” the issues of compensatory damages and punitive damages, citing R.C. 2315.21(B). The doctors sought an order that would prevent AKI from presenting any evidence or argument on the issue of punitive damages during the initial stage of a trial, in which a jury would consider if AKI proved its claims and the doctors were liable for compensatory damages.
AKI opposed the motion, and the trial court agreed the matter could proceed before a jury in a single phase. The doctors appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
El-Hitti and Bansal appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Issues Must Be Divided, Doctors Assert
Under R.C. 2315.21, a “tort action” is any civil lawsuit seeking damages for injury or loss to person or property, the doctors note. The law treats an LLC as a person, and AKI is seeking damages for financial losses the doctors allegedly caused, the doctors explain. When a person seeks both compensatory and punitive damages in a tort action, R.C. 2315.21(B) requires the trial to be divided into two stages. At the compensatory damage stage, the law states that no party can present evidence “that relates solely to the issue of whether” a party can recover punitive damages.
The doctors argue that since the claims are tort actions, the law requires split court proceedings if AKI wants to seek punitive damages. The importance of dividing the trial is to prevent jury confusion, the physicians assert. To receive compensatory damages, AKI must prove the doctors are liable by a preponderance of evidence, the physicians note. But to win punitive damages, AKI would have to prove the doctors acted with “malice” or committed fraud. A finding of malice would require proof by “clear and convincing evidence .” Citing the Court’s 2015 Sivit v. Vill. Green of Beachwood L.P. decision, the doctors argue AKI must show their conduct was driven by “hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge,” or “a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.”
Dividing the trial prevents the jury from considering evidence of malice at the lower proof level of preponderance of the evidence when determining if the trio caused injury to AKI, the doctors argue. If the jury were to find them liable, then a second stage would ensure AKI could then present evidence alleging the doctors acted with malice, and then the jury would have to weigh that evidence using the clear and convincing standard, they explain.
The doctors note that R.C. 2315.21 states the law doesn’t apply to “breach of contract or another agreement between persons.” They argue that AKI insists their claims are not tort actions, so the law doesn’t apply to them, and a jury can consider all the claims in one phase. The doctors argue that if the Court decides the claims aren’t torts, then Ohio law wouldn’t allow for AKI to pursue punitive damages. They maintain that AKI can’t have it both ways -- either the claims are torts and must be divided into two phases, or the company can’t seek punitive damages at all.
Jury Can Consider Claims in One Phase, Company Maintains
AKI argues R.C. 2315.21 was enacted as part of the General Assembly’s “tort reform” efforts to prevent exceedingly large jury awards for “pain and suffering.” The reforms didn’t encompass litigation between business partners, the company asserts. AKI also argues the law is aimed at addressing negligence claims where injuries were caused by accidents, and not intentional misconduct, which is what AKI is claiming the doctors engaged in.
AKI maintains the Court has addressed the issue of preventing punitive damages awards for breach of contract, but those cases didn’t address intentional fraudulent activities by one of the business partners. The company argues Ohio law permits the award of punitive damages in cases dealing with “agreements between persons,” if the misconduct is intentional. Further, the company argues R.C. 2315.21 only prevents evidence that could demonstrate malice from being introduced at the compensatory damages stage if the evidence is “solely related” to punitive damages. The company explains that the rule has been used in cases such as when a jury first must decide if a driver caused an accident, and then, in the second phase, alerting the jury that the driver was intoxicated, which would allow for punitive damages to be awarded.
AKI argues the doctors’ misconduct is the basis for the claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition. The jury must know what the doctors did in order to find them liable, and that same evidence would also justify punitive damages. The lower courts correctly discerned that the company’s counterclaims should be considered in one phase, and the time and expense of two phases was unnecessary, AKI concludes.– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Wassim El-Hitti et al.: Christopher Congeni, ccongeni@amundsendavislaw.com
Representing Americare Kidney Institute: John Hill, john.hill@lewisbrisbois.com
Could Siting Board Reject Solar Project Based on Local Opposition?
In the matter of Circleville Solar LLC, Case No. 2025-0363
Ohio Power Siting Board
ISSUE: Did the Ohio Power Siting Board’s decision not to grant a construction permit to a solar farm violate state law when the denial was based on unanimous and consistent local opposition?
BACKGROUND:
In December 2021, Circleville Solar filed an application with the Ohio Power Siting Board to develop, construct, and operate a 70-megawatt solar power electric generating facility on 1,289 acres in Jackson Township in Pickaway County. Circleville Solar secured the rights of private landowners to develop the facility on land historically used for agriculture. The solar farm structures are planned to sit farther back from neighboring residences than required by board rules, and about 98% of the facility is sited more than 1,000 feet from the nearest road.
The project has the support of the Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC), which provides electricity to about 240 Ohio communities. NOPEC agreed to purchase all the power generated by the farm.
The siting board staff conducted public hearings on the matter and received comments opposing the project. The Pickaway County Board of Commissioners and the Jackson Township Board of Trustees passed resolutions opposing the project. In April 2023, Circleville Solar, NOPEC, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation filed a joint recommendation to the siting board, which included modifications to the project. The siting board staff didn’t join the recommendation.
In November 2024, the board denied the application, finding that the project failed to meet the requirement in R.C. 4906.10(A)(6), which expects the project to serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” The board stated there was unanimous and consistent local opposition to the facility.
Circleville Solar appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which is required to hear these types of appeals. The Court also permitted NOPEC and the Jackson Township trustees to intervene in the case and argue on their own behalf.
Blocking Project Soley on Local Opposition Unlawful, Developer Argues
Circleville Solar argues the “public interest” prong of R.C. 4906.10(A)(6) reflects a greater interest than just local interest. The developer claims the siting board adopted its own new local opposition standard to reject its application. The company points to a hearing on the project in which a board staff member testified that the local opposition was the sole reason for not recommending the project, and that Circleville Solar met all other technical requirements.
Circleville Solar disputes that there is unanimous opposition and points to several Circleville area officials and leaders who endorsed the project. It also argues the project has significant local benefits as well as statewide benefits. The developer points to a STEM education center that will be on the site to help students learn more about solar-powered electric generation. The company estimates it will generate $63.3 million in total economic input and pay $560,000 in taxes to local governments over the 30-year lifespan of the project.
The benefits from the facility outweigh any generalized opposition cited by the board, the company asserts. The board cannot even establish that the concerns raised by the local governments are legitimate, and Circleville Solar argues it has addressed many issues expressed by opponents.
NOPEC adds that under the law, local interest is only to be taken into consideration when a project fails to show it’s of statewide interest. NOPEC argues it represents local governments and communities across a wide range of Ohio who are seeking Ohio-produced renewable energy and hope to benefit from the price stability offered by solar-powered electricity. The organization maintains the board is violating the law by not factoring in the interests of its 500,000 Ohio customers when it considers whether the project is in the public interest.
Decision Followed Law, Board Argues
The board notes that not only did Jackson Township trustees and Pickaway County commissioners consistently oppose the project, but the city of Circleville also added its opposition later in the process. The board asserts that it weighed the benefits of the project against the impacts, and the local community raised several concerns about the effect on the community, including fire safety, traffic, and reduced availability to farm agricultural land.
The board noted it’s not unique or unprecedented to find a project is not in the public interest, convenience, or necessity because of local opposition. It cited two solar projects and one wind project that the board considered in 2022 and 2023, and found local opposition contributed to the rejection of the projects.
The board noted the General Assembly outlined eight criteria for the board to apply when reviewing a certificate, and nothing in the statutes prohibits or restricts the board from considering the opinions and concerns of local government. The board cites federal government precedent that when weighing the public interest, significant discretion is given to the regulatory agency to determine what is in the public interest. The board argues the Court shouldn’t second-guess its policy considerations when the board is following the law to reach its conclusion.
The Jackson Township trustees, who intervened in support of the board, argue the case boils down to whether the impacts of local communities and the local environment factor into determining if a project is in the public interest. The project may have some benefits statewide, but it threatens the agricultural nature of the township and takes hundreds of acres of farmland out of service, which could impact farmers and local businesses that rely on crop income, the township argues.
Friend-of-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Circleville Solar’s position was submitted by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce. The chamber makes an additional argument that if the siting board denies a private company a permit, then the actions should be considered a regulatory taking. If the board denies the permit, it owes just compensation because it prevents Circleville Solar from using its property in an economically viable way.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Circleville Solar LLC: Kara Hernstein, khernstein@brickergraydon.com
Representing Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council: James Lang, jlang@calfee.com
Representing the Ohio Power Siting Board from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Rhiannon Howard, rhiannon.howard@ohioago.gov
Representing Jackson Township Board of Trustees: Jack Van Kley, jvankley@vankley.law
Did Jury Have Enough Information to Distinguish Among 11 Counts of Child Endangering?
State of Ohio v. Amy Rodriguez, Case No. 2025-0066
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: To uphold convictions for each count when there were multiple counts for the same offense, must the prosecutor only have presented evidence of discernible facts to substantiate the separate counts?
BACKGROUND:
In February 2022, Amy Rodriguez was indicted on 11 counts of endangering a child for offenses allegedly committed against her stepson, identified as “C.D.” Most of the counts were for offenses taking place between January 2018 and April 2021. Each count was a second-degree felony and alleged that Rodriguez “recklessly tortured or cruelly abused C.D., and the violation resulted in serious physical harm to C.D. …”
Rodriguez’s attorneys requested a “bill of particulars,” and the Hamilton County prosecutor provided descriptions of the specific alleged acts. They weren’t numbered, but there were 11. The case against Rodriguez went to trial before a jury. Her parents also were charged with a few counts and were tried with Rodriguez. C.D., then 15 years old, testified at the trial in the fall of 2022.
At the time of the alleged offenses, Rodriguez was married to the biological father of C.D. and C.D.’s brother. The boys, their father, and Rodriguez lived together, along with her two biological children, who stayed at the house about half of the time. Among the experiences C.D. testified to, he said he was forced as punishment to stand in the corner all day long. Rodriguez placed a camera above him to make sure he didn’t nap or close his eyes while in the corner. He said he had to eat while standing and holding the plate. He wasn’t allowed to use the bathroom and would sometimes accidentally urinate on himself. Rodriguez subsequently made C.D. wear pull-up diapers while standing in the corner.
C.D. said he also had to stand on his toes and lean against a wall, using only his fingertips and toes to hold himself up, for more than 20 minutes at a time. At other times, he was made to stay in his room all day with no human contact while monitored by cameras. He was barred from access to food and given different food than his siblings. His siblings testified about C.D. being punished differently than them. They said they were able to order meals from the menu at restaurants, but C.D. wasn’t. Rodriguez would instead pack carrots and a sandwich for him. After C.D. occasionally snuck food at home, Rodriguez put locks on the pantries and refrigerator. A doctor testified that in October 2020, C.D., who was then 12, weighed 67 pounds, which is in the 2.5th percentile for that age. Three months later, he weighed 62 pounds, which placed him in the .29th percentile for his age.
Jury Begins Deliberations, Sends Questions to Court
At the close of the trial, the court approved the prosecutor’s request to amend counts 1 and 4 from second-degree felony child endangering, which required proof that Rodriguez caused serious physical harm, to third-degree felonies, which required proof of causing physical harm. During the closing arguments, the prosecutor reviewed each count, referring to them by numbers.
The trial court then instructed the jury stating, “The charge set forth in each count of the indictment constitutes a separate and distinct matter. You must consider each count and the evidence applicable to each count separately and you must state your findings as to each count uninfluenced by your verdicts on the other counts.”
After about 30 minutes of deliberation, the jury sent a question to the court, asking “For [Rodriguez]’s 11 counts, which punishment corresponds to which count?” The court told the jurors to refer to the jury instructions, the testimony, and the evidence that had been presented to them.
The next day, the jury asked a second question: “Which count aligns with each separate and distinct matter? We are referencing Page 6 under ‘multiple counts’ in the jury instructions.” The court responded that they should refer to the jury instructions and “use your collective memories” to apply the instructions to the testimony and evidence.
A few hours later, the jury issued guilty verdicts against Rodriguez for counts 2, 4, 6, and 10. She was acquitted of the other seven counts, and her parents were acquitted on the charges against them. The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to three to four-and-a-half years in prison.
Rodriguez’s attorney subsequently filed a request for acquittal, with factual details. The attorney argued that a parent sending a child to the corner, having a child stand with their fingertips against the wall, sending a child to his bedroom aren’t torture or abuse, and denying access to food as a punishment doesn’t cause serious physical harm. The court denied the motion.
On Appeal, Stepmother Contests Lack of Distinction Among 11 Counts
Rodriguez appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. She challenged the trial court’s failure to differentiate the counts in the multicount indictment and argued her trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions and the verdict forms – neither of which aligned each count with specific conduct.
The First District noted the jury was clearly confused about which actions corresponded with each count of endangering children. The appeals court concluded because the trial court didn’t provide the jury with instructions or verdict forms that detailed which conduct was the basis for each count, Rodriguez’s convictions and sentence must be overturned. The appeals court added that Rodriguez was convicted of some, but not all, of the counts, so she couldn’t be retried because it was unclear which offenses she was acquitted of. Double jeopardy prohibited her from being retried for any actions that led to an acquittal.
The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
State Argues Distinct Facts Were Presented to Support Each Count
The prosecutor notes that a person charged with a felony in Ohio has the right to an indictment that presents the nature and cause of the accusations. If a written request is made, a defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars, which describes the nature of each charged offense and the defendant’s conduct alleged to prove the offense.
The prosecutor maintains there is no controlling legal authority from the Supreme Court or other Ohio law that explains what level of differentiation is needed when there are “carbon copy” indictments for multiple counts of the same crime. The prosecutor argues the state only needs to present evidence of discernible facts that substantiate each count and support each conviction.
The prosecutor contends that Ohio courts can rely on the record developed at trial and the victim’s testimony to determine whether the counts are adequately differentiated. In this case, the prosecutor asserts that 11 separate factual allegations outlined how Rodriguez committed the endangerment of a child. The jury found that Rodriguez committed four distinct acts of endangering a child, the prosecutor argues. Count 2 was making C.D. stand in the corner all days, eating his meals standing up and monitoring him by a camera. Count 4 involved forcing C.D. to lean on his fingertips against the wall for long periods of time. Count 6 was isolating C.D. in his room all day and monitoring him on camera. Count 10 was for restricting C.D.’s access to food for years. The prosecutor argues the state’s burden was met to present sufficient, specific, and discernible evidence for each count for which Rodriguez was convicted. The prosecutor asks the Court to reinstate Rodriguez’s convictions and sentence.
Stepmother Counters That Jury’s Confusion Shows Lack of Differentiation Among Counts
Rodriguez contends that the counts in the multicount indictment weren’t differentiated but must be before a jury starts deliberating. The 11 counts were identically worded, she notes. Although the prosecutor points to the closing argument when specific conduct was tied to each count of the indictment, Rodriguez counters that this “attempted differentiation” was completely ineffective, as shown by the jury’s repeated requests for guidance about aligning conduct with counts.
The jury wasn’t given the instructions needed to weigh the evidence and carry out its duty as the fact-finder, Rodriguez argues. She maintains that the trial court was put on notice twice of the problem when the jury reached out with questions. However, the court chose not to address the defect by providing further instructions, she notes.
Reversal of the convictions is required because the jurors didn’t know what conduct was the basis for each guilty verdict, making it impossible for her to contest the sufficiency of the evidence on the convictions in an appeal, Rodriguez maintains. Without the ability to appeal, there was a manifest miscarriage of justice, requiring reversal, she concludes.
State Attorney General Files Additional Brief, Will Argue Before Court
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the Hamilton County prosecutor. The attorney general asked to participate in oral argument in the case, and the Court granted the request. The attorney general will share the time allotted to the prosecutor.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office: Jonathon Vogt, jon.vogt@hcpros.orgv
Representing Amy Rodriguez from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Craig Jaquith, craig.jaquith@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
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