Thursday, January 8, 2026
Dept. of Development Services for the City of North Canton v. CF Homes LLC, Case No. 2025-0458
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
Patricia D. Wilkes, as personal representative of the estate of Marquise S. Byrd v. Ohio Department of Transportation, Case No. 2025-0632
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Pedro Badra-Muniz v. Vinyl Carpet Service Inc. et al., Case No. 2025-0656
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
Jasman J. Johnson v. Mercy Health Care, St. Vincent Medical Center, Case No. 2025-0668
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
Was Probable Cause Shown for Warrant to Inspect Rental Property?
Dept. of Development Services for the City of North Canton v. CF Homes LLC, Case No. 2025-0458
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUES:
- When municipalities seek warrants to search homes for a noncriminal purpose, is the Ohio Constitution’s requirement to show probable cause for the search more protective than the U.S. Constitution’s protections in the Fourth Amendment?
- Based on the original public meaning of probable cause at the time of the 1851 Ohio Constitution, must courts have evidence of the probability of unlawfulness at a property to approve a warrant?
BACKGROUND:
The city of North Canton enacted laws in April 2022 to establish a registry of rental units. The city wanted to ensure that properties rented in North Canton complied with certain requirements to provide a safe and sanitary environment for residents and their guests. The standards detailed the need for smoke detectors, carbon monoxide detectors, hot water, trash containers, heating, ventilation, pest control, working appliances, and more.
The laws stated that any premises with eight or fewer units and not occupied by the owner couldn’t be rented or occupied unless the owner applied for and received a rental license from the city. Once an owner applies, the city’s Department of Development Services inspects the rental unit and premises for compliance. If the owner doesn’t schedule the inspection within 30 days of the application filing or declines to allow the inspection, the department’s permit director can ask a court for a warrant to inspect the property.
Apartment Building Owner Declines Inspection
CF Homes owns a six-unit rental property in North Canton and declined to have the property inspected. In July 2023, the city filed a request in the Stark County Common Pleas Court for an administrative inspection warrant. The court found that the city established probable cause and issued the warrant for the inspection.
CF Homes appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's decision. The Fifth District applied a U.S. Supreme Court case, Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco (1967), which considered administrative warrants and the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which requires a warrant based on probable cause for a search. The ruling states:
“Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. …
In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable – and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection – the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement. …
Having concluded that the area inspection is a ‘reasonable’ search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that ‘probable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.”
CF Homes appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to review the issues.
Apartment Owner Argues Probability of Unlawful Activity Needed for Warrant
CF Homes notes there were no allegations made of unlawful conditions, threats, or conduct at the property to support a warrant and an inspection. The inspection sought by the city didn’t involve criminal allegations or an emergency, and there was no consent to the inspection, the property owner adds.
The owner contends that the Ohio Constitution requires more than the U.S. Constitution to support a noncriminal warrant for an administrative inspection. CF Homes maintains that Camara relaxed the standards for establishing probable cause for administrative warrants involving noncriminal searches. Camara stated that probable cause is shown if the basis is reasonable legislative or administrative standards. But CF Homes objects to the Supreme Court of Ohio “lock-stepping” with the U.S. Supreme Court on this rationale.
CF Homes cites to the Supreme Court of Ohio ruling in Norwood v. Horney (2006). CF Homes argues the decision explains that Ohio gives greater protection to property rights than the federal constitution and requires a heightened standard of review for government intrusion into someone’s property, such as a home. The owner’s brief contends that following Camara and the Fifth District decision in this case would give virtually no protection to the homes of noncriminal Ohioans, while ensuring greater protections requiring showing probable cause before searching the “hotel rooms, automobiles, and cell phone of fentanyl dealers and murderers.”
CF Homes also looks to the original public meaning of “probable cause” at the time Article I, Section 14 was placed into the Ohio Constitution. Probable cause was defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion,” and no Ohioan voting to ratify that section of the constitution in 1851 would have thought warrants could be issued to search the interior of private homes for noncriminal matters, the owner contends. It maintains that a search warrant to intrude on an Ohioan’s occupied home can’t be issued without the government showing a probability that something unlawful is going on at the property.
City Counters Courts Have Permitted Warrants for Health and Safety
North Canton notes that the dispute over the warrant was fully analyzed in the trial court, where both sides presented evidence and raised legal arguments. The due process given to CF Homes is greater than what most other subjects of warrants receive, the city maintains.
It also contends that the state Supreme Court, along with other state and federal courts reviewing similar provisions, have long allowed local governments to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of residents by obtaining administrative search warrants to inspect homes when probable cause is shown. Besides Camara, North Canton cites the Supreme Court of Ohio ruling in State ex rel. Eaton v. Price (1958). In Eaton, a Dayton ordinance allowed city housing inspectors to enter any dwelling at any reasonable hour to ensure that minimum housing standards were met. The city maintains that the Supreme Court ruled the local law didn’t violate the Ohio Constitution’s warrant requirement and prohibition on unreasonable searches because property owner rights should be subordinate to the community’s general health and safety.
The city notes that although the Court isn’t mandated to follow Camara, the decision is instructive about administrative search warrants. Camera and the Fourth Amendment are consistent with the Ohio Constitution’s provision regarding searches and warrants, and Eaton aligns with Camara, the city argues.
The city also contends that at the time of the 1851 Ohio Constitution, many municipalities had ordinances to protect residents from unsafe housing conditions. Ohioans would have understood Article I, Section 14 of the constitution to permit investigative searches as part of health and safety regulations, the city argues. It asserts that such searches weren’t interpreted as unreasonable in the constitutional sense. The city adds that sections of state law enacted by the General Assembly also set standards for showing probable cause. R.C. 2933.21 allows courts to issue warrants to search a house “[f]or the existence of physical conditions which are or may become hazardous to the public health, safety, or welfare, when governmental inspections of property are authorized or required by law.”
Finding the North Canton ordinances were reasonable, the lower courts properly issued the warrant, the city concludes.
Additional Briefs Filed Backing Apartment Owner
Amicus curiae briefs supporting the position of CF Homes were submitted by these organizations:
Attorney General, Cities, and Several Others Submit Briefs for City
The following groups filed amicus briefs supporting North Canton:
- Fourteen Ohio municipalities, the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association, in a joint brief.
- Six Ohio legal aid organizations, jointly.
- The Ohio Attorney General’s Office.
The attorney general also will participate in the oral argument in this case, sharing the time allotting to the city.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing CF Homes LLC: Maurice Thompson, mthompson@ohioconstitution.org
Representing the Department of Development Services for the City of North Canton: Brendan Heil, bheil@brickergraydon.com
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Is ODOT Protected From Lawsuits for Injuries Stemming From Bridge Design?
Patricia D. Wilkes, as personal representative of the estate of Marquise S. Byrd v. Ohio Department of Transportation, Case No. 2025-0632
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUES:
- Can Ohio Department of Transportation design decisions be challenged in tort lawsuits without evidence that a government official deliberately considered and dismissed a design element linked to the injury?
- Should a state agency be held to the same standards as private parties in tort cases without increasing its burden to defend against such lawsuits?
BACKGROUND:
In December 2017, Marquise Byrd was a passenger in a vehicle traveling on I-75 in Toledo when a sandbag was dropped from the Indiana Avenue bridge. The bridge was undergoing renovation at the time. The sandbag struck the vehicle and caused fatal injuries to Byrd. Four teenagers were later found guilty for the act.
During the construction project, the north portion of the bridge, which included a sidewalk and permanent vandal protective fencing, had been removed. A sign directed pedestrians to use the other side of the bridge, and a concrete barrier separated the roadway from the open space where the sidewalk had been.
After Byrd’s death, his estate, represented by Patricia Wilkes, filed a lawsuit against the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). On Jan. 12, 2024, the Ohio Court of Claims ruled ODOT wasn't immune from the lawsuit but found Wilkes had not proven negligence. The court entered a judgment for ODOT.
Wilkes appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which in March 2025 reversed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court concluded ODOT owed a duty of care to Byrd, determining the state had general knowledge of the risk of objects being thrown from highway overpasses but failed to take action to prevent that from happening after removing the permanent vandal protection. The court found ODOT failed to act responsibly because it didn’t implement any reasonable measures to prevent such criminal acts during the construction period, particularly after the protective fencing was removed.
The court held Byrd’s death was a likely result of ODOT’s failure to address the vulnerability created by the reconstruction. The Tenth District also rejected ODOT’s claim of immunity, reasoning the state didn’t make a policy decision to take no action; rather, it took no action because it didn’t see the issue as needing attention.
ODOT appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case for review.
Temporary Fencing Decisions Deemed Discretionary, ODOT Asserts
ODOT argues it retains immunity from liability for discretionary acts of governing, which includes its policy decisions about not installing temporary fences on bridges under construction. ODOT contends this immunity is grounded in the constitutional principle of separation of powers between the branches of government. The arguments emphasize that decisions involving governance and policymaking fall under the executive branch and are not subject to judicial review in tort lawsuits.
The department asserts the state's liability in this case must be based on a "rule of law that is generally applicable to private parties." It notes no private party would be held liable for the criminal acts of others in a similar situation. ODOT also states a private party wouldn't be found liable if the plaintiff couldn't produce evidence that a feasible, safer alternative design would have prevented the incident. ODOT maintains its design decisions regarding temporary fencing are discretionary and therefore immune from tort lawsuits.
Wilkes Asserts ODOT's Special Duty to Protect
Wilkes counters ODOT acted negligently. She argues the department failed to mitigate a known risk of harm when it removed the permanent, policy-mandated fencing during the bridge reconstruction. Wilkes contends ODOT should have instructed the construction company to install temporary vandal fencing or other protective measures.
– Andy Ellinger
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Patricia D. Wilkes for the estate of Marquise S. Byrd: John Breen, john@breenlegal.com
Representing the Ohio Department of Transportation from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioAGO.gov
Can Employers Be Sued for Liability if Employee Isn’t Named a Party?
Pedro Badra-Muniz v. Vinyl Carpet Service Inc. et al., Case No. 2025-0656
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
ISSUE: Can an employer be held liable for the allegedly negligent actions of its employee if the time limit to sue the employee has expired?
BACKGROUND:
In May 2019, Pedro Badra-Muniz was the job superintendent overseeing remodeling work at a Dayton nursing and rehabilitation center. There, he slipped, fell, and suffered injuries to his knee that required multiple surgeries. The slip, Badra-Muniz alleges, was due to “an invisible slippery substance.” He further alleged the substance was left on the floor by a subcontractor who worked for Vinyl & Carpet Service at the time.
On March 15, 2021, still having pain and mobility issues after his surgeries, followed by “extensive” rehabilitation, Badra-Muniz filed a lawsuit in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. He named both Vinyl & Carpet Service and the unidentified employee directly responsible for his injuries.
Badra-Muniz later requested from Vinyl & Carpet Service the name and whereabouts of the employee responsible for installing the flooring where Badra-Muniz fell. Vinyl & Carpet Service responded by naming Tommy Dixon and giving Dixon’s mother’s address, the last known address for Dixon. The company’s president later testified during a deposition that Dixon left Vinyl & Carpet Service in 2020, and the company hadn’t been in contact with him since. On March 21, 2022, Dixon was served with notice of the lawsuit.
In June 2022, Badra-Muniz named Dixon in an amended complaint. Vinyl & Carpet Service and Dixon moved to have the case dismissed by the trial court, claiming Dixon was served notice one week after the statute of limitations had expired.
In September 2022, the trial court ruled in favor of Dixon and dismissed the case against him. Then, Vinyl & Carpet Service filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it could not be held vicariously liable for Dixon’s negligence since he was no longer named in the suit. Vicarious liability allows a plaintiff to sue employers in addition to employees. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case against the company.
Badra-Muniz appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. The Second District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Second District cited two Supreme Court of Ohio holdings involving legal and medical malpractice. The Court ruled that a law firm or medical practice couldn’t be found vicariously liable without one of their employees being found directly liable.
Injured Worker Argues Court Applied Case Law Too Broadly
Badra-Muniz maintains that Vinyl & Carpet Service can still be found liable for his injuries even if the subcontractor employee is no longer named in the complaint.
Badra-Muniz contends Vinyl & Carpet Service shouldn’t be able to evade vicarious liability. He points to a 1940 Supreme Court of Ohio ruling, Losito v. Kruse, which states that an injured party can sue an employer, employee, or both.
The Court’s 2009 Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth and 2022 Clawson v. Hts. Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C, decision shouldn’t be applied to his case, Badra-Muniz argues. He argues the Second District applied Wuerth and Clawson too broadly. Those cases, Badra-Muniz argues, were intended for medical and legal malpractice. Badra-Muniz also points to a newly enacted Ohio statute, R.C. 2307.241, to support his argument. That statute was created specifically to curtail Clawson’s application beyond medical and legal professionals.
Company Contends Second District Was Correct
Vinyl & Carpet Service counters that the Second District Court properly applied the Wuerth and Clawson holdings, and in doing so, the company cannot be found vicariously liable since the employee in question was removed from liability. Vinyl & Carpet Service also argues that even if the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Badra-Muniz, it wouldn’t change the outcome of the case because of the trial court’s other holdings in favor of the company.
– Christine Holmes
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Pedro Badra-Muniz: Thomas J. Intili, tom@igsttorneys.com
Representing Vinyl & Carpet Service Inc.: T. Andrew Vollmar, avollmar@bcvalaw.com
Can Patient Sue Hospital Without Pursuing Employees Who Caused Injury?
Jasman J. Johnson v. Mercy Health Care, St. Vincent Medical Center, Case No. 2025-0668
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUE: Can a hospital be held liable for the allegedly negligent actions of its employees if the time limit to sue the employees has expired?
BACKGROUND:
In December 2020, Jasman Johnson was a patient at Mercy Health – St. Vincent Medical Center in Lucas County. She alleged that she had a seizure and fell from her hospital bed and suffered injuries. While she alleged the reason for her fall was based on the St. Vincent employees’ failure to provide adequate care, she only named the hospital in the lawsuit and not any staff member.
Johnson attempted to extend the one-year statute of limitations to file a medical claim using a 180-day letter, which, under Ohio law, allows for more time to file a lawsuit. She sent an 180-day letter only to the hospital and not to any staff member. She refiled her lawsuit 166 days later. St. Vincent responded to the lawsuit and urged the Lucas County Common Pleas Court to dismiss it, arguing Johnson had not extended the time to sue any employee. Since the statute of limitations expired by failing to sue an employee, the hospital couldn’t be held liable, St. Vincent asserted. Johnson then invoked another Ohio law allowing her another year to refile her lawsuit. She refiled in December 2023. St. Vincent again asked the trial court to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations expiring for any lawsuit against an employee.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. Johnson appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals. In a 2-1 decision, the appeals court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding it unnecessary to name non-physician employees in a lawsuit in order to pursue a lawsuit against the hospital.
St. Vincent appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Employer Responsible Only if Employee Can Be Held Liable, Hospital Argues
Johnson’s attempt to hold the hospital liable based on the actions of its employees is based on the long-held principle of respondeat superior, St. Vincent notes. This theory, also known as vicarious liability, holds the employer responsible for the acts of employees acting within the scope of their employment, the hospital explains. The Sixth District and several Ohio courts have misinterpreted a 1940 Supreme Court of Ohio ruling to allow plaintiffs to sue employers without pursuing a suit against the employees who committed negligent acts that injured the plaintiff, St. Vincent asserts. The Losito v. Kruse decision stated that a plaintiff could sue the employer, the employee, or both, which most courts cite as a reason for allowing only the employer to be named in a lawsuit. However, St. Vincent maintains that the ruling in Losito further states that when the liability of the employee is extinguished, the liability of the employer is as well.
Under the proper reading of Losito, the trial court correctly found that the statute of limitations expired when Johnson took no action to name or sue a hospital employee, the hospital asserts. At that point, the right to sue the hospital also ended, St. Vincent maintains. The hospital argues that the Court reaffirmed the holding of the 1940 Losito decision in its 2022 Clawson v. Hts. Chiropractic Physicians LLC decision, in which the Court found the employer, Heights Chiropractic, could no longer be pursued for malpractice after the plaintiff failed to serve notice of the lawsuit on the chiropractor who injured her.
St. Vincent argues that while the Clawson case had to do with a medical malpractice lawsuit, the Court found that the nature of the employer-employee relationship didn’t matter. Once the chiropractor couldn’t be held liable because the statute of limitations to sue him expired, Heights Chiropractic couldn’t be pursued for medical malpractice, the Court held. St. Vincent argues this principle applies to a hospital and its staff. Since Johnson failed even to name a hospital employee who was responsible for her injury in the time allotted, the time to sue the hospital expired, St. Vincent concludes.
Suing Employees Not Necessary, Patient Asserts
The Losito decision restates principles of common law that have existed for centuries, Johnson argues, and allows a plaintiff to sue the employer, the employee, or both. There is no requirement to expend the time and money to identify the nurses, technicians, or other hospital staff to find out who was on duty that night, just to hold the hospital accountable for its negligent practices, she asserts. Further, the General Assembly, in response to recent Court decisions, enacted R.C. 2307.241. The law makes it clear that, other than professionals such as doctors, attorneys, or dentists, who can commit malpractice, it isn’t necessary to name other employees in a lawsuit alleging respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
The Clawson decision didn’t reaffirm the hospital’s belief that Losito found that once an employee’s liability was extinguished, the employer couldn’t be held liable, Johnson maintains. Citing the Sixth District’s opinion, Johnson noted the Supreme Court emphasized that Clawson pertained to medical malpractice only. The Clawson decision extended a prior Court ruling dealing with legal malpractice and determined that it pertained to medical malpractice claims, Johnson asserts.
Johnson explains that she doesn’t have a medical malpractice claim because she isn’t suing a doctor. All other cases claiming injuries by nonphysician employees are for “medical claims,” and proceed under R.C. 2305.11, she notes. That law doesn’t require an employee to be named or sued to pursue the hospital, she argues.
Johnson notes that the hospital admitted that she doesn’t even need to actually sue a staff member. However, they maintained she needed to preserve her right to serve an employee with notice that she was extending the statute of limitations using the 180-day letter and the refiling of the case. She describes the hospital’s argument as a distortion of Ohio law. Johnson does note that while she has no obligation to sue an employee along with the hospital, she will have to prove that an employee’s negligence led to her injury in order for the hospital to be held liable. She argues the hospital is conflating the requirement of suing the employee with the requirement of proving an employee was negligent.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting Johnson’s position was submitted by the Ohio Association for Justice.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Mercy Health Care, St. Vincent Medical Center: Julia Smith Wiley, jwiley@rcolaw.com
Representing Jasman J. Johnson: Jonathan Ashton, jashton@gallonlaw.com
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