Tuesday, February 10, 2026
John Paganini v. The Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland et al., Case No. 2025-0386
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Dollar Bank FSB v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2025-0412
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
Reed Havel v. Board of Zoning Appeals, City of Kent, Case No. 2025-0495
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
Jeffrey Liles v. Richard Sporing, Case No. 2025-0509
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Are Caps on Damages for Catastrophic Injuries Unconstitutional?
John Paganini v. The Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland et al., Case No. 2025-0386
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Does the cap on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice that applies to serious or “catastrophic injuries” violate Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution?
BACKGROUND:
In December 2021, 92-year-old John Paganini visited the Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland, where Dr. Gregory Louis performed cataract surgery. The surgery went well, and Paganini went home that day. Later that evening, Paganini experienced some pain from the surgery, and early the next morning began seeing black dots. Paganini called the center early in the morning and reached the after-hours answering service, which asked him questions about his symptoms. The information was relayed to Louis’s staff, and Paganini was scheduled for an appointment with Louis later that morning. At the appointment, Louis observed signs of a hemorrhage, but didn’t diagnose Paganini with any other condition.
The next day, Paganini’s son called Louis to tell him his father was experiencing worse pain, and Louis referred Paganini to a specialist. The specialist diagnosed Paganini with endophthalmitis, an aggressive eye infection that can lead to vision loss and the loss of an eye. The infection increased, and Paganini lost permanent sight in his eye. His damaged eye was replaced with a glass eye by the end of December 2021.
In 2022, Paganini sued Louis and the Cataract Eye Center. A Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court jury found Louis and the center liable and awarded $1,487,500 in damages. Because of Paganini’s age, the jury was asked to award only noneconomic damages, since he didn’t suffer economic losses such as lost income. The jury found his injuries constituted a loss of a “bodily organ system” and a “substantial physical deformity.”
Paganini filed a motion with the trial court asking it to award the full amount of noneconomic damages and not to apply the damages cap in R.C. 2323.43(A)(3). The cap limits noneconomic damages for serious injuries resulting from medical malpractice to $500,000. The loss of a bodily organ system and a substantial physical deformity are two of the serious or catastrophic injuries listed in the law, which allows for a jury award of up to $500,000. For less serious injuries, the law caps noneconomic damages at $250,000.
The trial court awarded the full $1,487,500 and ruled R.C. 2323.43(A)(3) was unconstitutional because it violates Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution states, “that every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”
Louis and the center each appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. The doctor and his employer appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Cap on Damages Constitutional, Physician Argues
R.C. 2323.43 was a provision in a comprehensive “tort reform” effort made by the General Assembly in 2003 to address rising costs of medical malpractice insurance, Louis explains. Aware that the Supreme Court of Ohio had struck down prior caps on damages, lawmakers adjusted with this reform, including offering separate caps for less serious injuries and catastrophic injuries, the doctor explains. Further, the General Assembly added uncodified law stating that the intent of the new caps was based on the state’s rational and legitimate interest in stabilizing the cost of health care. The legislature stated that through research, it found large noneconomic damage awards were driving up the cost of medical malpractice insurance, leading doctors to leave the state and increasing the cost of providing health care.
The trial court and Eighth District found R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), which places the cap on catastrophic injuries, violated this constitutional provision referred to as the “due course of law” clause. Louis argues that the constitution doesn’t state that remedies are unlimited and allows the legislature to place caps on them for rational reasons. The Eighth District noted that Ohio courts have permitted caps on damages for noneconomic loss for less severe injuries when the laws didn’t cap losses for catastrophic injuries.
Louis contends those laws allowing limitless awards were tied to general injury cases, while this law is specifically related to medical malpractice. When adopting R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), lawmakers tied the caps directly to a rational reason for them, which doesn’t violate the state constitution, they argue. Louis notes the Court has found caps constitutional when the legislature provides a rational reason for enacting the limits.
Caps Unconstitutional, Patient Asserts
Paganini notes the Eighth District has followed Court precedent in striking down the caps on catastrophic injuries. The Court first ruled against flat caps on medical malpractice damages in its 1991 Morris v. Savoy decision because the legislature provided no evidence that the caps were related to lowering health care costs. In its 2007 Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson decision, the Court ruled that new tort reform caps were generally permissible for tort claims because there was an exception stated in the statute that placed no limits on catastrophic injuries. While the Arbino decision addressed another statute, Paganini argues the decision’s logic should apply to R.C. 2323.43(A)(3).
Paganini notes that Louis argues the legislature presented evidence to demonstrate caps are rationally related to controlling health care costs when it passed the reform measures in 2003. Paganini maintains the Court shouldn’t consider only a long-past moment in time. The same reforms also established a Medical Malpractice Commission that was required to report annually to the legislature on the impact of the reforms on malpractice insurance costs.
The Eighth District reviewed the commission’s 2019 report, which revealed that less than 1% of all medical malpractice cases ended with a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. And in only 30 cases between 2005 and 2019 did a jury award a plaintiff damages exceeding the caps. The commission didn’t break out how many of the 30 cases involved catastrophic injuries. From the evidence, Paganini notes, the Eighth District found there is no evidence that shows this very small number of possible cases involving catastrophic injuries could have a meaningful impact on malpractice insurance premiums.
Paganini argues Ohio courts are empowered under the “due course of law” provision of the constitution to determine whether a law capping a remedy is irrational and arbitrary. He maintains the lower courts correctly determined that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to his circumstances.
Attorney General to Participate in Oral Arguments
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting Louis’ position. The Court has permitted the attorney general to share oral argument time with the doctor.
Friend-of-Court Briefs Submitted
The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys has submitted an amicus brief also in support of Louis. A joint amicus brief in support of Louis was submitted by:
- The Academy of Medicine of Cleveland & Northern Ohio.
- The Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice.
- The Ohio Hospital Association.
- The Ohio Osteopathic Medicine Association.
- The Ohio State Medical Association.
The American Association for Justice and the Ohio Association for Justice submitted a joint brief in support of Paganini.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland et al.: Bradley McPeek, bmcpeek@brickergraydon.com
Representing John Paganini: Louis Grube, leg@pwfco.com
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@agoohio.gov
Does Ohio Financial Institutions Tax Infringe on Interstate Commerce?
Dollar Bank FSB v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2025-0412
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
ISSUE: Is the Ohio financial institutions tax unconstitutional, causing some banks to pay a higher rate of tax because they do the majority of their business in other states?
BACKGROUND:
Dollar Bank is based in Pennsylvania and does business in Ohio. It is subject to the Ohio financial institutions tax (FIT). The FIT is a special tax imposed on banks. It isn’t an income tax, but instead is based on “equity capital,” which is the excess of assets over liabilities. The tax rate is variable, with the greater the equity capital, the lower the rate. For the first $200 million in equity capital, a bank is taxed at 0.8%. For amounts between $200 million and $1.3 billion, equity capital is taxed at 0.4%. For equity capital over $1.3 billion, the tax rate is 0.25%.
For banks doing business in multiple states, bank equity capital is apportioned among the states in which they operate. Dollar Bank filed its FIT taxes for tax years 2016 through 2020. Dollar Bank reported its total equity capital in 2017 was $853 million. It apportioned 19.4% of its assets to Ohio. The bank stated that for the five tax years in dispute, about 20% of its business could be apportioned to Ohio for FIT purposes.
Dollar Bank filed for a tax refund in October 2020 for tax years 2016 through 2020, arguing it overpaid the FIT by nearly $7 million during that time span because the state sets tax brackets differently from other states. Using 2017 as an example, Dollar Bank stated it paid $1.33 million in Ohio FIT because Ohio based its calculation on the equity capital attributed to Ohio, which was under $200 million and taxed at the highest rate of 0.8%. In contrast, had the bank done all its business in Ohio, it would have paid a lower rate of about 0.5% on all its equity capital. Dollar Bank argued this violated the U.S. Constitution’s commerce clause and due process clause, and it violated the “internal consistency test” set by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining whether taxes on multistate businesses are constitutional.
The Ohio tax commissioner denied the refund. Dollar Bank appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which affirmed the tax commissioner’s decision. Dollar Bank appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which is required to hear such appeals.
Tax Applied Unfairly, Bank Asserts
Dollar Bank explains that the U.S. Supreme Court developed an “internal consistency test” to determine if a state tax violates the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The test poses a hypothetical question: If every state enacted a tax identical to the tax at issue, would a person doing business in multiple states pay more, in the aggregate, than a person conducting business entirely within the state?
Dollar Bank says the Ohio FIT fails the test. Many states use a tax similar to Ohio, and first determine the tax brackets for the bank, then tax the equity capital based on the apportionment. The bank explained the difference and its effect on its taxes. Based on $853 million in equity capital, with 19.4% of its business apportioned to Ohio, the state determined that $166 million in Dollar Bank's equity capital should be taxed. Because it falls under $200 million, the entire amount was taxed at 0.8% for a total of about $1.33 million.
Dollar Bank argues other states reverse the order of the calculation. Had Ohio first considered that Dollar Bank had a total of $200 million in equity capital taxable at 0.8%, and $653 million in total taxable at 0.4%, it would have computed its total tax at $4.2 million. If it then apportioned the taxable income and taxed 19.4% of the equity capital, Dollar Bank would have paid about $820,000 in FIT to Ohio for 2017. Dollar argues this fails the internal consistency test. Had the bank done all its business in Ohio, it would have paid a lower rate, it maintains. The bank argues it is harmed by Ohio’s higher tax payments because they reduce the interest it earns, which it can pass on to customers, and because the amount it pays in taxes factors into the interest rates it charges customers for loans.
Dollar Bank urges Ohio to adopt an alternative calculation, similar to those of other states, and to apportion the taxes after setting the equity capital amounts in the brackets.
Tax Constitutionally Applied, Commissioner Argues
The tax commissioner argues the internal consistency test examines whether a state tax formula leads to double taxation of out-of-state revenues and if the tax unduly burdens interstate commerce by discriminating against out-of-state businesses. The commissioner maintains Dollar Bank has invented a new theory that the FIT is inconsistent because a multistate tax bank might pay a higher effective tax rate. That isn’t a violation of the commerce clause, the commissioner maintains, because the difference in taxes owed is based on a bank’s own choice on where to do business, and not on its location.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Dollar Bank FSB: Paul Melniczak, pmelniczak@reedsmith.com
Representing Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio: Kirsten Fraser, kfraser@organlegal.com
Are Zoning Laws Limiting Number of Unrelated People Living Together Constitutional?
Reed Havel v. Board of Zoning Appeals, City of Kent, Case No. 2025-0495
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
ISSUE: Is the Ohio Constitution more protective of residential occupancy rights than the U.S. Constitution, as explained in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974)?
BACKGROUND:
Reed Havel owns a house on a lot in Kent in Portage County. The house, which has been in Havel’s family since 1994, has almost 1,800 square feet, six bedrooms, and six off-street parking spots. Havel, a realtor and real estate investor, bought it from his mother in 2022. The house is located in a district designated as “R-3,” which is “high density residential.” Single-family dwellings are permitted in the district.
After Havel became the owner, a city investigation indicated Havel lived elsewhere and six people were living in the house. Two were brothers. The city notified Havel that he was in violation of ordinances that prohibit more than two unrelated individuals from living in a single-family dwelling in R-3 districts. One of the ordinances explains that R-3 districts were “established to encourage single family residential development at high densities in areas of existing development of such density and thereby providing a more orderly and efficient extension of public facilities.” The city notes that the public facilities include managing parking on narrow residential streets, delivering water and sewer services based on the capacity needed for single-family residences, and providing police and fire protection.
In September 2022, Havel applied for a certificate of non-conforming use for the property. The city’s Community Development Department denied the request, viewing the property as a rooming or boarding house that is only permitted in the district if used for those purposes continuously and before the ordinances were enacted. Havel appealed the decision to the Kent Board of Zoning Appeals, which found he didn’t prove that the home had been used as a rooming house for the required length of time.
Homeowner Goes to Court to Challenge Constitutionality of Zoning Laws
Havel appealed to the Portage County Common Pleas Court, arguing in part that the zoning restrictions prohibiting more than two unrelated people from occupying the house are unconstitutional. The trial court agreed.
The zoning board appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which overruled the trial court. The Eleventh District determined that the zoning restrictions in the city ordinances were constitutional as applied to Havel because they encourage a distinct type of property development to provide effective public facilities. The appeals court also noted, “[I]t is well-settled law that zoning restrictions that limit unrelated individuals residing within single family dwellings are constitutional,” citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974).
In Belle Terre, a city prohibited no more than two unrelated persons from living and cooking together in a single-family dwelling. The homeowners, who leased their house to six unrelated college students, challenged the law as unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the restriction, ruling the law didn’t affect any fundamental constitutional rights and had a rational relationship to a permissible government objective.
Havel appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
Zoning Restrictions Infringe on Rights Ensured by Ohio Constitution, Homeowner Asserts
Havel argues that the rational basis review used in Belle Terre is unnecessary and inadvisable when applied to the property rights of Ohioans. Under the Ohio Constitution, Ohioans have basic and fundamental property rights, and the Kent laws infringe on those rights, Havel maintains. The rational basis standard is too lenient to use for a court review of the ordinances because of the state constitutional rights at stake, he argues. He mentions an out-of-state court opinion that criticized rational basis review by noting the ease with which the government can “ace” the rational basis test “while flunking the straight-face test.” The opinion described the standard as “largely a judicial shrug.”
Havel also points to Yoder v. City of Bowling Green (2019), which involved a law in Bowling Green, Ohio, that prohibited three or more individuals from living in a single-family home if they weren’t related by blood or marriage or otherwise met the city’s definition of “family.” The law placed no limit on the number of people living together if they qualified as “family,” yet the law’s stated purpose was to control density. In Yoder, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio rejected Belle Terre. The federal court ruled that Ohio law and Supreme Court of Ohio precedent require a higher level of scrutiny than the federal baseline when determining whether such restrictions on occupancy are constitutional. Yoder stated, “[U]nder the Ohio Constitution, private property rights are ‘fundamental rights’ to be ‘strongly protected’” and require a stricter type of review by courts.
Havel also disagrees that the Kent ordinances fall within its broad “police powers” – which the Ohio Constitution grants to municipalities for police, sanitary, and other similar regulations. Based on his review of texts defining and discussing police powers in the years leading up to the 1912 adoption of those powers in the state constitution, Havel explains that individuals are entitled to use their own property however they like as long as the health or property of others aren’t injured. Legislation that prohibits using one’s own property in a way that causes no such injuries to others is barred by the Ohio Constitution, he contends. His brief argues no Ohioan voting to ratify this provision of the constitution at the time “would have thought it authorized municipal power limitless enough to outright prohibit, without more, three unrelated individuals from living together within the same large home.”
Municipal restrictions on occupancy cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable and must not unnecessarily infringe on the rights of citizens, Havel adds. He contends it is unclear how the Kent restrictions on the number of unrelated individuals living together provide for a more orderly and efficient provision of public parking, water and sewer services, and police and fire protection. “It is also unclear how segregating those not currently living with their families from those currently living with their families accomplishes this,” Havel concludes.
Zoning Restrictions Fall Within Municipal Police Powers in Constitution, City Contends
The brief from the Kent zoning board reiterates that the ordinances were enacted “to encourage single family residential development at high densities in areas of existing development of such density, which provides a more orderly and efficient extension of public facilities.” The zoning restriction prohibiting no more than two unrelated individuals in a single-family dwelling is constitutional under both Belle Terre and based on the police powers bestowed on municipalities in the Ohio Constitution, the board argues. Citing a 1926 case, the board contends that Ohio courts for 100 years have viewed zoning limitations and restrictions as proper as long as the restrictions are a valid exercise of a municipality’s police power. The Kent zoning restrictions are a valid exercise of the city’s municipal police powers, the board argues.
Even if analyzed through the Yoder decision, the Kent ordinances are still valid and should be upheld, the board maintains. It notes that the zoning restriction in Yoder was found unconstitutional as applied in that case because the law was enacted to control population density but had no actual effect on density. In this case, the ordinances were enacted for a different reason – to encourage single-family residential development to provide a more orderly and efficient extension of public facilities, the board notes, and the Eleventh District found the laws to be constitutional as applied to Havel.
The board also argues the zoning restriction is reasonably necessary because it “substantially advances the state’s interests, bears a substantial relationship to those interests, and is not arbitrary or offensive,” adding that “[t]he zoning restriction is less concerned with the relationships of the individual occupants of single-family residences than the use of the property itself as a single-family residence.”
The zoning restriction doesn’t “dogmatically prohibit” more than two unrelated individuals from dwelling together, the board maintains. “[I]t does, however, require some justification so as to complement the neighborhood without unduly straining the delivery of public facilities to the community,” the board’s brief states. As a result, the restriction isn’t arbitrary, the board argues. It maintains that Havel can use his property in one of the permitted or conditionally permitted ways, such as a single-family dwelling with no more than two unrelated residents living there; he can apply for a non-conforming use certificate when he qualifies; or he can rent to three or more unrelated individuals in other districts where that is permitted.
Additional Briefs Filed to Support Homeowner
Amicus curiae briefs supporting Havel’s position were submitted by the Institute for Justice and Buckeye Institute, jointly; the Ohio Realtors; and the Pacific Legal Foundation.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Reed Havel: Maurice Thompson, mthompson@ohioconstitution.org
Representing the Board of Zoning Appeals, City of Kent: Mark Fusco, mfusco@walterhav.com
Could Lawsuit for Bike Accident Injuries Be Refiled After Statute of Limitations Expired?
Jeffrey Liles v. Richard Sporing, Case No. 2025-0509
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: Can a plaintiff use the saving statute in R.C. 2305.19(A) to revive a lawsuit if the statute of limitations has expired and the plaintiff failed to “commence” the suit by completing service on the defendant?
BACKGROUND:
Jeffrey Liles filed a lawsuit against Richard Sporing on July 23, 2020. Liles was suing for injuries that occurred on July 24, 2019, when he was riding his bike in Cincinnati and he and Sporing’s vehicle collided.
Liles made a written request to the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court for delivery by certified mail of certain documents, called service of process, to Sporing. In September 2020, the court provided notice that service wasn’t completed to Sporing.
In February 2022, Sporing filed a request with the court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing Liles failed to complete service. A rule for civil cases states, “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a named defendant ….” In March 2022, while the motion was pending, Liles voluntarily dismissed the case against Sporing without prejudice.
On July 29, 2022, Liles refiled the lawsuit. Service was completed on Sporing in May 2023. Sporing asked the trial court for summary judgment in his favor because Liles didn’t complete service in the case within one year of initially filing the lawsuit and within the two-year statute of limitations for this type of lawsuit. The court agreed and dismissed the case.
Liles appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which overruled the trial court decision. The First District concluded that Liles didn’t voluntarily dismiss the case based on its merits and he could refile his complaint based on the “saving statute,” in R.C. 2305.19(A).
Sporing appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
Driver Argues Bicyclist Voluntarily Dismissed Lawsuit Too Late
Sporing maintains that when Liles voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit in March 2022, the dismissal was actually made with prejudice, meaning it couldn’t be refiled. Sporing asserts that Liles had not commenced the lawsuit by completing service by July 2021, one year after filing the first complaint, and the two-year statute of limitations also had expired before he refiled the lawsuit.
A plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss a case in an attempt to lengthen the time limit in the statute of limitations, Sporing argues. When a plaintiff hasn’t commenced a lawsuit by completing service, Sporing maintains that the case can be voluntarily dismissed only before the one-year time limit for commencing the action or before the statute of limitations expires. Because Liles failed to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit in either timeframe, the lawsuit couldn’t be refiled, Sporing contends.
Sporing maintains that the straightforward Supreme Court of Ohio ruling in Moore v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys. (2020) applies. Liles attempted to commence an action but didn’t obtain service within the one-year timeframe, the lawsuit wasn’t dismissed or refiled inside the one-year timeframe, and the statute of limitations expired on July 26, 2021, Sporing notes. Because of these facts, Liles couldn’t rely on the saving statute to revive his lawsuit by voluntarily dismissing it in March 2022, Sporing concludes.
Bicyclist Contends Driver Adds Requirements to Saving Statute
Liles counters that he met all that was required for the saving statute to apply. He notes that he filed his original lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired, he attempted to commence the lawsuit by requesting service on Sporing, and he voluntarily dismissed the complaint after service wasn’t completed. The saving statute explains that “the plaintiff’s representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of … the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.” Liles argues that when he voluntarily dismissed the case in March 2022, the case was dismissed for reasons other than its merits, and he had one year to refile the lawsuit, which he did in July 2022.
Liles notes that the Supreme Court of Ohio has held for more than 130 years that a voluntary dismissal qualifies under the saving statute as a failure other than on the case’s merits. Also, Moore doesn’t apply because the case involved different circumstances, he maintains. Specifically, the plaintiff in Moore didn’t fail “other than on the merits,” didn’t voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit, and didn’t refile his lawsuit, Liles states.
Additional Brief Filed for Court
The Ohio Association for Justice has submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Liles’ positions.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Richard Sporing: Lisa Haase, lhaase@curryroby.com
Representing Jeffrey Liles: Joel Adam Buckley, jlbuckley@jklawoffices.com
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