Tuesday, May 19, 2026
State of Ohio v. Michael D. Jones, Case No. 2025-0913
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
State ex rel. Ohio attorney general v. Leah Mohiuddin, Casey Goleb, et al., Case No. 2025-1181
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dominic R. Leone III, Case No. 2026-0161
Mahoning County
Would More Advanced DNA Testing Change Outcome of Rape and Robbery Convictions?
State of Ohio v. Michael D. Jones, Case No. 2025-0913
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUE: Under the Ohio postconviction DNA testing law, can a trial court presume that if DNA evidence obtained from the crime scene is not from the victim or the convicted defendant, then the test results would alter the outcome of the original case?
BACKGROUND:
In 2024, Michael Jones filed an application for postconviction DNA testing with the Stark County Common Pleas Court. Jones believed advances in DNA testing might yield results that weren’t possible when he was convicted of rape and other charges in 2007.
The trial court first considered the evidence that led to Jones’s conviction. In March 2007, Jones was living with a roommate, Willis McGeorge, in Canton. That month, Jones robbed two Speedway gas stations, and during the second robbery, he kidnapped and raped the gas station employee.
A clerk at the first Speedway, identified in court records as “I.S.,” stated sometime around 2 a.m., a black male wearing a baggy black winter coat with a hood pulled down to cover his eyes grabbed him and demanded money. I.S. said he could see that the man had facial hair and was missing a tooth. The man struck I.S. with a flashlight, which shattered into pieces, and took about $350 in cash.
Three days later, at a second Speedway, a man entered around 1:15 a.m., wearing a dark hoodie and a cap, which he pulled down to cover his eyes. He told the store clerk, identified as “D.O.,” that he had a gun and to hand him all the money from the drawer. It contained $60. He then directed D.O. to a back room and told her to undress. He demanded more money, and she gave him $80 she had in her purse.
He then ordered her to leave the store and drive him in her van to a dirt road underneath a bridge. He instructed her again to remove her clothes and to perform oral sex on him. After she complied, he got out of the van. D.O. returned to the store and called the police.
Police Investigate Robberies
A Massillon police officer took D.O. to Affinity Medical Center, where they swabbed her mouth and removed her clothing. She was then sent to Mercy Medical Center, where a rape kit was administered, and another oral swab was taken.
Police found a bicycle near the Speedway and cut off the hand grips to submit to the county crime lab for DNA testing. The second Speedway had video recording equipment. The officers obtained an image of the robber and posted it on the patrol room door to alert other officers. One officer immediately recognized the suspect as Jones and told the investigating officers that he had known Jones for more than 20 years and had had several interactions with him in the community.
The next day, a local newspaper published a surveillance photo of Jones from the store. A police officer in a neighboring community called the investigators and identified the man in the photo as Jones. The officer said he had known Jones for more than 15 years. The news article generated two tips from readers, including a call from McGeorge, Jones’s roommate. McGeorge corroborated much of the timeline of the robberies based on his interactions with Jones. He also said Jones used his bike to go to the gas stations.
I.S. and D.O. both identified Jones as their attacker when police showed them a set of six photographs. The crime lab found a mixture of DNA on the bike grips, with the major profile matching Jones. There were no fingerprints on the flashlight, and no DNA was found when the flashlight handle was tested.
Neither blood nor semen was found on D.O.’s clothing that was tested. The rape kit tested by the second hospital, Mercy, found no biological materials other than D.O.’s. Tests of swabs obtained at the first hospital, Affinity, found that the presence of semen from an oral swab was inconclusive. The analyst could not confirm whether there was any biological material on the swab, but determined there was “an indication of something.”
The inconclusive swabs were sent to LabCorp for more advanced Y-STR DNA testing, which focuses on the presence of male DNA. The test revealed no further information.
Convicted Man Seeks to Retest DNA
Jones was indicted on one count of rape, one count of kidnapping, and two counts of robbery. He pleaded not guilty, and at his trial, his defense team maintained that McGeorge, the roommate who owned the bike, was the perpetrator. The prosecutor presented the testimony of the two victims, the investigating officers, along with the three who reported from the photo that Jones was the perpetrator. The prosecution also presented the DNA evidence from the handle grips.
A jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 22 years in prison. In 2008, the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
In 2024, Jones filed an application for DNA testing under R.C. 2953.74. He asked the trial court to have the state retest the bike handles, D.O.’s clothing, and the rape kit swabs. The trial court denied the application, finding that when considered with all the other available evidence presented at trial, any new DNA results wouldn’t be “outcome determinative,” and wouldn’t lead to a new trial.
Jones appealed to the Fifth District. The appeals court found that a new test of the rape kit swabs could lead to a different trial result if the DNA testing yielded male DNA that wasn’t Jones’. It directed the trial court to only test the rape kit DNA.
The prosecutor’s office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Trial Court Had Discretion to Deny Application, Prosecutor Argues
Under R.C. 2953.74(A), if a prior DNA test produced an inconclusive result, a trial court still has the discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to reject a DNA testing application, the prosecutor explains. The law lists several factors for the court to consider. Most importantly, the prosecutor maintains, is whether the DNA test will produce an “exclusion” result that would rule out Jones as the offender.
Specifically, the law requires that an exclusion result, when analyzed in the context of all available admissible evidence related to the offense, would create a strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have found the offender guilty of the offense, the office notes. Jones only offered speculation about what the DNA results might show, and the appeals court lowered the standard for granting DNA testing, indicating the possibility that another man’s DNA found on the rape kit swab would change the outcome in the case, the prosecutor asserts. This is too low of a standard and amounts to the appeals court substituting its judgment for the trial court's rather than relying on the trial court’s assessment of the evidence, the office argues.
The prosecutor maintains the appeals court gave great weight to the possibility that the presence of male DNA in the victim’s mouth would exonerate Jones, but discounts all the other evidence in the case. The trial court properly ruled that new DNA from the rape kit, even if it did produce a conclusive result, likely wouldn’t lead to a different outcome in Jones’ case, the prosecutor concludes.
Appeals Court Correctly Applied DNA Testing Law, Jones Maintains
The Fifth District applied the DNA testing law appropriately, following precedent set by Ohio courts, Jones asserts. The prosecutor is seeking an interpretation of R.C. 2953.74 that would, he argues, effectively end the ability of defendants to seek postconviction DNA testing.
Jones notes the legislature has revised the testing request law over the years as DNA testing technology has advanced. Prior versions of the law required that the DNA test produce an exclusion result, and that it would lead to a different result in a trial, he notes. The latest version of the law softened the requirements, and now the DNA result must show a “strong possibility” that the result would be outcome determinative.
Citing the Supreme Court’s 2022 State v. Scott decision, Jones notes the Court found that when deciding whether to grant DNA testing, a trial court must consider the possibility of the presence of a DNA profile other than the defendant and the victim. The Fifth District applied that precedent in Jones’ case, finding that if Jones were excluded by the male DNA found on the oral swabs, it would suggest another man raped D.O.
In contrast to the prosecutor’s argument, Jones argues the presence of another male's DNA on the swabs would exclude him and could impact the outcome of the case. Jones maintains the rest of the prosecution’s case is weak and it is likely that his roommate, McGeorge, was the perpetrator. But until the DNA testing takes place, there is no way to know what the evidence might reveal, he argues.
Jones asserts that DNA testing is far more advanced than it was in 2007, and new testing methods often produce results that were unachievable years ago. The trial court abused its discretion by not granting the test, and the Fifth District’s ruling should stand, he concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Jones’ position was submitted by the Innocence Network.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Stark County Prosecutor’s Office: Lisa Nemes, lanemes@starkcountyohio.gov
Representing Michael D. Jones: Donald Caster, donald.caster@uc.edu
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Does Attorney General Have Right to Appeal Attorney Fees Awarded to Teacher?
State ex rel. Ohio attorney general v. Leah Mohiuddin, Casey Goleb, et al., Case No. 2025-1181
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: Is the state entitled to appeal an award of attorney fees?
BACKGROUND:
In October 2014, the auditor of state received a complaint that employees of Sunrise Academy, a Columbus-area charter school, had embezzled money from the academy and the local school district.
The auditor explained in a February 2015 report that the academy’s director, Leah Mohiuddin, had the school district hire teacher Casey Goleb as an English language learners instructor for the academy. Goleb’s term ran from December 2010 to August 2013. His compensation and benefits were charged to the local school district’s auxiliary fund, which is provided by the Ohio Department of Education.
The audit found that Sunrise Academy didn’t offer an English language learners program or services to its students. The auditor issued “a finding for recovery for public monies illegally expended” against Goleb and Mohiuddin in the amount of $198,746, based on Goleb’s compensation and benefits.
Attorney General Sues Academy Director and Teacher
In February 2021, the Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed a lawsuit against Mohiuddin and Goleb to recover the misspent funds. The attorney general requested $268,127 plus interest.
A trial before a jury was scheduled in December 2022. Before the trial, Mohiuddin filed a bankruptcy request in federal court, putting her state trial on hold.
Goleb’s trial went forward. In February 2024, the jury found that the state didn’t prove its claims against Goleb. He requested attorney fees. The trial court ruled the state wasn’t “substantially justified” in suing Goleb and granted him $48,362 in attorney fees.
The attorney general appealed the attorney fee award to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The appeals court concluded that it couldn’t consider the case because the state didn’t have the right to appeal the attorney fee award.
The attorney general appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to review the issue.
State Maintains It Can Appeal Attorney Fee Awards
The attorney general argues that R.C. 2505.03 allows “[e]very final order, judgment, or decree of a court” to be appealed. The office rejects the claim that R.C. 2335.39, which addresses compensation for attorney fees, eliminates the ability of the state to appeal an award of attorney fees.
R.C. 2335.39 states that “the court shall review the request for the award of compensation for fees and determine whether the position of the state in initiating the matter in controversy was substantially justified ….” It also provides:
“An order of a court considering a motion under this section is appealable as in other cases, by a prevailing eligible party that is denied an award or receives a reduced award. If the case is an appeal of the adjudication order of an agency pursuant to section 119.12 of the Revised Code, the agency may appeal an order granting an award.”
Nothing in that law prevents the state from appealing an award of attorney fees based on R.C. 2505.03, the attorney general contends. R.C. 2505.03 authorizes appeals of all final orders by the losing party, and R.C. 2335.39 permits appeals by the prevailing party for fee awards that are denied or reduced and for appeals of agency adjudication orders. “Together, [the statutes] permit appeals in all these situations,” the attorney general’s brief concludes.
Teacher Contends That Laws Don’t Allow State to Appeal Award
Goleb counters that the General Assembly enacted laws to award attorney fees so that private parties can afford to defend themselves against unreasonable government behavior. He notes that he has been defending himself against the state audit and subsequent lawsuit for more than 12 years, beginning in 2014.
Goleb points out that according to the trial court, the attorney general failed to prove that the lawsuit against him had substantial justification. He maintains that the state didn’t call any substantive witnesses during a hearing where the state had to provide proof that it was substantially justified in filing the lawsuit.
R.C. 2505.03 explains appeals of final orders, but it is limited and doesn’t apply to the state’s attempt to appeal an attorney fee award, Goleb argues. Nor does any provision in the attorney fee statute, R.C. 2335.39, give the state the right to appeal, he maintains. His brief contends that the state lacks “a general, broad, and unlimited authority to appeal” under either statute. He maintains that the review of the factual and legal issues in this case has been exhaustive and asks the Court for a final resolution.
Parties That Didn’t File Briefs Won’t Argue
Mohiuddin didn’t file a brief in the case and won’t be permitted to argue before the Court. Other parties named by Mohiuddin in the case – Mouhamed Nabih Tarazi, chair of the Sunrise Academy board; the Hilliard School District Board of Education; and its treasurer Brian Wilson – didn’t file briefs in the case, waiving participation in oral argument.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Representing Casey Goleb: Luther Liggett, lliggett@columbus.rr.com
Stayed Suspension Recommended for Former Municipal Court Judge
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dominic R. Leone III, Case No. 2026-0161
Mahoning County
A former judge in Struthers Municipal Court is facing possible discipline for his conduct toward both the Struthers mayor and a domestic relations judge.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which investigated the matters, recommended an 18-month suspension, with 12 months stayed, for Dominic Leone III. In its report, the Board of Professional Conduct determined that the recommendation was too harsh and failed to account for the First Amendment rights of judges as clarified by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Disciplinary Counsel v. Grendell (2025).
However, the board concluded that Leone’s arguments for the complete dismissal of the misconduct charges were “equally untethered to protected speech.” His conduct involving the Struthers mayor led to a civil stalking protection order being issued against him, and his behavior in the domestic relations court involved false statements made with actual malice, the board explained.
The board recommends that the Supreme Court impose a one-year suspension, fully stayed with conditions, on Leone, who has resigned from the municipal court. Leone objects to the board’s findings, legal conclusions, and recommended sanction. His objections have triggered an oral argument before the Court. He primarily asserts that his speech was protected under the Grendell standards.
The disciplinary counsel also objects to the board’s conclusions on four points, including the full stay of a suspension for Leone. The disciplinary counsel additionally maintains that Leone’s speech toward the mayor and the judge wasn’t protected by the First Amendment.
Mayor Seeks Protection Order After Encounter With Judge at Polls
In May 2023, Struthers Mayor Catherine Miller filed a request in Mahoning County Common Pleas Court for a civil stalking protection order against Leone. Miller had previously worked for Leone when he was the Struthers law director. Miller said she was running for reelection to mayor and was at a polling location a few days before she filed the protection order request. She alleged that Leone arrived at the polling location and called her a “fat b****” and threatened to “get rowdy” with her. Miller described his behavior as part of an escalating pattern of harassment that started in January of that year. She said she feared for her safety. The court granted the ex parte order and scheduled a full hearing a few weeks later.
At the hearing, Miller testified that because the mayor’s office and the municipal court are in the same building, she had to check Leone’s schedule to avoid running into him at the office. She said Leone also falsely told many people that the FBI was investigating her. At the polls, she described Leone calling her insulting names, stopping her from speaking to voters by stepping in front of her, and saying “let’s get rowdy” with clenched fists. Court staff and the local police chief also testified in support of Miller. Leone didn’t testify or call witnesses. The court granted the petition for the protection order, which remained in effect until May 2025.
Leone resigned as a judge on the municipal court in September 2023. He appealed the protection order to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which in March 2024 upheld the trial court decision.
Leone Disrupts Domestic Relations Proceedings, Questions Judge’s Impartiality
In May 2024 in the Portage County Domestic Relations Court, the mother of Leone’s child filed a request for a domestic violence civil protection order. She asserted that Leone had threatened her. During a hearing on the petition, Leone, who had an attorney, began making irrelevant arguments to the judge. His comments spanned 69 pages of the transcript. Leone’s attorney and Judge Paula Giulitto repeatedly explained to Leone that his grievances weren’t relevant to the proceedings.
Leone also made allegations against the attorney for his child’s mother. Eventually, Leone agreed to a consent order to extend the time period for the civil protection order. After his attorney withdrew from the case, Leone filed motions to modify or terminate the order, and to recover personal property. At an August 2024 full hearing regarding the protection order, Leone failed to appear, and the trial court granted the order.
Leone appealed to the Seventh District. He alleged that the judge was religiously biased against him. He referred to Judge Giulitto as “the catholic Judge,” “the catholic Trial Court,” and “this catholic court” 36 times in his brief. He stated, “This case is the best example of a catholic court going bonkers for Catholics only.” During the hearing, there was only a short discussion about a baptism and his religious beliefs, the Seventh District noted. It found that the hearing wasn’t about a religious disagreement, and the judge didn’t decide whether to issue the protection order based on religious preferences. The Seventh District upheld the trial court decision and noted that Leone’s conduct at the hearing “demonstrated a lack of respect for the authority of the domestic relations court, as well as an objective lack of self-control.”
Board Reviews Case in Light of Grendell Ruling
The board agreed with two aggravating factors found by the disciplinary counsel against Leone – a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. The board rejected two other aggravating factors – a lack of cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.
The board also determined that Leone should be given credit in mitigation for voluntarily resigning his judgeship before the disciplinary hearing and partial mitigation for his mental health issues and treatment.
The board noted that this is the first disciplinary case involving the free speech rights of judges to reach the Court after Grendell. The board explained that Leone’s conduct toward the mayor while he was a judge can’t be considered speech that is protected by the First Amendment because his insults, bullying, and threats were quasi-criminal, leading to a protection order. They also constituted fighting words, which aren’t protected speech, the board noted. Regarding the claim that the mayor was under FBI investigation, this false statement was made to others with actual malice, meaning a reckless disregard for the truth, the board found.
As for his conduct in Judge Giulitto’s courtroom, the board concluded that Leone’s accusations of her religious bias were “false, undignified, discourteous and degrading” to the court and were made with reckless disregard for the truth.
The board recommends a 12-month suspension, fully stayed, if Leone undergoes an assessment by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP), complies with its recommendations, commits no further misconduct, and pays the costs of the disciplinary proceedings.
Former Judge Argues His Conduct Was Protected Speech
In his objections, Leone maintains that the custody dispute was in essence a disagreement over selecting a religion for the child’s baptism. His statements regarding the judge weren’t knowingly false, but instead were his sincere beliefs about the proceedings. He argues that Grendell protects any “rude” or “unproductive” speech because the comments reflected his honest perception of a government operation, specifically the court.
He contends that his dispute with the mayor was about court funding and the mayor’s accounting practices. Although his speech at the polls was vulgar, it was directed at a public official during a heated primary election, he maintains. This type of political speech is protected by Grendell, Leone argues.
He contests a 12-month stayed suspension as disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and not giving appropriate weight to the multiple mitigating factors, including his resignation from the bench. He asks that the Court waive the OLAP requirement, waive payment of the costs of the proceedings, and dismiss the charges.
Disciplinary Counsel Disagrees With Stayed Suspension and Aspects of Board Analysis
The disciplinary counsel objects to the board’s reasoning when applying partial credit for Leone’s mental health treatment, when considering whether he understood the wrongful nature of his misconduct, and in finding that he was cooperative during the disciplinary proceedings. Regarding his cooperation, the disciplinary counsel notes that Leone refused to answer questions during a disciplinary deposition and claimed to be unaware of basic facts about the underlying matters. The disciplinary counsel cites parts of the proceedings where he says he didn’t recall whether the mayor filed a civil stalking protection order against him, didn’t recall insulting the mayor, and more than 20 other instances where he didn’t recall relevant events.
In the Judge Giulitto matter, the disciplinary counsel points to examples of the false statements Leone made in legal documents filed with the courts and submitted during the disciplinary case. In the situation with the mayor, the disciplinary counsel maintains that Leone’s speech also isn’t protected because it led to a civil stalking protection order against him. The protection order was based on conduct that violates Ohio law, including violent outbursts and irate and abrasive behavior that established physical and mental threats toward her, the disciplinary counsel argues.
The disciplinary counsel points out that Leone’s misconduct continued in the domestic relations case after he resigned from the bench, raising questions about his future fitness to practice law. A period of actual suspension with the proposed conditions is appropriate for Leone, the disciplinary counsel concludes.– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Dominic R. Leone III, representing himself: atttydomleone@gmail.com
Representing the Office of Disciplinary Counsel: Joseph Caligiuri, joseph.caligiuri@odc.ohio.gov
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