Oral Argument Previews for Wednesday, May 20, 2026

Wednesday, May 20, 2026

State of Ohio v. Kiersten Dowell, Case Nos. 2025-1103 and 2025-1210
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)

State of Ohio ex rel. Eugene J. Utz v. Pavan V. Parikh, Case No. 2025-1142
Writ of Mandamus

Lorain County Bar Association v. Anthony Baker, Case No. 2026-0164
Lorain County

State ex rel. Candy Bowling et al. v. Governor Mike DeWine et al., Case No. 2025-1055
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)

Is Resisting Law Enforcement’s Attempt to Hospitalize a Crime?

State of Ohio v. Kiersten Dowell, Case Nos. 2025-1103 and 2025-1210
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)

ISSUES:

Do acts by a patient rejecting an order to be taken for emergency hospitalization under R.C. 5122.10 constitute the offense of obstructing official business or resisting arrest?
To convict for obstructing official business, must the state prove that a defendant committed an illegal act?

BACKGROUND:
In April 2024, a physician ordered the emergency hospitalization of Kiersten Dowell, a patient. Dowell had left the physician’s office, and authorities were notified to locate her and take her to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation to ensure her safety.

An officer in the Harrison Police Department saw Dowell driving and pulled her over. The officer explained that police had been notified of the emergency order and needed to transport her to the hospital for evaluation. Dowell was talking on the phone, seemed to ignore the officer, and wouldn’t get out of her car. A second officer arrived and, after further discussion, Dowell exited her car. She continued to refuse to go with them to the hospital.

The police had a hospitalization report indicating that Dowell had access to guns. For safety, the officers attempted to handcuff Dowell, and she struggled against them. The officers told her that if she didn’t cooperate, she would be arrested for obstructing official business. She fought and twisted for five to 10 minutes before they were able to place her in handcuffs, and she was placed under arrest on two charges – obstructing official business and resisting arrest.

Defendant Challenges Arrest and Charges
In Hamilton County Municipal Court, Dowell filed a motion to dismiss the charges. She argued there was no probable cause to arrest her for obstructing official business based on an order for an emergency hospitalization. Without any probable cause for obstruction, she couldn’t be charged with resisting arrest, she added. She also maintained that state law doesn’t criminalize mental health issues, making her arrest unlawful.

The court found there was probable cause that she committed the offense of obstructing official business, but it occurred in the context of a “medical zone” and she couldn’t be charged with the crime. Without the obstruction charge, there was no lawful basis to charge her for resisting arrest, the court concluded. Both charges were dismissed.

The Hamilton County prosecutor appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which overturned the trial court decision. Based on its case law, the First District determined that the state only had to prove that Dowell’s conduct obstructed the police from performing their official duties, not that she committed some other illegal act. In addition, Dowell then physically resisted being arrested, the First District concluded.

Dowell appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The First District also certified to the Supreme Court that the Dowell decision conflicts with a 2012 ruling from the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court accepted Dowell’s appeal and agreed to review the conflict between the appellate courts. The cases were consolidated for briefing and oral argument.

Offense of Obstructing Official Business
R.C. 2921.31 explains the offense of “obstructing official business” stating, “No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties.”

Woman Argues Resisting Involuntary Hospitalization Can’t Be Crime
Dowell contends that resisting an involuntary hospitalization is different from the crimes of obstructing official business and resisting arrest. She notes that the emergency hospitalization statute, R.C. 5122.10, imposes no penalties for refusing to follow the doctor’s order. A refusal isn’t a crime and cannot be the basis for obstructing official business or resisting arrest, Dowell argues.

Dowell agrees with the Eighth District’s 2012 ruling on this issue. The appeals court stated that obstructing official business requires proof of “an illegal act that quickens the duty of the police officer to enforce the law, and interference with intent to impede that enforcement.”

She maintains that someone who doesn’t cooperate with an involuntary civil commitment during a mental health crisis isn’t committing an illegal act. She also points to the exception given in R.C. 2921.31 for someone who has a privilege to obstruct official business, arguing that a person facing a mental health crisis and an involuntary civil commitment has a privilege allowing them to resist commitment.

“The very nature of the situation is to commit someone who does not agree to be committed. It should be expected that police would meet at least some resistance,” Dowell’s brief states. “It should not cross over into an illegal act until there is at least an attempt or threat to cause physical harm to a public official performing a lawful duty.”

State Counters That Refusing Hospitalization Obstructed Official Business of Police
The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office maintains that obstructing official business only requires a person to engage in affirmative conduct that sufficiently obstructs law enforcement from carrying out their official duties. Refusing emergency hospitalization may not be a criminal offense on its own, the prosecutor notes. However, if someone is sufficiently disruptive or obstructive toward police attempting to discharge their duties under the emergency hospitalization statute, the behavior can rise to the level of obstructing official business, the prosecutor argues.

The same is true in many other cases involving charges of obstructing official business, the prosecutor asserts. The prosecutor highlights examples in which legal conduct becomes illegal when someone obstructs law enforcement: running from the scene of an investigation; trying to hide from police; or causing delays in the issuance of a traffic ticket. Convictions for obstructing official business in these cases have been upheld, the prosecutor notes.

The prosecutor rejects the idea that the General Assembly considered people who are mentally ill as having a privilege that exempts them from the obstructing official business statute. That view could be dangerous to law enforcement by excusing behavior that is otherwise illegal if committed by someone exhibiting symptoms of mental illness, the prosecutor maintains. The prosecutor also argues that Dowell presented no evidence that the legislature intended to grant a privilege in these types of circumstances.

Attorney General Submits Brief, Will Argue Before Court
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Hamilton County prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The attorney general also will participate in oral argument before the Court, sharing time with the prosecutor.

– Kathleen Maloney

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2025-1103 and 2025-1210).

Contacts
Representing Kiersten Dowell from the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office: Joshua Thompson, jathompson@hamiltoncountypd.org

Representing the State of Ohio from the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: John Hill Jr., john.hill@hcpros.org

Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov

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Are Attorney Fees Owed in Case Requesting Records After Cincinnati Fights?

State of Ohio ex rel. Eugene J. Utz v. Pavan V. Parikh, Case No. 2025-1142
Writ of Mandamus

ISSUES:

If a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the production of public records becomes moot because the records are ultimately provided, does a claim for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs remain viable?
Does the Supreme Court of Ohio’s authority in the Ohio Constitution to issue rules of general superintendence over the state’s courts vest the Supreme Court with the power to supersede state law, such as the Ohio Public Records Act?

BACKGROUND:
In the early morning hours of July 26, 2025, chaotic and violent fights broke out among groups of people in downtown Cincinnati. Several videos surfaced on social media showing some of the encounters and attacks. The Cincinnati Police Department investigated and charged multiple individuals.

On Aug. 28, 2025, an attorney for Cincinnati resident Eugene Utz asked the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts to inspect and obtain copies of all filings or entries in the criminal case of Alexander Tchervinski. A disorderly conduct citation had been issued to Tchervinski. He also was shown in a video being stomped, kicked, and punched during the fights. Utz’s attorney was told that a prosecutor had filed a request to restrict the case documents from public access and the clerk’s office was waiting for the judge’s ruling. The attorney was informed that the Hamilton County Municipal Court had scheduled the matter for a hearing on Sept. 8.

The prosecutor’s motion to the court asserted that the case documents should be sealed because Tchervinski faced “the risk of injury to his person” as a victim of the fights. The motion was based on Rule 45 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio. Rule 45 explains the process for courts when restricting public access to court documents, including considering “[w]hether factors that support restriction of public access exist, including risk of injury to persons, individual privacy rights and interests, proprietary business information, public safety, and fairness of the adjudicatory process.”

Tchervinski responded, noting that his identity as one of the crime victims had already been revealed to the public. He requested only that his personal information, such as his address, be redacted to protect his privacy, and he called the prosecution against him “particularly shameful.”

Cincinnati Resident Sues for Access to Records
Having not received the records, Utz filed a complaint on Sept. 4 in the Supreme Court of Ohio asking for a writ of mandamus ordering the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts Pavan Parikh to allow inspection of the requested records and to provide copies. Utz also requested statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs from the clerk for withholding the records.

Following the Sept. 8 hearing, the municipal court judge denied the prosecutor’s motion to seal the records. The same day, the compliance officer for the clerk’s office emailed Utz with records responsive to his request. Utz later alleged that one of the requested documents – the police department’s investigation document – wasn’t provided. Once the omission was later brought to the compliance officer’s attention, she said she “immediately” sent the document on Nov. 20.

The clerk’s office asked the Supreme Court to hold oral argument in the case. The Court granted the request.

Record Requestor Argues Damages and Fees Required Under Public Records Act
Utz notes that some records were produced on Sept. 8, but all of the responsive records weren’t provided until Nov. 20. Based on prior precedent, the production of the records moots his request for a writ, but his claims based on the clerk’s other duties and for damages, attorney fees, and court costs weren’t mooted, Utz maintains.

He notes, though, that damages, attorney fees, and court costs apply to claims that fall under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Public record requests made under the Rules of Superintendence, which address court records, don’t provide for such awards, he points out. The Supreme Court adopted Rules 44 through 47 – the superintendence rules regarding the public’s access to court records – in 2009. He argues, however, that the Court exceeded its constitutional powers by adopting those rules, and the Public Records Act instead controls access to records held by courts and clerks of court.

“[T]his Court has effectively amended the Public Records Act solely through its fiat through the issuance of the Rules of Superintendence and subsequent declarations that courts records (including those kept or maintained by a clerk of court) are not subject to the Public Records Act,” his brief states.

He contends that although the Court has the authority to issue rules regarding the general supervision of state courts, the Ohio Constitution didn’t empower the Court to change or amend statutes, such as the Public Records Act, through the adoption of such rules.

If the Public Records Act is applied, Utz believes he is entitled to statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. He argues the clerk’s office didn’t follow the law requiring the prompt inspection of records, providing copies of the records within a reasonable time, and providing a citation to legal authority when denying a public records request. At the time he requested the records, there were no orders sealing the records, so the clerk’s office had a duty to provide them, Utz contends. By denying the inspection and not providing copies for about a week, the clerk’s office violated the Public Records Act, he maintains. He notes that he also requested copies of the records in the felony cases filed against others allegedly involved in the fights, and he received those records earlier, on Sept. 2.

Clerk Contends Legal Duties Met and Superintendence Rules Bar Monetary Awards
Parikh responds that Utz’s case is moot, under either the Rules of Superintendence or the Public Records Act, because the records have been provided. There is nothing more to compel, the clerk maintains.

Parikh also asserts that he performed every duty required by law. He maintains that the prosecutor’s office filed a motion to seal the Tchervinski case documents under Rule 45, and, given the pending motion, the clerk’s office was unsure how to handle Utz’s records request. The office asked for guidance from the judge and the prosecutor, and those actions don’t indicate bad faith, the clerk contends. Parikh also maintains that waiting for a judge to rule on the matter isn’t a denial of a public records request. Once the judge issued a ruling on Sept. 8, the clerk’s office provided the requested records the same day, he notes.

In addition, the records were provided within six business days of the initial request, Parikh notes. He acknowledges that the clerk’s office inadvertently left out a few pages from the case file, but maintains that the information was made available online on Sept. 8. At most, Utz experienced minor inconveniences stemming from the timeframe – nothing that justifies monetary awards, Parikh argues.

Parikh argues the Public Records Act doesn’t apply to this case, and no monetary awards are warranted. He explains that the Supreme Court has held several times that the Rules of Superintendence are the sole vehicle for obtaining court records after the rules took effect in 2009. The rules don’t authorize damages and fee awards under any circumstances, he contends.

However, if the Supreme Court changes its prior rulings and determines that the Public Records Act applies to Utz’s case and future requests for court records, the clerk’s office shouldn’t be punished in this case for taking a rational position on this legal issue, the clerk maintains.

– Kathleen Maloney

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Representing Eugene J. Utz: Curt Hartman, hartmanlawfirm@fuse.net

Representing Hamilton County Clerk of Courts Pavan V. Parikh from the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: Matthew Miller-Novak, matthew.miller-novak@hcpros.org

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Six-Month Suspension Proposed for Attorney Who Lied to Judge

Lorain County Bar Association v. Anthony Baker, Case No. 2026-0164
Lorain County

A Lorain County lawyer opposes a proposed six-month suspension based on lying to a judge about why he signed his client’s name on a court document without the approval of the client or the judge.

The Board of Professional Conduct has recommended that the Supreme Court of Ohio suspend Anthony Baker based on two ethics violations.

A three-member board panel conducted a hearing in December 2025. In a 2-1 decision, the majority found that Baker falsely represented that his client signed a pretrial entry form and that he made false statements to the trial court to defend his actions. The dissenting panel member wrote that the evidence didn’t prove Baker forged his client’s signature or intentionally lied to the judge, and the panel member indicated he would vote to dismiss the complaint.

Baker maintains that he didn’t violate the rules, but if the Court finds he did, he should at most receive a fully stayed suspension. Baker’s objections to the board’s recommendation triggered the Court to schedule oral argument on the matter.

Lawyer Signs Form After Client Leaves
In April 2024, Baker represented Willis Hamilton in a criminal matter. The two appeared at a morning pretrial hearing before Lorain County Common Pleas Court Judge Melissa Kobasher. Baker requested that a new pretrial hearing be set for the following week.

Baker and Hamilton left the courtroom after the hearing, and Baker instructed Hamilton to return to work. Baker then needed to leave the courtroom to attend another hearing on a different matter. After Judge Kobasher’s morning docket finished, her bailiff texted Baker at 12:25 p.m., directing him and Hamilton to return to the courtroom because Hamilton didn’t sign a pretrial entry form that the trial court had created.

The form includes signature lines for the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, the prosecutor, and the judge. Judge Kobasher requires the defense attorney and the defendant to sign the entry form acknowledging that the defendant was present at the pretrial and notifying the defendant of future court dates. Judge Kobasher stated that if a client is unavailable to sign or has to leave court early, she will permit a lawyer to sign on behalf of the client, provided the attorney ensures the client has authorized the attorney to sign.

When Baker returned to Judge Kobasher’s courtroom a minute after the bailiff sent the text, he was presented with the pretrial entry form. Baker took the form to a conference room just outside the courtroom and returned shortly afterward. He handed the entry form, which had Hamilton’s name printed on it, to the bailiff and left the courtroom.

A court reporter advised the bailiff that Baker had entered the conference room and no one else was in the room. The bailiff also checked the room to see if Hamilton was there, and he wasn’t. The bailiff told Judge Kobasher that there was a question as to whether Baker had inappropriately signed Hamilton’s name to the entry form.

Judge Confronts Attorney at Hearing
The following week, at the rescheduled pretrial hearing, Judge Kobasher confronted Baker about Hamilton’s name being printed on the form. The judge hadn’t informed Baker in advance of the hearing about the discrepancy. Judge Kobasher asked Hamilton if it was his signature on the form, and he said it wasn’t.

Baker admitted to writing Hamilton’s name on the entry, and he said he did so after calling his client to obtain his consent. He said he made the call from the conference room, but the judge questioned that. Baker checked his phone and said he called Hamilton at 11:04 a.m. The judge told Baker that he hadn’t entered the conference room until after 12 p.m., so he couldn’t have called Hamilton from the conference room at that time. Baker then admitted he didn’t call Hamilton.

The judge asked Baker if he had previously signed a client’s name to a court document. He responded he did, after asking the prosecutor for permission. In this case, he didn’t ask the prosecutor, and the prosecutor believed that Baker had gone to the conference room to have Hamilton sign the entry.

Judge Kobasher filed a grievance against Baker with the Lorain County Bar Association. In response, he stated that he had received permission from Hamilton in person to sign the entry, but could provide no evidence.

The panel found Baker violated the rule prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation when he falsely misrepresented to the court that Hamilton signed the entry form. The panel also found he violated the rule prohibiting making a false statement to a court when he lied to the judge about calling Hamilton from the conference room to get his permission to sign. The board adopted the panel’s findings and the recommended sanction.

Lawyer Objects to Sanction
Baker denies that he intentionally meant to mislead the court and that he didn’t violate the rules. He maintains he went to the conference room to gather his thoughts after a busy morning and signed the document. Because Hamilton had been present at the pretrial hearing that morning, Baker recalled receiving Hamilton’s permission to sign the document. A week later, when confronted by the judge, he stated he had no notice that the issue of the entry would be discussed and, “under duress,” tried to explain the events of the day as he could best recall them. He admits he didn’t speak to Hamilton in the conference room, but did speak with him by phone earlier in the morning and in person.

He also indicated that he had signed the form in Judge Kobasher’s court twice before for clients and didn’t recall on either occasion receiving express consent from the judge to sign.

He also objects to a board finding that his client was harmed by his acts, and that it delayed the conclusion of Hamilton’s case by nine months. Hamilton had prepared to enter a plea deal at the May pretrial hearing. But after Baker withdrew that day from representing Hamilton, he obtained a new lawyer and decided to fight the charges. Hamilton later changed his mind, and Baker attributes the delay to Hamilton and his new attorney as they explored their options.

Attorney Clearly Violated Rules, Bar Association Asserts
The bar association notes that Baker stipulated to statements submitted to the board and now wants to retract those stipulations, including his admission of fraud. The bar association indicated that Judge Kobasher, the bailiff, and the assistant prosecutor at the pretrial hearing testified at Baker’s disciplinary hearing. Baker didn’t present any witnesses and had a chance to cross-examine the bar association’s witnesses. The board found the bar association’s case credible and didn’t find Baker’s account to be credible.

At his disciplinary hearing, the panel asked Baker why Hamilton had not been called to testify that he had permitted Baker to sign the document. Baker stated that Hamilton was incarcerated and unavailable. The bar association argues that Baker could have found a way for Hamilton to testify in the disciplinary case and that incarcerated individuals often testify in court proceedings.

The bar association notes that the Court has previously sanctioned Baker. He received a public reprimand in 2021 after being found in contempt of court for his conduct during a criminal trial. Because he has been previously disciplined and committed multiple violations of the rules, the bar association argues that an actual six-month suspension is appropriate.

– Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Anthony Baker, representing himself: bakera5tony@yahoo.com

Representing the Lorain County Bar Association: Margaret O’Bryon, mobryon@fauverlegal.com

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Could Governor Withdraw State From Pandemic Unemployment Benefits Program?

State ex rel. Candy Bowling et al. v. Governor Mike DeWine et al., Case No. 2025-1055
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)

ISSUES:

Does the governor, after entering a federal program to enhance unemployment benefits, have the authority to withdraw the state from the program?
Does a common pleas court have the jurisdiction to consider a case that is declared moot by the Supreme Court of Ohio if the case hasn’t been decided on the merits?

BACKGROUND:
The parties in this case have asked the Supreme Court of Ohio to address a procedural issue to determine if the lower courts had the right to consider the matter. If the appeal could be brought to the Supreme Court, the parties want a decision on whether Gov. Mike DeWine had the authority to withdraw the state from a pandemic-era program that paid an additional $300 per week in unemployment benefits to unemployed workers.

Federal and state governments share responsibility for providing unemployment benefits. In Ohio and most states, standard benefits are paid for up to 26 weeks. In certain circumstances, unemployment benefits can be extended. For the initial 26 weeks, the state pays benefits from taxes collected through a tax on employers, and the federal government pays the program's administrative costs. For extended benefits, the state and federal governments split the cost of paying benefits, and the federal government still pays the administrative costs.

The federal government provides directives on what states must do to receive federal funds for unemployment programs. Ohio adopted what is known as a “cooperation statute,” which requires the state to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Labor to the fullest extent to secure federal funds. The statute, R.C. 4141.43, directs the state to adopt “appropriate rules, regulations, and administrative methods and standards” to participate in unemployment compensation programs.

Governor Withdraws from Program
The COVID-19 pandemic led to business closures and a massive rise in unemployment. The federal government enacted three pandemic-era programs to extend and enhance unemployment benefits. One program, the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program (FPUC), added dollars to the amount payable for weekly unemployment benefits. Between March and July 2020, the program paid an extra $600 per week to laid-off workers. The amount was later decreased to $300 per week. Ohio signed a contract with the Department of Labor to participate in the enhanced benefit program. However, as pandemic workplace restrictions were lifted, employers across the state reported to Gov. DeWine that they were struggling to find employees. The governor notified the labor department in May 2021 that Ohio would no longer participate in the FPUC program as of June 26, 2021. The program was set to expire in September 2021.

Candy Bowling and two other Ohioans receiving FPUC benefits filed a class action lawsuit in July 2021 to prevent Ohio from withdrawing from the FPUC program. Bowling sought a ruling to declare that the governor didn’t have unilateral authority to withdraw the state from the program, and only an act of the General Assembly could permit it. She asked the Franklin County Common Pleas Court for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to rescind the governor’s termination order.

The trial court denied the request for the preliminary injunction, finding that Bowling wouldn’t prevail on the merits of her claim. She immediately appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in August 2021 and ordered the state to remain in the program.

The Ohio Attorney General’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the case. The Court heard oral arguments in May 2022. In November 2022, the Court issued a one-sentence entry stating, “This cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as moot.”

Case Returns to Trial Court Over Objections by the State
After the decision, the attorney general asked the Court to clarify its order, vacate the Tenth District's decision, and remand the case to the appeals court with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. The Supreme Court denied the state’s request.

Bowling then returned to the trial court. She argued the Supreme Court’s dismissal was related to the request for a preliminary injunction. Since the FPUC program expired more than a year earlier, it was no longer possible for the Court to prevent the state from leaving the program. However, she maintained that the workers could still pursue compensation from the state for the 10 weeks the program would have offered the additional $300 per week to eligible recipients.

As the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended R.C. 4141.43, giving the director of Job and Family Services the authority to cease participation in any “voluntary, optional, special, or emergency program” offered by the federal government.

The trial court granted a writ of mandamus to Bowling and ordered the state to reinstate the FPUC participants and secure federal benefits to pay for the final 10 weeks of the program. The attorney general appealed, and the Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Tenth District also agreed with the trial court’s position that the 2022 Supreme Court decision to dismiss the case as moot didn’t apply to the merits and the case could be considered.

The attorney general again appealed the decision to the Court, which agreed to hear the case.

Case Is Over, Attorney General Asserts
The attorney general raises three arguments to support dismissing the case: the Court’s 2022 decision ended the case; the 2023 amendment to the cooperation statute gave the governor the express right to withdraw from the program; and the law, as it stood before the amendment, didn’t prevent the governor from withdrawing from FPUC.

The 2022 Court entry stated the “cause is dismissed.” The attorney general explains “cause” is the same as “case” in legal terms, and that the Court’s ruling ended the case and the Ohio judicial system lacks jurisdiction to further consider Bowling’s challenge to the governor’s withdrawal.

The office notes that the FPUC program was enacted as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), passed by Congress in 2020. The cooperation statute passed by the General Assembly applies to five specific federal laws, most importantly for this case, the Social Security Act and the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970.

The 2023 amendments to the cooperation statute clarify that the governor, because he oversees the director of Job and Family Services, can withdraw from a program created by the CARES Act. And because R.C. 4141.43 only pertains to five federal acts, the law doesn’t prevent the governor from withdrawing from any other unemployment compensation program not established by those acts, the attorney general asserts. Even if the CARES Act could be considered as related to the existing federal programs, the amended law now allows the governor to opt out, the office adds.

The law is also not being retroactively applied, the attorney general maintains. While the FPUC ceased operations in 2021, Bowling is asking the trial court to direct the state to take all necessary steps to obtain federal funds. The trial court’s decision to order the state to pursue the money came after the law changed. The trial court had no authority to disregard the governor’s right under the amended law to leave the program, the attorney general argues.

Additionally, the attorney general maintains that the cooperation statute only requires the state to make rules and regulations to prepare to receive and operate unemployment compensation programs. Nothing in the law compels the state to participate in programs or prevents the governor from leaving a federal program, the office asserts.

Case Can Continue, Bowling Argues
Bowling notes that when the attorney general asked the Court to clarify its ruling, she objected, stating that there were still issues to be resolved in the case even after the program ended. The Court declined to clarify its decision, leaving the trial courts free to consider the merits of her claim that the governor couldn’t withdraw the state from FPUC.

Bowling claims the 2020 version of the cooperation statute applies and that the 2023 amendment can’t be retroactively applied to the case. Even more, the amendment adopted in 2023 applied to the withdrawal of “voluntary, optional, special, or emergency” programs, she asserts. FPUC is not a standalone program but rather enhances the payment amount of the existing regular unemployment benefits, she asserts. While adopted as part of the CARES Act, the federal law directs the program to distribute the funds through the processes set up by the Social Security Act and the Extended Unemployment Compensation Act, she notes.

Not only do the provisions in R.C. 4141.43 direct the state to take advantage of all the benefits of those programs, including FPUC, she argues, but R.C. 4141.45 wasn’t amended by the General Assembly in 2023. R.C. 4141.45 expresses that only the General Assembly can modify the unemployment compensation programs, and the governor has no unilateral authority to withdraw the state from a program governed by the cooperation statute, she asserts.

Bowling also points to the Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 34, which grants the General Assembly the authority to legislate matters concerning the welfare of employees, and the governor’s action violates the separation of powers principle incorporated into the Ohio Constitution, she concludes.

Friend of the Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the attorney general’s position was submitted by the Buckeye Institute. A joint amicus brief supporting Bowling was filed by:

– Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Representing Governor Mike DeWine et al. from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov

Representing Candy Bowling et al.: Andrew Engel, notices@dannlaw.com

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These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.

Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.