Tuesday, June 9, 2026
Checkfree Services Corporation v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2024-1569
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
City of Columbus et al. v. State of Ohio et al., Case No. 2025-1057
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
State of Ohio v. Christopher B. Smith Jr., Case No. 2025-1215
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Geauga County)
State of Ohio v. William J. Jackson, Case No. 2025-1430
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Lake County)
Are Bank’s Purchases of Bill Payment Services Taxable?
Checkfree Services Corporation v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2024-1569
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
ISSUES:
- Is a bill payment service sold to banks and financial institutions a taxable financial service under Ohio law?
- Must the taxability of each component of an integrated service be analyzed when the charges aren’t separate and distinct from the integrated service?
BACKGROUND:
Checkfree Services is part of Fiserv, which offers financial e-commerce services to clients in Ohio and nationwide. Banks and financial institutions generally contract with Checkfree for a suite of digital financial services. Among them are services for debit authorizations and disbursement authorizations. Debit authorization allows bank consumers to withdraw funds from an ATM or pay a vendor using their debit card. Disbursement authorization is a bill payment service, allowing consumers to securely pay bills to third-party vendors.
Fiserv was responsible for collecting Ohio taxes from bank clients on its services as required. Ohio imposes sales and use taxes on automatic data processing (ADP) services and electronic information services (EIS). ADP is the processing of another’s data, and EIS means providing access to data via telecommunications, such as the internet.
Checkfree filed claim with the Ohio tax commissioner for a refund of sales taxes collected from July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2015. Checkfree asserted that sales taxes were incorrectly collected on debit authorization services, bill pay/disbursement authorization services, and integral components of each service. None qualified as taxable ADP or EIS services, the company maintained. It claimed it was entitled to a refund of $1.89 million in taxes paid during the timeframe.
The tax commissioner denied the refund claims, finding the evidence was insufficient to show that the services weren’t taxable. Checkfree appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA).
The BTA determined that debit authorization transactions aren’t taxable. On the issue of whether the separately invoiced components of the debit authorization services were taxable, the board sent the case back to the tax commissioner for further analysis. The BTA also concluded that the commissioner needed to conduct additional review of the taxability of the bill pay/disbursement authorization and its components.
Checkfree appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which must accept this type of appeal from a BTA decision. Tax appeals are typically referred to a master commissioner for oral argument . However, the Supreme Court can grant a request, as it did in this case, to hold oral argument before the full court.
Company Argues Services Aren’t Taxable
Checkfree asserts there was sufficient evidence for the BTA to determine the taxability of the bill pay/disbursement authorization services and the components of both challenged services.
Taxation of the services depends on whether the “true object” of clients’ purchase of financial services from Checkfree is to process the client data, which would be taxable as ADP, or to provide access to Checkfree information, which would be taxable as EIS, the company maintains. It argues neither applies to its bill pay/disbursement authorization services. Based on earlier tax cases, the true object of those services is instead the safe and efficient transfer of funds by paying a designated payee on behalf of a consumer on a due date and collecting that amount from the consumer, the company argues. The company points out it takes on the risk of providing the service with the assumption that the consumer has sufficient funds to cover the bill. The company contends that such activities aren’t taxable.
Checkfree notes that the separately invoiced components of both debit authorizations and bill pay/disbursement authorizations are required by its clients for their internal accounting purposes. However, those separate charges are part of the umbrella services of debit authorizations or bill pay/disbursement authorizations and aren’t taxable, the company concludes.
Tax Commissioner Counters That Bill Payment Involves Activities That Are Taxable
The tax commissioner notes that ADP and EIS are taxable, while personal and professional services aren’t taxable. The tax commissioner maintains that the BTA correctly found Checkfree’s bill pay/disbursement authorization services don’t qualify as personal and professional services, which cannot be taxed. The BTA also determined that the bill pay/disbursement authorization services were automated.
The tax commissioner notes that to provide bill pay/disbursement authorization services, Checkfree processes and sorts data and also prepares checks or payment documents. The commissioner argues that the computer automation of the service and the steps Checkfree takes to handle online bill payments make the service a type of ADP, which is taxable.
The tax commissioner also asserts that it is too soon for the Supreme Court to review questions about the taxability of Checkfree’s separately invoiced components for both debit authorization and bill pay/disbursement authorization services. Those issues were returned to the tax commissioner’s office for further consideration, the commissioner notes.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Checkfree Services Corporation: Steven Dimengo, sdimengo@bdblaw.com
Representing Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Samantha Cowne, samantha.cowne@ohioago.gov
Does State Ban on Local Regulation of Flavored Tobacco Products Violate Home-Rule Powers?
City of Columbus et al. v. State of Ohio et al., Case No. 2025-1057
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUES:
- Based on the original meaning in the Ohio Constitution Home-Rule Amendment, is a “general law” one that operates uniformly across the state or one that meets the test in the Supreme Court of Ohio ruling in Canton v. State (2002)?
- Under Canton, must courts consider all Ohio statutes on the relevant subject rather than the challenged statute in isolation?
BACKGROUND:
Many Ohio cities have passed local laws in the past several years to ban or restrict flavored tobacco and alternative nicotine products. Those products include flavored menthol cigarettes, vape liquids, and chewing tobacco.
In December 2022, the General Assembly added a proposed new law, R.C. 9.681, to a pending bill. The proposed statute banned political subdivisions , including municipalities, from regulating tobacco and alternative nicotine products. The bill passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but the governor vetoed R.C. 9.681, raising concerns about the impact on youth smoking. R.C. 9.681 was then added to the next biennial budget bill. After the governor again vetoed R.C. 9.681, the General Assembly overrode the veto, and the statute’s effective date was April 24, 2024.
A few weeks before the law went into effect, 14 cities sued the state in Franklin County Common Pleas Court. The cities were Columbus, Bexley, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dublin, Gahanna, Grandview Heights, Heath, Hilliard, Oxford, Reynoldsburg, Upper Arlington, Whitehall, and Worthington. In May 2024, the cities of Athens, Barberton, Kent, North Ridgeville, Oberlin, Springfield, and Toledo asked to join the lawsuit .
The cities argued in part that the Ohio Constitution establishes a right to home rule for Ohio municipalities, and the state’s ban infringes on their constitutional right to enact laws limiting flavored tobacco and alternative nicotine products. The home-rule provision in Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution states that “municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”
The trial court agreed with the cities and issued a permanent injunction to block the enforcement of R.C. 9.681.
The state appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which found that R.C. 9.681 isn’t a general law of the state. The Tenth District applied the test from Canton v. State, a 2002 Supreme Court of Ohio ruling that analyzed a home-rule challenge regarding manufactured homes. The Tenth District also considered the text, history, and tradition of the constitution’s Home-Rule Amendment, which was adopted by voters after a 1912 Constitutional Convention. The appeals court determined that the R.C. 9.681 ban does nothing more than limit the powers of municipalities. The statute violates established home-rule case precedent and contradicts the original intent of the Home-Rule Amendment when it was proposed and adopted, the Tenth District concluded.
The state appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to review the issues.
Statute Bans Local Laws on Flavored Tobacco and Alternative Nicotine Products
R.C. 9.681 states:
“The regulation of tobacco products and alternative nicotine products is a matter of general statewide concern that requires statewide regulation. The state has adopted a comprehensive plan with respect to all aspects of the giveaway, sale, purchase, distribution, manufacture, use, possession, licensing, taxation, inspection, and marketing of tobacco products and alternative nicotine products. No political subdivision may enact, adopt, renew, maintain, enforce, or continue in existence any charter provision, ordinance, resolution, rule, or other measure that conflicts with or preempts any policy of the state regarding the regulation of tobacco products or alternative nicotine products ….”
State Argues It Can Deny Power of Local Governments to Enact Certain Types of Laws
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office first explores the constitution’s home-rule provision and the original meaning of “general laws.” The provision states that municipalities have the power to enact local police, sanitary, and other similar regulations that aren’t in conflict with “general laws.” In looking at the text and history of the provision in 1912, the attorney general contends that the term “general laws” would’ve been commonly understood to mean laws that applied uniformly throughout Ohio.
The attorney general notes that the powers of municipalities in Ohio’s early years were strictly limited to powers that the state legislature expressly granted to them. In 1912, elected delegates gathered to consider changes to the Ohio Constitution. One of the changes discussed led to a proposal to provide home rule for municipalities. The attorney general asserts that the convention debates show the delegates wanted to adjust the earlier system that gave the state full control, but that they also intended for the state to keep its ability to prohibit, forbid, or deny local exercises of police power.
With this background, the attorney general argues that the R.C. 9.681 ban on municipalities regulating flavored tobacco and alternative nicotine products is a general law because the statute uniformly applies to municipalities throughout Ohio. The attorney general argues the state regulates the field of tobacco in many ways, and R.C. 9.681 clearly explains the state’s intent to reserve the regulation of the field to itself and to preempt municipalities from imposing their own regulations on top of state laws. Because the local and state laws regarding this field are in conflict, state law prevails, the attorney general asserts.
To be a general law based on the Canton test, a statute “must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.”
The attorney general contends that Canton improperly stretched the meaning of “general law” far beyond its 1912 understanding. The attorney general argues that, for example, voters in 1912 would have expected the General Assembly to be able to grant or limit the legislative power of a municipality, not to prohibit such state legislation.
In addition, the attorney general assertsthat Canton has left the state’s lower courts confused and has fueled ongoing litigation on issues such as firearm regulations, plastic bag use at grocery stores, and tow-truck regulations, among others. The Court should overrule Canton because it was wrongly decided and has defied practical workability, and no undue hardship would result for those who have relied on the ruling, the attorney general argues.
“That the judiciary over time usurped the people’s power and added meaning that they did not intend is a miscarriage of direct democracy that this Court can, and should, remedy,” the state’s brief asserts. “The Home Rule Amendment was never intended to create independent city-states, impervious to the State that created them – or to the sovereign people who created them both.”
If the Supreme Court doesn’t overturn Canton, then the attorney general asks the Court to clarify the test and require courts to consider home-rule challenges in the context of all Ohio statutes on the relevant topic. The attorney general maintains that R.C. 9.681 is part of a comprehensive, statewide legislative scheme regulating tobacco. The statute is also a general law that doesn’t violate Canton’s third prong because it does more than limit municipal authority, the attorney general argues. Specifically, citizens and businesses can still engage in any tobacco-related conduct that isn’t prohibited by state and federal law, and the statute prevents a confusing patchwork of restrictions across Ohio, the attorney general notes. Under Canton, the statute is constitutional, the attorney general concludes.
Cities Assert That State Laws Can’t Restrict Local Lawmaking
The 21 Ohio cities counter that Canton isn’t an outlier but instead follows and consolidates a century of Supreme Court decisions on home rule.
“Canton placed roughly 100 years of this Court’s jurisprudence into a single paragraph for all to follow,” the cities’ brief maintains.
Since 1912, the Court has ruled that the General Assembly lacks the constitutional authority to pass laws that merely put limits on municipal regulation, the city explains. As Canton clarified, the General Assembly can’t pass a statute restricting lawmaking by municipalities because that type of statute isn’t a general law, the cities contend. They argue R.C. 9.681 is just such a statute. The law regulates Ohio municipalities, not the issues surrounding tobacco or alternative nicotine products, the cities maintain.
Applying Canton, R.C. 9.681 isn’t a general law, the cities argue. They contend that it violates both the third and fourth prongs of the Canton test because the statute operates to limit municipal lawmaking and fails to impose a general rule of conduct on the people of the state. The statute instead places rules on municipal legislative bodies, the cities assert. As a result, R.C. 9.681 is unconstitutional, the cities argue.
In 1912, delegates and voters understood “general laws” to be those that operate uniformly and deal with the peace, safety, and health of Ohioans, the cities argue. Attempts, such as R.C. 9.681, to directly regulate municipalities aren’t general laws, the cities assert. They contend that R.C. 9.681 would have been viewed as a special law, rather than a general law, in 1912 because the statute only operates on a selected class – municipalities – rather than the public generally. As understood at that time, home rule meant that the General Assembly couldn’t pass a law simply designed to tie the hands of Ohio’s municipalities, the cities argue.
The cities point to other parts of Article XVIII in the Ohio Constitution. Sections 1 through 14 of Article XVIII were part of the 1912 ballot proposal presented to voters as “Municipal Home Rule.” The proposal didn’t suggest that the intention was to allow the General Assembly “to pass laws robbing a municipality of its authority by simply saying it could not legislate on certain topics,” the cities’ brief asserts. To support that view, the cities note that the ballot proposal conveyed the General Assembly’s authority to specifically oversee other activities, such as debt limits, taxes, reports on financial conditions, and audits.
“[The Home-Rule Amendment in] Section 3 was a complete rejection of the old way of doing things,” the cities’ brief argues. “Thus, it was understood to do more than simply change the conditions from requiring the General Assembly to pass a law allowing a city or village to act to one in which the General Assembly was free to simply pass a law prohibiting all municipal action. Instead, Section 3 radically altered the relationship between the State of Ohio and municipalities.”
Six Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Filed in Case
Amicus curiae briefs supporting the state’s position were submitted by the following organizations:
- National Shooting Sports Foundation.
- Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Energy and Convenience Association, and Ohio Chamber of Commerce, jointly.
- Ohio Wholesale Marketers Association and Ohio Grocers Association, jointly.
The Buckeye Institute and Professor Nathaniel M. Fouch filed a joint amicus brief supporting neither side. The brief instead traces the history of “general laws,” and the institute explains that the Court’s resolution of the legal issues in this case will directly affect individuals the institute represents.
The following groups filed amicus briefs supporting the 21 Ohio cities:
- Ohio Mayors Alliance and Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association, jointly.
- Seventeen state and national public health, medical, and civil rights organizations, jointly.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Representing the 21 Ohio cities: Richard Coglianese, rncoglianese@columbus.gov
Does Duty to Register Include Reporting Different Job Sites Assigned by Employer?
State of Ohio v. Christopher B. Smith Jr., Case No. 2025-1215
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Geauga County)
ISSUE: Are a defendant’s constitutional rights violated due to vagueness if the sex offender notification requirements in state law don’t define “place of employment,” which is an element of the offense for failure to register?
BACKGROUND:
Christopher Smith Jr. of Cleveland is a tier III sex offender who is required by state law to register with law enforcement and report certain information. Smith’s reporting requirements include notifying law enforcement of residence, school, higher education institution, and place of employment address, as well as changes to any of this information.
In 2023, Smith was employed by the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO), which offers job services to people recently released from incarceration. CEO’s address is on Hamilton Avenue in Cleveland. Through CEO, Smith was placed with Immaculate Cleaning, a janitorial company that provides cleaning services throughout northeast Ohio. Court documents indicate that he registered his place of employment and address as CEO/Immaculate Cleaning with the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Office and his parole officer.
Smith was assigned to work on a cleaning crew for Immaculate Cleaning for several weeks at Camp Wise, a children’s camp in Geauga County. Smith and others on the crew would meet at a Cleveland location and travel by van to Camp Wise. After they completed the cleaning duties each day, they would travel back to Cleveland.
In August 2023, a Geauga County grand jury indicted Smith on one count of “failure to register change of employment,” a requirement in R.C. 2950.05. He asked the Geauga County Common Pleas Court to dismiss the charge, which is a third-degree felony. He argued “place of employment address” refers to CEO’s business location in Cuyahoga County. The county prosecutor maintained that the phrase means the location where someone works. In October 2024, the trial court denied Smith’s motion, finding that his place of employment was where he spent the majority of his workday.
Smith pled no contest to the charge. The trial court sentenced him in January 2025 to three years of community control, with credit for 213 days of time served.
Smith appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing the statute is unconstitutionally vague under both the U.S. and Ohio constitutions. The Eleventh District disagreed and upheld the trial court decision. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
Registrant Argues His Place of Employment Didn’t Change
Smith contends that he complied with his statutory requirements. R.C. 2950.05(F)(2) states, “No person who is required to register a new residence, school, institution of higher education, or place of employment address with a sheriff … pursuant to divisions (B) and (C) of this section shall fail to register with the appropriate sheriff … in accordance with those divisions.” He argues his place of employment didn’t change. He notes he worked for Immaculate Cleaning through CEO, maintaining that Camp Wise was simply a work site.
He asserts that the statute’s use of “new … place of employment” is unconstitutionally vague in his circumstances. The due process clause of the U.S. Constitution voids a criminal law if it fails to define an offense sufficiently for ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited. “Place of employment address” isn’t defined in the Ohio statute. Smith argues differing interpretations of the statute are reasonable based on the common usage of the words.
He points out that an employee of a pizza shop might deliver pizza to another county. However, the worker would say the worker’s place of employment is the pizza shop location, not the homes or businesses where the pizzas are delivered each day. Also, Smith’s attorney in this case is the Geauga County public defender, and his office is in Chardon. When he argues a case in Warren before the Eleventh District or in Columbus at the Supreme Court, his place of employment is still the public defender’s office in Chardon. For a plumber or electrician, the place of employment is the shop location, not the address in the cities or counties where they do jobs for their assignments, Smith maintains. He contends that the common usage and understanding of a person’s place of employment doesn’t change because the person works at a different job site location each day. He adds that a common person of ordinary intelligence wouldn’t give a job site location as their place of employment on paperwork, such as health insurance forms or a credit card application.
It couldn’t be reasonably expected that he would register with the sheriff in Geauga County because his employer selected that work site for him for those weeks, Smith maintains. He concludes that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to know from the statute’s language what is prohibited or specifically required by the statute to comply with the reporting requirements.
State Responds That Short-Term Jobs Require Registration in That County
The Geauga County Prosecutor’s Office counters that R.C. 2950.05 isn’t ambiguous or subject to different reasonable interpretations. The prosecutor argues the law clearly conveys that individuals must register a change of their employment address with the sheriff of the county in which they are employed.
The prosecutor notes that R.C. 2950.05(F)(2) cross-references divisions (B) and (C) of the statute. Those divisions refer to requirements in R.C. 2950.04, which describes what must be included on the registration form. R.C. 2950.04(C)(5) states that the form for an offender who is registering as a result of “being employed in this state or in a particular county in this state … for more than three days or for an aggregate of fourteen or more days in any calendar year” must include “the name and current address of the school, institution of higher education, or place of employment of the offender … who is registering, including any other employment information, such as the general area where the offender … is employed, if the offender … is employed in many locations;”.
The common usage of “place of employment,” the prosecutor contends, is the location where the work is taking place and the individual is performing the work. The provisions in R.C. 2950.04 recognize individuals who, in circumstances similar to Smith’s, are working short term in several locations, the prosecutor maintains. The prosecutor argues the registration duties apply to even those individuals whose physical work locations may change periodically during the year.
Smith wasn’t at the camp or in that community for a brief period, such as an hour, the prosecutor notes. He instead was in the community for full workdays over several weeks. The law’s focus and intent is knowledge of the current whereabouts of the individual required to register, the prosecutor maintains. Because Smith was at Camp Wise for at least three days or an aggregate 14-day period in a calendar year, he had to register that address with the Geauga County Sheriff’s Office when he was working at the camp, the prosecutor concludes.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Christopher B. Smith Jr. from the Geauga County Public Defender’s Office: Paul Mooney, publicdefender@co.geauga.oh.us
Representing the State of Ohio from the Geauga County Prosecutor’s Office: Nicholas Burling, nicholas.burling@gcpao.com
Did Trial Court Adequately Explain Harsher Sentence After Retrial?
State of Ohio v. William J. Jackson, Case No. 2025-1430
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Lake County)
ISSUE: When imposing a harsher sentence after a criminal defendant’s retrial, what findings must a trial court make on the record to indicate the sentence is not vindictive?
BACKGROUND:
William Jackson was tried twice for crimes he committed during an April 2020 drive-by shooting at the Eastview Meadows Apartments in Eastlake. After his second trial, Jackson received a longer sentence than initially imposed by the court. To hand down a longer sentence, the trial judge is required under U.S. Supreme Court precedent to demonstrate that the additional time isn’t motivated by vindictive reasons.
Jackson’s First Trial
Jackson was charged with attempted murder, felonious assault, two counts of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation, and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. Evidence presented at Jackson’s first trial in Lake County Common Pleas Court indicated that on the morning of the shooting, Jackson sent a text message to Tricia Jenkins that he was going to kill Vincent Anderson. Jackson instructed Jenkins to delete the message.
Jackson and Jenkins lived together at Eastview Meadows. On the morning of the shooting, Jackson wasn’t initially at the apartment complex. He asked Kraig Davis to give him a ride to Eastview Meadows. Phillip Herbuck was a friend of Anderson’s and received a text from Anderson asking him to drive Anderson to Eastview Meadows. Herbruck testified that he picked up Anderson at a nearby motel and drove him to the apartment.
Anderson didn’t testify at Jackson’s first trial. Jackson and Herbruck did. Jackson said he believed Anderson was at the apartment complex to harm his family, and he retrieved a firearm when he saw Anderson. Jackson said Anderson was armed, and after the two exchanged words, Anderson reached for his gun. Jackson said he shot two warning shots to scare Anderson, and then Anderson shot at him. Jackson then said he shot his gun at Anderson in rapid succession. Jackson said Anderson fired a second shot at him after Anderson got into Herbruck’s vehicle.
Herbruck testified that Anderson was unarmed. He said Anderson was already back in the vehicle when the shooting began. Davis’ vehicle was driving at them when the shooting started, he said.
Police found no damage to Davis’ vehicle and found 10 bullet casings from one gun at the scene. Bullets were lodged into Herbruck’s vehicle and flattened a tire. Also, two bullets struck the apartment building, but no one was physically injured during the shooting.
A jury found Jackson guilty of the charges. At his sentencing, the trial judge noted that Anderson didn’t appear at the trial and expressed disappointment in not hearing any testimony regarding why Anderson was at Eastview Meadows.
The trial court sentenced Jackson to a minimum of three years in prison for attempted murder and ran the prison terms for the other charges concurrently with the attempted murder sentence. The judge also sentenced Jackson to one three-year firearm specification and one five-year firearm specification, which were to run consecutively to each other and the attempted murder sentence. Jackson received a total of 11 to 12.5 years in prison.
Both Jackson and the Lake County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the conviction and sentence to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. The prosecutor argued the trial court was required to impose two three-year gun specifications at a minimum and one five-year specification. The 11 years of mandatory prison time for the gun specifications would increase Jackson’s minimum sentence to 14 years.
The Eleventh District found the trial court committed errors and vacated Jackson’s conviction and sentence. A second trial was ordered.
Jackson’s Second Trial
At the second trial, Anderson testified. The evidence indicated that Jackson threatened Anderson the night before through social media messages. Anderson was staying at a motel with his girlfriend, and she also testified at the second trial, indicating that Jackson, in a social media post, pointed a gun at the camera and threatened her and Anderson.
Anderson received immunity to testify. The prosecutor informed the trial court that, before the trial started, Jackson asked a friend to post on social media court information indicating that Anderson had received immunity, along with a message accusing Anderson of being a snitch. Anderson explained he went to the apartment the next morning to confront Jackson and intended to fight him. But he said he was unarmed, and video surveillance footage from the apartment complex supported his testimony.
The prosecution also introduced recorded phone calls Jackson made to an incarcerated friend. In one call, about a month before the shooting, Jackson told his friend he was going to kill Anderson. A later recorded call after the shooting revealed Jackson admitting he called Anderson the night before the shooting and threatened him.
Jackson was convicted of the same charges. When sentencing Jackson, the trial court noted any harsher sentence than the one originally imposed would be presumed to be vindictive, and the judge had to explain why a longer sentence was issued. The judge noted the additional evidence and testimony, as well as his concern about the effort to intimidate Anderson immediately before the trial.
The judge imposed three gun specifications, as requested by the prosecution, for a total of 11 years in prison, and increased the prison time for the charges from a minimum of three years to six years. Jackson was sentenced to 17 to 19 years in prison.
Jackson appealed to the Eleventh District, arguing the increased sentence was vindictive. In a 2-1 decision, the appeals court ruled the trial judge didn’t adequately explain why the sentence was increased and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The trial judge conducted a new hearing, listed his reasons for the increased sentence, and reimposed the same 17- to 19-year sentence.
Jackson appealed again, arguing nothing the trial judge stated indicated why a longer sentence was justified. The appeals court agreed and ordered another resentencing. The prosecutor’s office appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Judge Properly Explained Reasons for Increased Sentence, Prosecutor Asserts
The Lake County prosecutor noted that, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1960 North Carolina v. Pearce decision, the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for successfully appealing a conviction may not play any part in sentencing after a new trial. If a judge wants to impose a more severe sentence, the court must place on the record information about the defendant’s conduct that warrants the increased punishment.
The prosecutor argues the Eleventh District is stretching the requirements of Pearce by requiring the trial court to explicitly state its reasoning for imposing additional time in prison on Jackson. The prosecutor maintains the trial court isn’t required to provide such specific reasoning on how it arrived at a different conclusion. Under the requirements of Pearce, the trial judge provided enough information by explaining the differences between the two trials. The judge stated that the victim testified in the second trial and that new information was presented regarding the reasons for the encounter. The trial judge also noted the efforts to intimidate Anderson were new and not present at the first trial. These statements, the prosecutor argues, provide support for increasing the punishment. The prosecutor also explains that half of the six-year increase was attributed to a mistake the trial made during the initial sentencing by not imposing 11 years in prison for the gun specifications.
The trial judge was aware that the court needed to demonstrate it wasn’t being vindictive and adequately explained at both resentencing hearings why the longer prison term was justified, the prosecutor concludes.
Trial Court Wrongly Increased Sentence, Jackson Argues
Jackson argues that the prosecutor presents the issue as if the trial judge didn’t use the right words when explaining the sentence or that the Eleventh District requires a certain script to be followed. Instead, Jackson maintains that a trial court can explain a harsher sentence in its own words but, in that presentation, must identify which trial evidence supports the increased punishment and what information was unavailable, undiscovered, or not fully developed at the first trial.
Jackson argues that a second trial often yields more information, but that doesn’t necessarily explain why a longer sentence is justified. He maintains that much of what was presented at the second trial was available to the prosecution and the trial court during the first trial. The Eleventh District focused on what was produced at the second trial that justified increasing the sentence, he notes, and didn’t see an explanation from the judge.
During the resentencing, the trial judge listed what was different from the first trial, Jackson asserts. He acknowledges that state sentencing laws might have required three more years in prison for the gun specifications. However, nothing the judge noted explains why the prison time for the charges he was convicted of in the first trial were increased. To add time, the trial court must do more than list new evidence, or else a reviewing court will not be able to determine if vindictiveness is the reason for the additional punishment, he concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Lake County Prosecutor’s Office: Jennifer McGee, jennifer.mcgee@lakecountyohio.gov
Representing William Jackson: Richard Hackard, richard@hackard.com
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