Wednesday, June 10, 2026
Mon Cheri Davenport et al. v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company et al., Case No. 2025-1102
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
J. Benjamin Drushal et al. v. Tyler Miller et al., Case No. 2025-1336
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Pike County)
[A.A] v. [S.P.], Case Nos. 2025-1374 and 2025-1563
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Mike Caradimitropoulo v. Richard F. Kruse, Case No. 2025-1641
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
Did Vehicle Owners Establish Common Issue to File Class-Action Lawsuit Against Insurer?
Mon Cheri Davenport et al. v. Progressive Direct Insurance Company et al., Case No. 2025-1102
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Can vehicle owners form a class to file a lawsuit challenging a single adjustment used by their insurers when determining the value of the total loss of their vehicles?
BACKGROUND:
When an insured vehicle becomes a total loss because of an accident, the insurer is required to pay the actual cash value (ACV) of the totaled vehicle to the insured. To determine ACVs, Progressive Insurance employs a number of valuation techniques, including a program developed for the company by insurance industry specialist Mitchell International. The Mitchell software allowed Progressive to determine a “projected sold adjustment (PSA).” The concept of the PSA is that many vehicles sell for less than their listed value. Mitchell gathers data from a leading automotive research company and compares vehicle list prices with the prices at which vehicles actually sold.
Progressive implemented the PSA as part of its ACV determination for its Ohio customers. Some Ohio customers argued the use of the PSA was lowering the payments Progressive made for their totaled vehicles. Given the lower amount, customers argued they couldn’t buy a comparable vehicle to replace their lost vehicle without incurring additional out-of-pocket costs.
Three customers, Mon Cheri Davenport, Candice Watts, and Kathi Cassi, filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Progressive in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. The three sought to serve as plaintiff representatives in a class-action lawsuit against Progressive. They argued that all customers whose total-loss claims were adjusted by Progressive using the PSA were entitled to a new valuation without the PSA.
Progressive sought to dismiss the class-action lawsuit. It argued key requirements for establishing a class were missing, including that common evidence is essential to all of the claims in the class. The company argued that determining ACV is an individualized process, noting the various factors for each totaled vehicle, including mileage, condition before the accidents, and customizations.
The trial court agreed to certify the class, and Progressive appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeal. The Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Progressive appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Vehicle Valuations Not Suited for Class-Action Lawsuit, Insurer Asserts
Progressive notes that vehicle owners in other states have attempted similar class-action lawsuits regarding how adjustments are made when determining ACV. The company points to four federal circuit court decisions in which the courts refused to certify the class, finding that valuation decisions are individualized and based on the specific factors of each vehicle. Because a common element of the case does not predominate, the plaintiffs failed to prove the case can be resolved as a class action, the insurer argues.
Progressive explains that the requirement to pay ACV is a part of the insurance contract, and the customers’ contracts with Progressive don’t specify how ACV will be calculated. The company notes that both sides agree there are numerous industry-accepted methods to determine ACV. Progressive maintains the use of PSA is not a breach of the contract unless the customers prove it actually resulted in a payment of less than ACV. The company argues it and other insurers use Mitchell’s PSA, and the results have shown that, for the most part, the calculations are very accurate to the actual price to purchase a comparable vehicle.
Progressive maintains that customers cannot simply claim they were harmed by the PSA or prove that, after Progressive made further adjustments based on other vehicle factors, they were paid less than ACV. More than just removing the use of PSA would need to be considered to prove the customers received less than the amount to which they were entitled, and those are individual issues, Progressive asserts. Customers who believe they were harmed by Progressive’s calculations must file individual lawsuits and cannot proceed as a class, the company maintains.
Method of Assessing Value Can Be Challenged as a Class, Vehicle Owners Argue
Davenport and the other vehicle owners filed their merit brief under seal, and their arguments aren’t publicly available. However, Mr. Auto Sales, a car dealership, submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Davenport’s position and has asked the Supreme Court to share oral argument time with the class members.
The dealership argues that Progressive fails to mention that the use of PSA is not acceptable under Ohio insurance law. Mr. Auto Sales notes that Ohio Administrative Code 3901-01-54 establishes the methods for which ACV can be determined in Ohio. The primary method to obtain the actual cost is to obtain the price of comparable replacement vehicles. For years, Progressive had followed that method when valuing total-loss vehicles, the dealership argues, before it began adding the PSA. The dealership maintains that the PSA has reduced the values below those of comparable vehicles.
Ohio requires vehicle insurers to incorporate the valuation rule into their contracts. Progressive argues that its contracts don’t specify how it will value vehicles, and it is not in breach when it adds the PSA. The dealership argues Progressive is wrong, and Progressive is obligated to use the comparable vehicle method whenever possible. The dealership notes the rule allows for two alternative methods to value vehicles, including the use of electronic databases, such as those used by the PSA. However, the rule is clear: the alternative can only be used when the comparable vehicle method isn’t available, and Progressive has not shown an inability to use the comparable vehicle method in Ohio, the dealership maintains.
The Eighth District found the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion when it allowed the vehicle owners to file as a class, and that the common resolution would be to remove the PSA from the ACV determination made by Progressive. The dealership argues this is a proper approach and would reveal which class members had their ACV improperly lowered.
Friend-of-the Court Briefs Submitted
The American Property Casualty Insurance Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce filed a joint brief in support of Progressive. The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys also filed a brief supporting Progressive, and the Ohio Insurance Institute and National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies filed a joint brief backing Progressive’s position.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Mon Cheri Davenport et al. : Andrew Shamis, ashamis@shamisgentile.com
Representing Progressive Direct Insurance Company et al.: Jeffrey Cashdan, jcashdan@kslaw.com
Can Landowner Challenge Trial Court’s Transfer of Property Without Seeking a Stay?
J. Benjamin Drushal et al. v. Tyler Miller et al., Case No. 2025-1336
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Pike County)
ISSUES:
- Is an appeal of a judgment to a creditor moot if a challenger to the judgment fails to seek a stay of the judgment and post a bond?
- Under R.C. 5313.07, does a trial court have the authority to convey title of land under a land contract to judgment creditors, or must a court order the sale of the land?
BACKGROUND:
Glen and Sharon Nickell owned property in Pike County that included a house and other structures. In 2019, they entered into a land contract with Tyler and Tara Miller. The Millers made some payments toward the property acquisition until they stopped payments. The Nickells and Millers entered into a new contract in 2022, and the Millers owed the Nickells about $101,000. They continued paying for the property. Under Ohio land contract law, the sellers are known as “vendors,” and the buyers as “vendees.”
In 2023, Tyler Miller borrowed money from J. Benjamin Drushal and Rusty Eager to acquire timber rights in Kentucky. Miller defaulted on the loans. Drushal and Eager received a judgment against Miller for $167,000. When the lenders learned Miller had no assets to pay back the loan, they filed a “creditor's bill” in Pike County Common Pleas Court. The lenders sought to have the Millers pay the money due, and if they could not, to have their property transferred, or conveyed, to the lenders. At the time, the Millers were not in default on their payments to the Nickels for the land, and the Nickels, as vendors, were owed $46,000 by the Millers.
Drushal and Eager asked the trial court to substitute them for the Millers in the land contract with the Nickells. They also asked that they be given possession of the Pike County property and that the county recorder be directed to convey the title of the property from the Nickells to them.
The Nickells contacted their attorney, who advised them not to respond to the case filed by Drushal and Eager. The attorney maintained that regardless of whether the Millers or the creditors were the vendees, the court would assure they, as the vendors, would get paid the remaining $46,000 owed on the contract.
Because neither the Nickells nor the Millers responded, the trial court granted default judgment to Drushal and Eager. Not only did the court grant the creditors the right to transfer title of the property into their names, it also ruled they owed nothing more to the Nickells.
The Nickells appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. The Fourth District noted that the Nickells had not requested that the trial court stay the judgment and didn’t file a bond in the amount of the property’s value, about $177,000, to preserve their right to appeal. The Fourth District ruled that once the property was transferred to the creditors to satisfy the judgment against the Millers, the appeal was moot.
The Nickells appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Appeal Available, Landowners Assert
The Nickells note that the appeals court relied on the Supreme Court’s 1990 Blodgett v. Blodgett decision, which found a voluntary satisfaction of a judgment renders an appeal moot. The Fourth District considered the trial court’s transfer of the title as a voluntary satisfaction because the Nickells didn’t respond to the lawsuit and a default judgment was issued.
The Nickells maintain a court judgment is an “involuntary” satisfaction of a judgment, and a voluntary satisfaction is one that is an agreement between the parties. The Nickells were unaware at the time that their property would be used to satisfy a debt owed by the Millers to their creditors. This transfer was not voluntary, and Blodgett doesn’t apply, they assert. They argue their right to appeal is not moot.
Further, the Nickells maintain the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it conveyed the property to the creditors. The Nickells note that R.C. Chapter 5313 governs land contracts. Under R.C. 5313.01, when a vendee defaults on a payment to a vendor, the trial court can conduct a judicial sale of the defaulted property and pay the vendors what is owed to them before disbursing any of the other sale proceeds. The trial court had no authority to convey the property to the creditors, but only to pay the Nickells first and then pay the creditors what was owed after conducting a judicial sale.
Because the trial court exceeded its authority, an appeal can be filed any time, and doesn’t require a stay or a bond to secure the appeal, the Nickells assert.
Property Transfer Valid, Creditors Assert
Drushal and Eager argue that the Blodgett decision reflects more than a century of Ohio case law. A voluntary satisfaction of the debt owed to them by the Millers was granted by a trial court, and the Nickells have no right to appeal, the creditors assert.
The creditors explain that the term “voluntary” usually doesn’t mean the debtor agrees to give up property to pay off the debt. Rather, the term means the trial court had the authority to award a judgment to the creditors once the case was completed. In this case, neither the Millers nor the Nickells responded to their lawsuit. The trial court was within its rights to convey the property to satisfy the debt the Millers owed, the creditors assert. Ohio law is very clear, they argue, that to appeal the trial court’s decision, the Nickells were required to seek a stay of judgment and post a bond. They didn’t do it, and the Fourth District correctly ruled that the appeal was moot, the creditors state.
The creditors dispute the claim that the trial court exceeded its authority when it transferred the property. The trial court didn’t exceed its jurisdiction, they argue. It had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the creditor’s claim. The creditors argue that nothing in R.C. Chapter 5313 prevents a judge from conveying the title to a creditor when there is a default of a land contract. And even if the trial court made an error when it did so, the trial court didn’t exceed its authority, they maintain.
Arguably, the trial court made an error when exercising its jurisdiction to rule on the creditors’ claim, they assert. If that is the case, the error can be appealed. But to appeal, the Nickells had to use the proper process to challenge the trial court decisions, and they didn’t, the creditors assert. The Nickells defaulted by not responding to the lawsuit and didn’t seek a stay or a bond, which was necessary if they wanted to argue about the trial court’s jurisdiction, the creditors conclude.
Couple Unable to Argue
The Millers didn’t file a merit brief in the case and aren’t permitted to participate in oral argument.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Tyler Miller et al.: James Kingsley, kinglseyjrlaw@yahoo.com
Representing J. Benjamin Drushal et al.: Douglas Drushal, ddrushal@ccj.com
Can Appellate Courts Review Protection Orders if Objections Weren’t First Filed in Trial Court?
[A.A] v. [S.P.], Case No. 2025-1374 and 2025-1563
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUES:
- Does a trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision to grant a civil stalking protection order violate the due process rights of the respondent?
- If a respondent doesn’t object in a trial court to a decision granting a civil stalking protection order, do Ohio courts of appeals have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the order?
BACKGROUND:
In May 2023, the ex-girlfriend of a man, who is identified as S.P., requested a civil protection order against him from the Franklin County Common Pleas Court. The couple had split in November or December of 2022. The ex-girlfriend retracted her request after S.P. agreed to write an apology letter that would confirm there would be no further contact between them. A notarized letter in July 2023 reflected this settlement.
In September 2023, the woman received three phone calls and an email from a man identifying himself as a mediator, stating that S.P. wanted an opportunity to resolve other issues. She didn’t respond. In January 2024, S.P. contacted her via social media, but she didn’t reply.
S.P. filed a lawsuit in February 2024 against the woman and one of her relatives, alleging defamation, extortion, and other civil claims. In May of that year, the woman filed a petition requesting a civil stalking protection order, alleging that she had repeatedly asked S.P. to stop contacting her, but he wouldn’t, and she was suffering mental distress. Both parties represented themselves in court and presented their arguments to a magistrate at a full hearing in August.
The magistrate found the evidence established a pattern of conduct by S.P. that caused the woman to be in fear of physical harm and to experience mental distress. The magistrate granted a protection order for three years. A judge reviewed and adopted the decision.
Appeals Court Determines It Can’t Hear Case
S.P. appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. After briefs were submitted and oral argument was held, the Tenth District ruled it didn’t have jurisdiction to hear S.P.’s appeal because he didn’t first file objections to the decision with the trial court before he appealed to the Tenth District.
S.P. appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Tenth District also notified the Supreme Court that its decision conflicts with rulings from other Ohio appellate courts. The Supreme Court accepted S.P.’s appeal, agreed to review the conflict among the appellate courts, and consolidated the cases.
Appellant Asserts That Orders Can Be Appealed Even if Objections Aren’t Filed
The notice from the trial court of its decision granting the protection order stated: “All objections and/or appeals may be made pursuant to the Civil Rules of Procedure as applies to civil protection orders under Civ. Rule 65.1. Copies of the foregoing Order, which is a final appealable order, was/were served on the parties indicated below pursuant to Civil Rule 65.1.”
S.P., who is representing himself in the case, points out that the notice describes the decision as “a final appealable order.” He adds, though, that the notice did not explain that, under Rule 65.1 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, he first needed to file objections to the decision before he could appeal to the Tenth District. He argues the notice is misleading and infringed on his rights.
R.C. 2903.214, which governs these types of protection orders, explains that a court’s order granting a protection order is a final, appealable order. By categorizing civil protection orders as final and appealable, the statute involves a substantive right to appeal, and the civil rules can’t infringe on that right, S.P. contends. However, the Rule 65.1 requirement that a party must file objections before filing an appeal sets up an additional review by a trial court after its judgment has been made. S.P. argues that extra post-judgment review is unconstitutional.
“[A]lthough Civil Rule 65.1 underwent a lengthy review process before it was adopted, it becomes apparent that, in practice, particularly in cases such as this, the attempt to balance courts’ desire to shift the burden of hearing these cases to magistrates while still preserving the speedy process established by R.C. 2903.214 resulted in a complete abrogation of a fundamental right created by the statute: the right to a direct appeal and the recognition that a civil protection [order] must be a ‘final, appealable order,’” his brief states.
Other Appellate Courts Found They Had Jurisdiction to Hear Appeals, Appellant Adds
S.P. also maintains that other Ohio appeals courts have determined that they have jurisdiction to consider appeals of civil protection orders even if objections weren’t filed in the trial court before the appeal.
Decisions from the First District Court of Appeals and Third District Court of Appeals note that Rule 65.1(G) specifically states that once a trial court adopts or denies a magistrate’s decision on a petition for a civil protection order, then the decision is a final appealable order. When there is a final appealable order, an appeals court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal even if a party fails to first file objections in the trial court, the courts ruled.
S.P. contends that his notice and others issued by trial courts don’t include a conspicuous warning of the consequences of failing to object to a civil protection order. With such confusing notices, a party is deprived of a meaningful opportunity to file objections, be heard, and preserve rights for appeals – all which are violations of due process, he asserts.
Other Party Didn’t Submit Brief
The woman who obtained the protection order hasn’t filed a brief in this appeal and cannot participate in oral argument before the Court.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2025-1374 and 2025-1563).
Is Receiver Entitled to Immunity After Failing to Secure Disputed Property?
Mike Caradimitropoulo v. Richard F. Kruse, Case No. 2025-1641
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
ISSUE: Under what circumstances can a court-appointed receiver claim immunity in a lawsuit holding the receiver personally liable for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty?
BACKGROUND:
Mike Caradimitropoulo paid Spectre Powerboats to build him a boat. Spectre failed to build the boat and agreed to refund Caradimitropoulo $143,600. The boat builder didn’t pay, and Caradimitropoulo sued Spectre in Logan County Common Pleas Court in June 2020. The shifting finances of Spectre prompted the trial court to appoint a receiver to safeguard more than $1.1 million in assets under Spectre’s control.
Richard Kruse was appointed receiver and was charged with overseeing the wind-up of Spectre’s business. He was to take possession, control, and manage its operations, and oversee all its real and personal property. The agreement didn’t extend to the personal assets of Spectre’s owner, Todd Lamb. It did indicate that Lamb couldn’t take or transfer ownership of any Spectre assets without Kruse’s permission.
During the receivership, the parties agreed to allow Lamb access to certain buildings and assets so he could finish building several boats and earn money to avoid bankruptcy. Kruse required the agreement to state that he couldn’t be held responsible for the loss of any of the assets because he didn’t have complete control of the property.
However, Lamb filed for bankruptcy and claimed that some of Spectre’s assets that Kruse oversaw belonged to Lamb, not the company. Kruse inventoried 1,121 items valued at about $1.1 million that belonged to Spectre. At some point in 2021, Lamb removed much of the equipment from the Spectre buildings and moved to Florida, where he opened a new boat manufacturing company.
In bankruptcy court, the parties learned that Kruse had been notified of the removal but didn’t file a police report or an insurance claim. The bankruptcy court overseeing the liquidation of the remaining Spectre assets provided them to creditors. Caradimitropoulo was one creditor and received a small amount of what Spectre agreed to pay him.
Caradimitropoulo filed a lawsuit against Kruse in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The federal lawsuit claimed Kruse was negligent and breached his fiduciary duty by failing to administer Spectre’s assets. Kruse claimed that as an appointed officer of the trial court, he was entitled to immunity and couldn’t personally be sued for handling Spectre’s business.
The federal district court indicated it couldn’t decide the case until it was clear that, under Ohio law, a receiver can claim quasi-judicial immunity when acting within the scope of their authority. The judge asked the Supreme Court of Ohio to answer whether receivers are entitled to immunity when sued personally for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court agreed to answer the questions.
Court Officers Entitled to Immunity, Receiver Asserts
For more than a century, Ohio has granted judicial immunity for judges and individuals assisting judges in their duties, Kruse explains. Those assisting judges are acting in a “quasi-judicial capacity,” he notes, and the state has recognized that those assistants are entitled to “quasi-judicial” immunity because they are acting on behalf of the judges who appoint them.
Kruse argues that Ohio law hasn’t expressly extended quasi-judicial immunity to court-appointed receivers, but it should. The only acts Kruse undertook were those authorized by the court, and the only actions he took when overseeing Spectre were in his official capacity as the receiver, he maintains. The Court should find that, under Ohio law, a receiver is immune from lawsuits so long as the receiver acted within the authority granted by the trial court, Kruse asserts.
In the alternative, the Court could consider a rule used by other states. In those states a receiver is granted immunity if the receiver acts within the authority granted by the trial court and in good faith, the receiver suggests. The good faith requirement would add another condition that protects receivers unless they act maliciously or corruptly in carrying out their duties, Kruse maintains. The Court should reject a lower standard, such as basing immunity on whether the receiver acted reasonably or with ordinary care, he argues.
Receiver, Not Entitled to Judicial Protection, Boat Buyer Argues
Quasi-judicial immunity is reserved for individuals “intimately associated” with the judicial phase of a legal proceeding, Caradimitropoulo argues, and many individuals involved in assisting the court during a legal proceeding are not granted quasi-judicial immunity. The receiver’s duty is to provide a service to the court by managing a defendant’s property during the legal dispute. Those services are not intimately associated with the judicial process and don’t entitle the receiver to immunity, the boat buyer asserts.
The buyer notes other states have adopted a rule that protects receivers but allows for lawsuits when a receiver is negligent or breaches their duty. He suggests that Ohio courts should establish a rule that those seeking to sue a receiver first seek the consent of the court appointing the receiver. If a court finds receivers exceeded their authority or failed to use ordinary care, then receivers can be held personally liable, he suggests.
The buyer argues the rule Kruse seeks would set a high bar, making it virtually impossible to hold a receiver accountable for any failures. Kruse’s proposed rule would place the appointing court in the position to determine whether the receiver failed to perform the duties of the court. If so, the receiver faces the same reasonable or ordinary care as any other individual being sued for negligence, Caradimitropoulo concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Richard F. Kruse: Zackary Stillings, zstillings@fbtgibbons.com
Representing Mike Caradimitropoulo: Michael Spillane, mspillane@cmrs-law.com
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