A Trumbull County man on death row since 1992 must follow a process set by state law, and not rely on court procedural rules, to challenge his sentence, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

A Supreme Court majority ruled that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals wrongly allowed Danny Lee Hill to rely on the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure to request that a trial court vacate his death sentence because he has an intellectual disability.

Writing for the Court majority, Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy explained that state lawmakers enacted the postconviction relief law in 1965. The law specifies certain requirements that must be met when making a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction. Postconviction relief provides an opportunity beyond a traditional appeal to contest a conviction and sentence.

The Trumbull County Common Pleas Court denied Hill’s postconviction relief petition and refused to reconsider his death sentence. After U.S. Supreme Court rulings changed how states should evaluate intellectual disabilities during sentencing, Hill filed a motion in 2022 under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, asking the trial court to reconsider his death sentence.

“Postconviction relief-proceedings are special statutory proceedings to which the Civil Rules are inapplicable, so Hill may not challenge the judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a motion under Civ.R. 60(B),” Chief Justice Kennedy wrote.

Justices Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined the chief justice’s opinion.

Justice Deters also wrote a concurring opinion “to underscore the injustice to the victim’s family caused by the delay in bringing finality to this case.” Hill was convicted of the 1985 torture and murder of 12-year-old Raymond Fife and has repeatedly challenged his conviction and death sentence.

Justice Deters noted several delays in the federal and state court systems. While trial courts must give proper consideration to postconviction challenges, they should be aware of the suffering of victims and their families when “courts unduly delay resolving matters before them,” he wrote.

He noted the trial court took three years to deny Hill’s initial postconviction relief petition, and then another year to dismiss the challenge he initiated in 2022.

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Jennifer Brunner agreed that Hill could not use the civil rules to reopen his case. Still, she noted the state has not yet allowed Hill to make his claim that he has an intellectual disability under the latest standards established by the courts.

“It is at the very least questionable whether Hill’s death sentence is constitutional,” she wrote.

She added it was “extremely concerning” that the state was trying to prevent Hill from having his claim reviewed under the current standards. She encouraged the lower courts to resolve the matter “at the earliest possible instance.”

Sentencing Disputes Focus on Intellectual Disability
Hill was convicted in 1986 of aggravated arson, kidnapping, rape, felonious sexual penetration, and aggravated murder for killing Fife in 1985. He appealed his conviction, and in 1992, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted his intellectual disability when considering his death sentence. The opinion stated that two psychologists testified that Hill’s IQ score was either 64 or 68. The Court found the evidence indicated Hill “knew right from wrong” and affirmed his conviction and sentence.

Hill then proceeded to challenge his conviction in federal court and raised the issue that, because of his intellectual disability, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars his execution.

As his case was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its Atkins v. Virginia decision in 2002, finding the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled people. The high court directed states to adopt their own definition of what constitutes intellectual disability for the death sentence, and Ohio did so in its 2002 State v. Lott decision.

Hill then returned to state court. Under R.C. 2953.21, he asked the Trumbull County trial court in 2003 to overturn his death sentence based on the new standards. An expert representing the Trumbull County Prosecutor’s Office and another hired by the trial court determined Hill was not intellectually disabled under the new standard. An expert hired by Hill found Hill had “mild” intellectual disability.

In 2006, the trial court denied his postconviction relief petition. Hill appealed the denial in state court and reopened his federal appeal.

New Standard Set for Executions of the Intellectually Disabled
As Hill’s appeals were being considered, the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions in 2014 and 2017, finding that the standards applied by Florida and Texas courts failed to meet the appropriate tests for determining intellectual disability. Based on those decisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio in 2019 found the state needed to update its standards to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s expectations.

Hill was unsuccessful in getting the federal courts to overturn his death sentence. In 2022, he made two arguments to the Trumbull County trial court to revisit its 2006 denial of his postconviction relief petition. He filed a motion under Civ.R. 60(B), which allows a party to ask a court to rescind its prior judgment. He argued the trial court used the prior standard to find he did not have an intellectual disability, and that under the new standard adopted in 2019, he should be deemed ineligible for the death penalty.

Hill attached an affidavit from the expert who testified on behalf of the prosecutor’s office in his postconviction relief hearing. The expert who had stated that Hill was not intellectually disabled now concluded he was and has been his entire life.

The trial court found that Hill could not challenge the prior decision under Civ.R. 60(B) but must instead follow the procedures in R.C. 2953.23. The trial court also stated it would consider Hill’s motion as a second request for postconviction relief. The court explained that certain requirements under R.C. 2953.23 must be met for the court to consider a second petition, and that Hill did not meet them. The trial court denied his petition.

Hill appealed to the Eleventh District, arguing that he could use the civil rules to reopen his case. In the alternative, if the court found he could not use the rules, he argued he met the requirements to file a second postconviction petition.

The Eleventh District agreed that Hill could use the civil rule process. It did not address his second claim.

The prosecutor’s office appealed the Eleventh District’s decision to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Analyzed Postconviction Process
Chief Justice Kennedy explained that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to all cases. Civ.R. 1(C) states that instances where the rules “would by their nature be clearly inapplicable” do not apply to a case. One of the exceptions includes “special statutory proceedings.”

A special statutory proceeding is a type of case that did not exist in common law but was established by legislation. In response to a U.S. Supreme Court order that states must provide their prisoners a “clearly defined method” to claim they have been denied their federal rights, the General Assembly authorized postconviction relief petitions, the opinion stated. The Court determined that the postconviction relief process is clearly a special statutory proceeding.

The Court examined whether the use of the civil rules would alter the procedures set by the postconviction relief statutes. The opinion noted that lawmakers established not only a procedure for petitioning for postconviction relief, but also the method for bringing successive or delayed petitions.

The opinion stated that R.C. 2953.21 states “without reservation” that it provides the “exclusive remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge” to a conviction, a sentence, or any other related order to conclude the case. Allowing the use of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion would conflict with the statute’s purpose of having one process to consider postconviction relief cases, the Court concluded.

The Court remanded the case to the Eleventh District to consider Hill’s second argument that the trial court incorrectly denied his right to file a second challenge after the standards on intellectual disabilities changed.

2024-0352. State v. Hill, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1427.

View oral argument video of this case.

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