The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that it cannot order the Sandusky County Board of Elections to remove a suspended judge seeking reelection from the Nov. 3 general election ballot.

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the board of elections correctly decided that under state law it could not permit a protest to the candidacy of Sandusky County Common Pleas Court Judge Jon Ickes. His opponent for the office filed a protest in August after Ickes won the Republican primary election in May. The Court also noted that the board, on its own, could not have considered removing Ickes from the ballot if the board found he was no longer qualified to hold office.

The Court suspended Ickes from the practice of law in August for two years and removed him from judicial office. Sandusky County Common Pleas Court Magistrate Kimberly Ontko, an independent candidate challenging Ickes in the general election, asked the board of elections to remove Ickes from the ballot. She argued his suspension no longer qualifies him to hold the office.

The board met four days after Ontko filed her protest and denied it on the grounds that it was filed too late. She then asked the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing Ickes on the ballot, or in the alternative, to prohibit the board from declaring Ickes the winner of the election.

In today’s opinion, the Court explained that under R.C. 3501.39, and its 2002 ruling in Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, a protest against the petition of a candidate can only be filed prior to the primary election. The board had no authority to consider Ontko’s challenge filed in August, several months after Ickes was certified as a candidate for judge.

Justices R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined the per curiam opinion.

Justice Jennifer Brunner concurred, noting that current law does not provide the Court with the ability to prevent voters from being “presented with a ballot that contains the name of a judicial candidate who is ineligible to hold the office for which he seeks election.”

Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justice Patrick F. Fischer concurred in judgment only.

Candidate Seeks Opponent’s Removal From Ballot
Ickes was appointed to a vacancy on the common pleas bench in July 2020 and won election to a six-year term which began in January 2021. During his time in office, he became the subject of a disciplinary complaint, and a Board of Professional Conduct panel conducted a hearing in May 2025. The professional conduct board later found Ickes committed some of the alleged ethical violations and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with the suspension fully stayed.

As the disciplinary matter was being considered, Ickes filed for reelection in January 2026, seeking the Republican nomination for the office. Ickes was unopposed in the Republican primary, and the board certified him as a candidate for the general election.

In August 2026, the Court adopted the board’s findings that Ickes committed professional misconduct, but imposed a harsher sanction than the board recommended. The Court suspended Ickes for two years with an immediate suspension without pay from his judicial office.

The next day, Ontko sent a letter to the board of elections captioned, “Election protest regarding Jon Marshal Ickes.” The letter indicated that in her view, the Court’s decision had the effect of disqualifying Ickes’ candidacy for judicial office. She asked the board to take swift action to ensure Ickes’ name did not appear on the general election ballot.

At a special meeting four days later, the board permitted Ontko’s attorney and the chairman of the Sandusky County Democratic Party to speak. The Court noted the record does not indicate whether the board took sworn testimony or that any documentary evidence was offered. The board rejected the protest, and Ontko sought a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus from the Court to prevent the board from placing Ickes on the ballot.

Supreme Court Analyzed Protest Law
The Court noted that the key question was whether Ontko's protest was allowed under Ohio election statutes, and, if not, the Court could not issue a writ of prohibition. Ontko argued her protest was properly issued with the board of elections under R.C. 3501.39.

R.C. 3501.39(A) contains four subsections that permit a board of elections to reject the placement of a candidate or issue on the ballot. The first provision indicates that a protest to a candidacy may be filed under any Revised Code section that provides a protest procedure. The Court noted that the relevant provision providing a protest procedure is R.C. 3513.05.

R.C. 3513.05 pertains to candidacy protests filed prior to the primary election by members of the candidate’s own party. Since Ontko did not indicate she was a member of the Republican Party and did not file her protest prior to the May primary, the board of elections could not accept her August protest under this provision, the Court stated.

Ontko pointed to R.C. 3501.39(A)(2), which does not contain the clause requiring a protest to be based on a “protest procedure.” Instead, it allows a protest if the candidate’s “petition violates any requirement established by law.” The Court noted that its 2002 Whitman decision also involved an attempt to remove a judicial candidate from the general election ballot after the primary election was conducted. The Court found that R.C. 3501.39(A)(2) cannot be read to circumvent the protest procedure time limits set out by state law and limits protests to a time prior to the primary election.

Ontko alternatively argued the board should remove Ickes under R.C. 3501.39(A)(4) because it allows the removal of any candidate for violation of “any other requirements established by law.” The Court found this provision does not pertain to an individual’s written protest to a candidacy, “rather it authorizes a board of elections on its own initiative, subject to certain time constraints” to remove a candidate.

The law does not allow a board of elections to remove a candidate within 60 days of the election. Because the board did not choose to remove Ickes within 60 days of the election, the Court cannot, at this time, order the board to take an act unauthorized by law, the opinion stated.

Request Not to Declare Winner Examined
The Court also considered Ontko’s request to bar the board from taking Ickes’ candidacy “into account when determining or declaring the winner” of the election. The opinion stated that Ontko’s request was not clear and that she did not cite any authority granting the Court the power to issue such an order.

She asked the Court to order the board to only count votes for “qualified persons” on the ballot. The Court stated that the request would require ordering the board to take an action, and a writ of prohibition does not allow the Court to compel a government office to act.

Also, Ontko’s request for a writ of mandamus asked the Court to order the board to grant her protest. The Court noted that it could grant her request only if her protest was authorized by law. Since the Court concluded that current Ohio law did not grant her the right to file a protest after the primary, it could not order the board to act.

2026-1133. State ex rel. Ontko v. Sandusky Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3573.

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