Wednesday, June 25, 2025
State of Ohio v. Susan M. Ballish, Case No. 2024-0899
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Geauga County)
State of Ohio v. Trevor Fraley, Case No. 2024-1038
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Butler County)
Kurt Steigerwald, administrator v. City of Berea et al., Case No. 2024-1077
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
In the matter of the application of Moraine Wind LLC, Case No. 2024-0098
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Does Test in State v. Jones Apply to Updated Laws on Community Control Conditions?
State of Ohio v. Susan M. Ballish, Case No. 2024-0899
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Geauga County)
ISSUE: Does the test from the Supreme Court of Ohio decision in State v. Jones (1990) apply to community control conditions that aren’t specifically authorized by statute?
BACKGROUND:
In November 2023, Susan Ballish pleaded guilty in Chardon Municipal Court to a misdemeanor count of theft. The court imposed a 180-day suspended jail sentence and a $250 fine plus court costs. She was ordered to take a course regarding theft and placed on community control for one year.
Among the conditions of the community control sanction, the court ordered that Ballish obey the law, not leave the state, and “not consume alcohol or possess, use, purchase, have under [her] control any narcotic drug, mind altering substance or any other controlled substance [or related drug paraphernalia].” She was ordered to submit to random drug and alcohol testing and was prohibited from going to bars unless it was for work.
Ballish’s attorney objected to the alcohol and drug conditions, arguing there were no allegations of drug or alcohol use in the theft charge and the prohibitions weren’t related to the crime. The municipal court judge responded that Ballish had been on probation previously in the court for a driving offense involving alcohol or drugs. The judge kept the prohibition in place as a condition of Ballish’s community control.
Ballish appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. She asserted that trial courts are limited when imposing conditions by a test established in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 1990 ruling in State v. Jones. The Eleventh District agreed, returning the case to the municipal court for resentencing.
The Geauga County prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case. At the prosecutor’s request, the municipal court stayed the remaining three weeks of Ballish’s one-year community control sanction while the case is considered by the Court.
State Argues Jones Test Doesn’t Apply to Overhauled Sentencing Laws
The Geauga County Prosecutor’s Office notes that the statutes governing community control have changed significantly since Jones was decided in 1990. At that time, the statute regarding conditions for felony and misdemeanor offenses stated that courts could impose additional conditions “[i]n the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and insuring his good behavior.” In Jones, the Court established a three-part test to help courts determine whether a condition met that standard. Specifically, the Court ruled that the condition must “[be] reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) [have] some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) [relate] to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation."
The felony sentencing laws were updated extensively in 1996, and significant revisions to the misdemeanor sentencing laws took effect in 2004. The statutory language interpreted in Jones was removed from the felony sentencing laws, but remained in the misdemeanor sentencing statutes, the prosecutor notes. After the changes, R.C. 2929.25, which addresses misdemeanors, read:
“The sentencing court shall require as a condition of any community control sanction that the offender abide by the law and not leave the state without the permission of the court or the offender’s probation officer. In the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender’s good behavior, the court may impose additional requirements on the offender.”
In addition, R.C. 2929.27 states that a court imposing a sentence for misdemeanors with no mandatory jail sentence can also impose any of several other conditions, including house arrest, a drug treatment program, random drug testing, and curfews. The law notes that the list isn’t limited to only those conditions. R.C. 2929.27(C) states that other sanctions can be imposed if “intended to discourage the offender or other persons from committing a similar offense if the sanction is reasonably related to the overriding purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing.”
The prosecutor argues that whether or not a defendant has a drug or alcohol issue isn’t relevant to whether a condition to regulate the use of those substances is appropriate. A court is allowed to impose that type of condition on a defendant, the prosecutor maintains. The prosecutor maintains that the Jones test is too narrow now, given the General Assembly's subsequent expansion of the sentencing statutes for misdemeanor community control sanctions.
Offender Contends That Jones Continues To Apply When Reviewing Conditions
Ballish maintains that although the misdemeanor sentencing laws now include a list of conditions the court may impose, the key framework of the statutes, including the language interpreted in Jones, also remains in those laws. Ballish points to the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing described in R.C. 2929.21 – “to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” To achieve the purposes, the law requires a court to consider “the impact of the offense upon the victim and the need for changing the offender’s behavior, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or the victim and the public.”
Ballish argues that the list of specific conditions in R.C. 2929.27 must be read in the broader context of all of the misdemeanor sentencing laws. She notes that R.C. 2929.25 requires abiding by the law and not leaving the state, and also allows a court to impose additional conditions that are “in the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the offender’s good behavior.”
That quoted language, which was at issue in Jones, still must be interpreted as explained in Jones, Ballish maintains. She points to the Court’s ruling in State v. Chapman (2020), where the trial court imposed a community control sanction requiring the defendant not to impregnate any women until he could prove he was able to support his current children. The Court applied the three-part Jones test and found that the condition wasn’t reasonably related to community control goals or reasonably tailored to avoid infringing on the defendant’s liberty any more than necessary. Ballish adds that lower courts also continue to apply the Jones test to reject or accept specific conditions listed in the statutes. Appeals courts must be able to continue to review any imposed condition to ensure that trial court sanctions aren’t unreasonable or overbroad, Ballish concludes.
Attorney General Files Brief, Will Argue Before Court
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Geauga County prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The attorney general will participate in oral arguments, sharing the time allotted to the prosecutor.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Geauga County Prosecutor’s Office: Nicholas Burling, nburling@geauga.oh.gov
Representing Susan M. Ballish from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Kathleen Evans, kathleen.evans@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov
Did Missed Filing of Trial Transcript Change Time To Request Postconviction Relief?
State of Ohio v. Trevor Fraley, Case No. 2024-1038
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Butler County)
ISSUE: Is the timeline for filing a postconviction relief petition following the denial of a reopened appeal the same timeline as for a delayed appeal?
BACKGROUND:
In 2019, a Butler County grand jury indicted Trevor Fraley on 101 criminal counts related to child pornography. In 2021, Fraley pled guilty to eight counts for possessing child pornography and eight counts for disseminating child pornography. He was sentenced to 31 to 35 years in prison. Fraley appealed his sentence to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. His attorney failed to file a trial transcript, which was required to be included in his appeal.
In January 2022, the Twelfth District dismissed the appeal because it lacked the trial transcript. Three months later, Fraley filed an application to reopen his appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to file the required transcript. The appeals court agreed and reopened his appeal. In May 2022, his new lawyer filed the transcript as required, and the court considered his case. In September 2022, the appeals court affirmed Fraley’s conviction and sentence.
Fraley appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which initially accepted the case and held it for a decision in another case that would determine whether his sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act was constitutional. Part of Fraley’s argument was his sentence unconstitutional because the Tokes Act allowed corrections officials to extend prison sentences, After the Court found the Tokes Act sentences were constitutional, Fraley and the cases of several other offenders were dismissed.
Offender Seeks Other Option To Overturn Sentence
In April 2023, 11 months after the Twelfth District denied his appeal, Fraley filed a petition for postconviction relief in Butler County Common Pleas Court. The Butler County Prosecutor’s Office opposed the motion, arguing that under state law, Fraley had 365 days after the trial court judgment to seek postconviction relief but waited 18 months to file it. Fraley responded that he had appealed his conviction but because his attorney failed to file the transcript, the clock had not yet started to run on the deadline to file for postconviction relief. He argued that his appeal was reopened when his attorney complied with the court rules and filed the transcript. He maintained he had 365 days from when his transcript was filed, which was in May 2022, to seek postconviction relief. The trial court sided with the prosecutor, ruling it didn’t have jurisdiction to consider the case because the petition was filed after the deadline.
Fraley appealed to the Twelfth District, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Fraley appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Attorney’s Failure Should Not Derail Challenge to Sentence, Offender Argues
Fraley argues the failures of the first attorney handling his appeal shouldn’t prevent the courts from considering the merits of his appeal. He points to the Court’s 2024 State v. Dudas decision, which found that a delayed appeal should be treated the same as a direct appeal when calculating the time to file for postconviction relief. Fraley argues the Court’s reasoning should apply to a reopened appeal.
Current law, R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a), sets two potential dates to start the one year timeframe to seek postconviction relief. One date starts when a direct appeal of a trial court judgment is launched. The law requires direct appeals typically to be filed within 30 days of a trial court verdict. When there is a direct appeal, the one-year clock to file for postconviction relief starts on the day a trial transcript is filed with the appellate court. The second option is when no direct appeal is sought. In such a case, the offender must wait until the expiration date of the time to appeal, usually 30 days, and then has one year from that date to file for postconviction relief.
Courts allow for delayed appeals when, for some reason, a direct appeal can’t be filed within 30 days. In Dudas, the Supreme Court ruled that when there is a delayed appeal, the deadline for filing a postconviction claim is the same deadline set in the provision of R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) that applies to a direct appeal.
Fraley notes the law doesn’t address the deadline when an appeal is reopened, which is what happened in his case. The case was reopened because the trial transcript wasn’t filed in the direct appeal. After it was filed, the trial court should have given him one year from the date of filing to submit the petition for postconviction relief, treating it the same as a direct appeal, he concludes.
Appeal Deadline Not Previously Addressed, Public Defender Adds
The Office of the Ohio Public Defender submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting Fraley’s position. The office also requested and received permission to share oral argument time with Fraley. The public defender notes this will be the first time the Supreme Court has been asked to determine which of the two deadlines in R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) apply to a reopened appeal. The Butler County prosecutor and the Twelfth District maintain that a reopened appeal should be treated as if no appeal was pursued. If that was the case Fraley had to petition for postconviction relief about a month after his conviction in October 2021. The public defender argues the key to a meaningful postconviction relief request is the examination of the trial transcript. Postconviction relief is different than a traditional appeal and requires making arguments that couldn’t be raised during a criminal trial or a conventional appeal, the office explains. The only way to examine whether the relief request covers issues separate from the trial is by reviewing the trial transcript, the public defender asserts.
Because the trial transcript is so crucial, the key date for petitioning for postconviction relief is based on when the transcript is filed with the appropriate court, the public defender argues. It is only fair to the accused that the petition be filed within a year after an appeal was considered, which starts when the transcript is filed, which was May 2022. While the law speaks to the typical deadline one year after a direct appeal is denied, the law doesn’t set the deadline for a delayed or reopened appeal. For consistency's sake, the Court should treat a reopened appeal the same as a direct appeal, the office argues, and not as if no appeal had been made.
Process Not Dictated by Transcript Filing, Prosecutor Maintains
The prosecutor argues Fraley and the public defender are overstating the necessity of the trial transcript filing date and omitting other key aspects of appeals related to the ineffective assistance of counsel. The prosecutor notes that the Supreme Court adopted Rule 26(B) of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure for the sole purpose of allowing an appeals court to reopen an appeal based on the argument that the appellant’s counsel was ineffective. Under Rule 26(B), the Twelfth District allowed Fraley to reopen his appeal because his first appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance by not filing the required transcript. The rule allowed the Twelfth District to reopen the case and treat Fraley’s appeal as a traditional direct appeal that would normally be filed within 30 days of a conviction, the prosecutor explained. The appeals court rejected his arguments and affirmed his prison sentence.
However, the process of a reopened appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule 26(B) doesn’t create any new deadlines for a postconviction relief petition. That deadline is in R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). Nothing in the law or court rules prevented Fraley from initiating both a reopened appeal and seeking postconviction relief at the same time, the prosecutor maintains. In Court decisions before Dudas, the Court treated a reopened appeal the same as if no appeal had been filed when setting a deadline to file for postconviction relief, the prosecutor argues. The deadlines in R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) are mandatory, and the trial court rightly ruled that it couldn’t hear Fraley’s petition when it was filed 18 months after his conviction was imposed, the prosecutor argues.
Fraley’s reopened appeal isn’t the same as the delayed appeal in Dudas, the prosecutor asserts, and shouldn’t be treated the same. The delayed appeal is the same as a direct appeal because the offender argues about issues raised in the trial court. The only difference is that, for some reason, the direct appeal couldn’t be filed in time. A reopened appeal is different. It is a “collateral attack,” just like a postconviction relief petition, the prosecutor notes. It raises arguments outside of the trial, such as whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no justification for Fraley to delay his postconviction relief request challenging his conviction while also waiting to learn if the Twelfth District would reopen his direct appeal, the prosecutor concludes.– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Trevor Fraley: H. Louis Sirkin, hls@santenhughes.com
Representing the State of Ohio from the Butler County Prosecutor’s Office: Willa Concannon, willa.concannon@bcohio.gov
Representing the Office of the Ohio Public Defender: Mallorie Thomas, mallorie.thomas@opd.ohio.gov
Is City Immune From Lawsuit Over Fatal Tripping Injury in Locker Room?
Kurt Steigerwald, administrator v. City of Berea et al., Case No. 2024-1077
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Can a city lose its immunity protection against a wrongful death lawsuit based on a “physical defect” on its grounds when the item causing the injury isn’t damaged and is operating as intended?
BACKGROUND:
Joan Steigerwald regularly participated in a swimming class for older women at the Berea Recreation Center. Steigerwald, 83, went into the remodeled women’s locker room in April 2018 to change for her swim class. She tripped over the legs of a newly installed bench in the locker room and fell, hitting her head on a locker. She died 12 days later.
Before the accident, the recreation center director was researching benches to place in the remodeled locker rooms. He sought out antimicrobial portable benches without backs. They would be resistant to mold and bacteria and could be moved more easily so the floors could be cleaned more efficiently with the center’s new cleaning equipment. The women’s locker room benches were 7.5 feet long, and the seat was about 10 inches wide. The legs on the bench were about 16 inches long and extended 5.75 inches out from the edge of the seat on one side of the bench.
The remodeled locker room was open for eight days before Joan’s accident. Kurt Steigerwald, Joan’s son and administrator of her estate, filed a lawsuit against the city. The lawsuit claimed Berea negligently or recklessly purchased benches with extended legs and placed them in a narrow locker room, creating a safety hazard that caused Joan’s death. The city sought to dismiss the case, claiming it was immune from such lawsuits under R.C. Chapter 2744. Steigerwald argued that an exception to immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applied. Under that law, a government entity could be held liable if an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee and is due to a physical defect within the grounds of the government’s building.
The trial court found no physical defect with the bench and dismissed the case. Steigerwald appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The Eighth District noted that at least 14 rec center members had complained that the new benches posed a danger. The Eighth District reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The city appealed the Eighth District’s decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Lawsuit About Bench Selection, Not Defect, City Asserts
Berea argues that Steigerwald’s claim is really about the process of selecting the benches and whether the rec center manager was negligent or reckless in the decision-making. That would have been grounds to lift the city’s immunity before 2003 when state lawmakers intentionally tightened the language in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). For the city to be liable for an injury on the government’s grounds, there must be proof that an employee was negligent and that the injury was caused by a physical defect within or on the grounds, the city explains.
There was nothing defective about the benches, the city asserts. The benches were new and in perfect working condition. Whether the benches with extended legs should have been used in the women’s locker room is a matter of judgment or policy, but there is no defect under the law, Berea maintains. The law doesn’t define “physical defect,” but under the common dictionary definition, there was nothing about a new bench being used as intended that constitutes a physical defect, the city explains. Because the city’s acts don’t meet the exception against immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), the Eighth District wrongly decided the case, Berea concludes.
Design of Bench Meets Physical Defect Definition, Estate Maintains
Steigerwald points to the Supreme Court’s 2022 Doe v. Greenville City Schools decision in which the Court observed that several appellate courts had adopted a definition of “physical defect” when considering the immunity exemption in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). In Doe’s lead opinion, the Court stated a “physical defect” is “a perceivable imperfection that diminishes the worth or utility of the object at issue.” Steigerwald argues that using a bench with extended legs in a narrow walkway in a cramped locker room is a physical defect. The extended legs made the bench a tripping hazard in a confined area. The utility of the bench was diminished because of its placement, the estate argues.
The combination of selecting benches with extended legs, ignoring the complaints about the hazard expressed by users of the remodeled locker room, and continued use of the benches in the locker room removes the city’s immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), Steigerwald asserts. The estate points to several cases in Ohio law where the improper use of equipment, given the conditions, was considered a physical defect. The term means more than whether the item is broken or inherently faulty, the estate maintains. Perfectly operable items in a state that creates a hazard, such as loose bolts on volleyball equipment and a loose floor mat that wasn’t properly secured, have been deemed physical defects when exempting a government body from immunity, Steigerwald asserts. The hazardous placement of the bench that caused a healthy, older adult to lose her life constitutes negligence, and the city is not immune from liability, the estate concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the city of Berea’s position was submitted by the Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the City of Berea et al. : Frank Scialdone, fscialdone@mrrlaw.com
Representing Kurt Steigerwald, administrator: Todd Rosenberg, rosenberg@lawohio.com
Is Electricity From Six Out-of-State Wind Farms Deliverable Into Ohio?
In the matter of the application of Moraine Wind LLC, Case No. 2024-0098
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
ISSUES:
- Were the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO)’s findings that the electricity resources from the applicants were “deliverable into this state” against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law?
- Did the PUCO follow the statutes and rules that governed the proceedings?
BACKGROUND:
Ohio electric utilities are required obtain a minimum percentage of electricity for consumers through qualified renewable energy resources. By the end of 2024, that amount was 7.5%. By the end of this year, the percentage will be 8%.
The renewable energy resources must be obtained either from facilities located in Ohio or with resources that can be shown to be deliverable into Ohio. To become certified as an eligible facility that generates renewable energy resources, a company must apply to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO).
Wind Farms in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota Seek PUCO Certification
Avangrid Renewables owns six wind farms in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The Avangrid wind farms – Moraine Wind, Rugby Wind, Elm Creek II Wind, Buffalo Ridge II Wind, Barton Windpower I, and Barton Windpower II – applied separately to the PUCO for certification. The administration of electricity in those states is handled by a regional transmission organization known as the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO).
The wind farms had to demonstrate to the PUCO that their electricity could be physically delivered to Ohio. In 2011, the PUCO adopted a test in In re Koda Energy LLC with criteria for determining deliverability. The ruling requires showing a measured change in electricity generation that has a significant impact on power flows over transmission lines. To support deliverability, the threshold value of impact on an Ohio transmission line must be 5% and greater than 1 megawatt. It is impossible to physically track energy from a specific generating facility to a specific destination. Given that fact, the PUCO has said that physical deliverability can be demonstrated through a distribution factor analysis (DFAX) study. The study reflects findings from a computer model of electricity transmission that measures the change in power flows from the addition of power from the renewable generating facility.
PJM Interconnection, which is the regional transmission organization for Ohio and 12 other states, conducted DFAX studies regarding the Avangrid facilities. The findings were submitted to the PUCO. The PUCO staff determined that the studies showed that each Avangrid facility met the deliverability criteria established in Koda.
In 2022, the Avangrid cases were consolidated before the PUCO. Carbon Solutions Group was permitted to intervene in the case, as were Blue Delta Energy, 3Degrees Group, and Northern Indiana Public Service Company. Carbon Solutions, a Chicago company, requested a subpoena from the PUCO to order an agent of PJM Interconnection to testify about the DFAX studies. The PUCO’s attorney examiners rejected the request, citing procedural grounds.
In September 2023, the PUCO certified the Avangrid facilities as eligible renewable energy resource generating facilities. Carbon Solutions appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which must hear the appeal from the PUCO decision.
Company Argues Evidence Didn’t Show Wind Farm Power Was Deliverable to Ohio
Carbon Solutions focuses on delivering carbon-free energy by partnering with solar installers, offering electric vehicle charging solutions, and assisting organizations with their renewable energy goals. Carbon Solutions argues the PJM studies on the deliverability of power from the wind farms don’t support the PUCO’s determinations and certifications. The Avangrid applicants had to demonstrate impacts on the transmission line from the origin within MISO (Point A) to PJM (Point B) to Ohio (Point C), Carbon Solutions states. Its brief asserts that the studies “do not convey transmission line impacts anywhere; they convey hypothetical impacts between Points B and C that ‘would’ occur ‘if’ the resources were delivered from Points A to B.” In the studies, Carbon Solutions contends, PJM simulated hypothetical transmission line impacts in the PJM region only, based on an assumption of deliverability into this region. That fails to meet the requirement to show actual impacts, the company argues.
Carbon Solutions also asserts that the PUCO denied its rights to be heard during the proceedings and to subpoena and question a PJM expert.
Commission Asserts That Evidence Supported Certifying Wind Farms
The PUCO counters that Carbon Solutions’ argument regarding deliverability is based on a single sentence in the PJM cover letters with the DFAX studies. The cover letters state that the wind power “would be expected to flow” to Ohio transmission facilities “if [the applicants] were to deliver their energy into PJM.” Carbon Solutions ignores the evidence in addition to the studies – testimony supporting the study findings, a third-party report, and the testimony of Carbon Solutions’ own witness, the PUCO maintains. It also notes that the standard, which was met, requires a showing that power is “capable of being physically delivered” to PJM and into Ohio. The evidence supported the findings on deliverability of power from the wind farms, the PUCO concludes.
The PUCO also contends that Carbon Solutions’ rights weren’t violated. The subpoena request was correctly denied because Carbon Solutions failed to submit a memorandum in support or a brief explanation regarding the grounds for the subpoena, as required by commission rules, the PUCO maintains.
Wind Farms and Other Companies Intervene To Submit Arguments
The Avangrid facilities were permitted to intervene in the case and file a brief. Avangrid maintains that the PUCO properly reviewed the evidence and applied Ohio law to determine that the Avangrid facilities satisfied state requirements, including the deliverability standard.
Blue Delta Energy, a renewable energy consultant in Connecticut, and Northern Indiana Public Service Company, a natural gas and electric company, also were allowed to intervene in the case to submit a joint brief. They assert that the Carbon Solutions appeal has delayed competitors from entering the Ohio market and the delay has led to higher renewable energy credit prices, which has benefited Carbon Solutions.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Carbon Solutions Group LLC: Mark Whitt, whitt@whitt-sturtevant.com
Representing the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Thomas Lindgren, thomas.lindgren@ohioago.gov
Representing the Avangrid facilities: Angela Paul Whitfield, paul@carpenterlipps.com
Representing Blue Delta Energy: Kimberly Wile Bojko, bojko@carpenterlipps.com
Representing the Northern Indiana Public Service Company: John Ryan III, johnryan@nisource.com
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