Wednesday, October 8, 2025
State of Ohio v. Elijah Striblin, Case No. 2024-1050
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Muskingum County)
State of Ohio v. John P. Kincaid, Case No. 2024-1184
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Meigs County)
State of Ohio v. D.T., Case No. 2024-1276
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Are Ohio’s Restrictions on Guns in Liquor Establishments Constitutional?
State of Ohio v. Elijah Striblin, Case No. 2024-1050
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Muskingum County)
ISSUE: Does the Ohio law prohibiting anyone from possessing a firearm on the premises of property licensed to sell alcohol violate the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, even if it exempts those allowed to carry a weapon as long as they aren’t drinking?
BACKGROUND:
In August 2022, Elijah Striblin and his girlfriend visited the Lazy River Lounge in Muskingum County. The lounge has a class D liquor permit. Striblin was carrying a concealed pistol. Over the course of the evening, Striblin ordered five drinks. Video from the lounge showed him ordering two drinks and taking a sip of one of them.
Shortly after 2 a.m., Striblin went to the men’s restroom, where he got into a fistfight with another man. Two other men broke up the fight, but Striblin drew his pistol and shot the man he was fighting in the neck.
Following the shot, the lounge evacuated all the patrons from the bar. Video showed Striblin outside the bar with his gun in his hand and then putting the weapon in the waistband of his pants.
As a result, Striblin was arrested, and a grand jury indicted him on six counts, including inducing panic, a fourth-degree felony. The charges included a firearm specification, which carries a mandatory three-year prison sentence. The other charges included violating R.C. 2923.121, which prohibits possession of a firearm in a liquor permit premises, a third-degree felony.
Striblin claimed he could legally carry the handgun and that he drank no alcohol at the bar. Before his trial, Striblin sought to dismiss three charges related to his possession of the handgun. He argued the laws were unconstitutional and violated his rights under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The trial court rejected his motions. Striblin and the Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office negotiated a plea deal in which Striblin would plead no contest to inducing panic and illegal possession of a firearm in a liquor establishment. The prosecutor agreed to dismiss the other charges and the firearm specification from the inducing panic charge. Striblin indicated he would plead no contest so that he could appeal the firearm charge.
The trial court sentenced him to 30 days in jail and placed him on three years of community control. He appealed the gun charge to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The Fifth District noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen decision, which holds that firearm regulations are unconstitutional unless they are firmly rooted in our nation’s history and tradition of gun regulation.
In a 2-1 decision, the Fifth District ruled that R.C. 2923.121, which prohibits a person from possessing a firearm in a liquor permit premises, even those who aren’t intoxicated, is unconstitutional under the Bruen decision.
The prosecutor appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Law Aligns With Historical Gun Restrictions, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor’s office explains that under the Bruen decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted how to assess whether a law regulating firearms is constitutional under the Second Amendment. The Court stated that “constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.”
The prosecutor notes that the Fifth District was skeptical of R.C. 2923.121 because it regulates class D permit holders, a wider group than just bars. It includes museums, theaters, community centers, shopping malls, “wine-tasting” events, and other places where drinking alcohol is not the main reason for people to gather, but just occurs incidentally. The Fifth District ruled there was no historical connection between limiting gun rights and such a broad spectrum of gathering places.
The prosecutor explains that critical to this appeal is that Striblin is making a “facial” challenge to the R.C. 2923.121. Instead of assessing the law as the Fifth District did – determining if it is constitutional in all instances – the Court only has to find that the law is constitutional in one instance, when applied to the facts of this case. Since laws restricting gun possession in sensitive places and where alcohol is being consumed predate the Second Amendment, the prosecutor argues the law clearly is constitutional when it applies to bars and pubs.
The prosecutor also argues another key failure of the Fifth District was to compare the Ohio law to laws in existence when the Second Amendment was adopted. This is called the “founding era,” the office explains. While not yet fully decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the prosecutor explains the law needs to be analyzed not only by the laws from 1791 when the Second Amendment was ratified, but also after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The amendments adopted after the Civil War are called the “Reconstruction era.”
Without the Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment only applied to actions by the federal government, the prosecutor notes. Striblin wouldn’t be able to challenge a state law, only a federal law, if not for the Fourteenth Amendment, the prosecutor explains. Since the Fourteenth Amendment required state laws to comply with the U.S. Constitution, “the people” noted in Bruen mean not only those who ratified the Second Amendment, but also “the people” who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
The prosecutor argues that in 1791, there were some government restrictions of gun rights where alcohol was involved. But there are several more examples by 1868, and shortly after, the office notes. The prosecutor also explains that Bruen didn’t require a state to uncover a “historical twin” with a law existing when the amendments were ratified. The decision only required a “historical analogue,” meaning a law with some “comparable burden on the right to armed self-defense.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio should agree there are historical analogues to Ohio’s current laws restricting gun possession while consuming alcohol, the prosecutor notes.
The prosecutor explains that R.C. 2923.121 isn’t so broad as to prevent carrying a weapon in a place where alcohol is served. The office notes that under R.C. 2923.121(B), someone permitted to carry a firearm in Ohio can take a gun into a bar if they don’t drink. Striblin pleaded no contest and waived any rights to argue he wasn’t drinking. The lounge video captured him taking a drink and carrying a weapon, indicating he violated the law and his conviction should stand, the prosecutor concludes.
Law Violates Self-Protection Rights, Gun Owner Maintains
While the U.S. Supreme Court had previously ruled that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect law-abiding citizens’ right to possess a handgun in their homes for self-defense, the Bruen decision establishes that the amendments also protect an individual’s right to carry a firearm for self-defense outside of the home, Striblin explains. The standard under Bruen establishes an “unqualified command” that individuals have the right to possess handguns outside of the home, he notes. That places the burden on the government to justify that its regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical regulation of firearms outside of the home, he argues. He maintains there are no historical regulations related to possessing a firearm where alcohol is being served.
Striblin rejects the prosecutor’s assertion that the appeals court and the Supreme Court can only look at the charges against him, not his account of what happened at the lounge, because he pleaded no contest. The Court can also consider his claims that he didn’t drink any alcohol and only possessed a gun. He argues that R.C. 2923.121 restricts mere possession of a firearm in a bar, which is different than any historical laws regulating possessing a weapon while intoxicated. No historical regulations restrict just the possession of a firearm on the premises of a liquor permit holder, making R.C. 2923.121 unconstitutional, he concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. A brief supporting the prosecutor was also filed jointly by the cities of Cincinnati and Columbus. The Office of the Ohio Public Defender filed an amicus brief supporting Striblin.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office: John Dever, jcdever@muskingumcounty.org
Representing Elijah Striblin: Elizabeth Gaba, gabalaw@aol.com
Do Police Safety Concerns Justify Prolonging Traffic Stop Before Dog Sniffs for Drugs?
State of Ohio v. John P. Kincaid, Case No. 2024-1184
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Meigs County)
ISSUE: Does the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez v. United States allow a law enforcement officer to prolong a traffic stop for officer safety?
BACKGROUND:
In December 2019, Deputy Tylun Campbell of the Meigs County Sheriff’s Office pulled over a driver later identified as John Kincaid. Based on evidence found during a search of the vehicle at the traffic stop, Kincaid was indicted for drug possession and drug trafficking.
The case was heard in the Meigs County Common Pleas Court. Kincaid asked the court to exclude the evidence found when the vehicle was searched. At a hearing to consider the request, Campbell testified about what happened. He said he observed the left-side tires of a vehicle cross the center line of a two-lane road, and he stopped the vehicle for that traffic violation. Kincaid was driving, and there was a passenger in the vehicle. Campbell said he had never met Kincaid but had information that he was involved in drug trafficking.
Campbell is a certified canine handler, and his canine partner, Cheri, was with him at the traffic stop. Campbell decided to use Cheri to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle to check for drugs. Before using the dog, he contacted another deputy, asking him to come to the scene for backup. Campbell said the request was made for officer safety because there were two people in the vehicle, it was dark, and he would be focused on watching the dog during the canine sniff.
It took five to 10 minutes for the other deputy to arrive, Campbell said. Before the other deputy arrived, Campbell contacted the dispatcher to search the names of Kincaid and the passenger for criminal histories and warrants. Neither of them had warrants.
Dog Conducts Sniff of Vehicle and Alerts, Indicating Presence of Drugs
When the other deputy arrived, Campbell gave Cheri the command to sniff the vehicle. The dog alerted on the driver’s side front door. Kincaid and the passenger were told to exit the vehicle, and the deputies searched it. They found a cigarette box containing multiple knotted bags containing what Campbell believed to be heroin. Campbell read Kincaid his Miranda rights and handcuffed him. No traffic ticket was issued.
The trial court denied Kincaid’s request to suppress, or not use, the evidence in court. The court determined that the time it took for the backup deputy to arrive was consistent with the time needed to complete a stop for a traffic violation.
The drug possession charges were dismissed, and Kincaid pleaded no contest to drug trafficking. The trial court sentenced him to 3 to 4.5 years in prison, and Kincaid forfeited about $1,500 that the deputies also found in the vehicle.
Kincaid appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court decision. The Fourth District ruled that the traffic stop wasn’t unreasonably extended to wait for the backup deputy and conduct the canine sniff.
Kincaid appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
U.S. Supreme Court Prohibits This Type of Delay, Driver Argues
Kincaid argues that the lower court decisions don’t align with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Rodriguez v. United States (2015). Kincaid contends that Rodriguez doesn’t allow a person’s detention at a traffic stop to be prolonged to wait for law enforcement backup before conducting the canine sniff. A person’s detention during a traffic stop is considered a “seizure” within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that police may conduct certain “ordinary inquiries” during a traffic stop – such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” These precautions are allowed because they align with the objectives of traffic laws – to ensure roadway and officer safety, the decision stated.
However, the opinion explained, a canine sniff is “not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Kincaid maintains that the U.S. Supreme Court also concluded that safety precautions taken to facilitate an on-scene investigation into other crimes – such as by conducting a canine sniff – aren’t part of the mission of a traffic stop. The Supreme Court determined that a traffic stop that takes longer than the time needed to address the reason for the stop violates the U.S. Constitution’s protections against unreasonable seizures, Kincaid notes.
He argues that conducting a canine sniff goes beyond a traffic stop’s mission if it prolongs the stop. In addition, safety precautions taken to facilitate the canine sniff also are improper if they make the traffic stop take longer, he maintains. In this case, the deputy had completed his investigation of the traffic violation and moved on to look for evidence of drug activity, Kincaid states. The deputy’s additional investigation had to based on a reasonable suspicion of drug activity to justify a longer traffic stop, but the deputy had no reasonable suspicion of drug activity, Kincaid concludes.
Traffic Stop Wasn’t Extended Beyond Its Purpose, State Counters
The Meigs County Prosecutor’s Office disagrees, arguing that the canine sniff didn’t improperly prolong Kincaid’s traffic stop. The prosecutor first maintains that once the deputy observed Kincaid committing the traffic violation, the deputy’s complete investigation of the traffic infraction itself was over because the deputy saw it happen. However, other measures associated with a traffic stop and possible citation, such as checking a driver’s license and insurance, talking to the driver, and checking for criminal histories and warrants, needed to be taken. Those steps fell within the purpose of the traffic stop, the prosecutor notes.
When the deputy called for backup, that step didn’t change the traffic stop’s purpose or extend the time needed for the stop, the prosecutor contends. While Campbell was waiting for backup, he was checking on the criminal histories and possible warrants for Kincaid and the passenger, the prosecutor notes.
The prosecutor’s brief notes that Ohio courts have ruled that a very brief traffic stop doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. The prosecutor contends that Kincaid’s traffic stop was less than 10 minutes. Waiting for the backup officer didn’t prolong the stop, and there was no delay for conducting the canine sniff, the prosecutor argues.
In the prosecutor’s view, the Fourth District decision didn’t create an exception to Rodriguez for law enforcement who are waiting for backup for safety reasons. Instead, the appeals court found that Campbell’s call for backup for safety reasons wasn’t unreasonable because he was still performing tasks associated with the traffic stop, the prosecutor maintains. The Fourth District decision doesn’t conflict with Rodriguez, the prosecutor concludes.
Attorney General Submits Brief, Will Argue Before Court
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the Meigs County prosecutor. The attorney general also will participate in oral argument, sharing the time allotted to the prosecutor.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing John P. Kincaid from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Max Hersch, max.hersch@opd.ohio.gov
Representing Meigs County Prosecutor’s Office: James Stanley, jstanley@meigscountyprosecutor.com
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Can Juvenile Appeal Conviction After Pleading Guilty in Adult Court?
State of Ohio v. D.T., Case No. 2024-1276
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: When a juvenile transferred to adult court pleads guilty, does the juvenile waive the right to appeal the case and raise errors allegedly made by the juvenile court when transferring the case?
BACKGROUND:
A juvenile, identified in court records as “D.T.,” was 14 years old in December 2021. Over the course of eight days around Christmas that year, he was charged with numerous crimes. He pointed a gun at a 20-year-old woman and stole her vehicle and ATM cards. He then forced a 22-year-old woman from her vehicle at gunpoint and stole her vehicle and credit cards. He also approached a 27-year-old woman, pointed a gun at her, and stole her vehicle. Additionally, he approached a man in a parking lot and demanded his vehicle. Finally, he brandished a gun at a 22-year-old woman. When she reached for the gun, he shot her in the thigh and stomach. She was wounded but survived.
D.T. was arrested and taken to the juvenile detention center. In February 2022, an attorney representing D.T. asked the juvenile court to order a competency evaluation to determine if D.T. could understand the case against him and participate in his defense. The Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court Diagnostic Clinic evaluated D.T.
The juvenile court didn’t conduct a separate hearing on D.T.’s competency. Rather, the juvenile court conducted a probable cause hearing in June 2022. D.T.’s attorney informed the court that D.T. would waive the probable cause determination and conceded that the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office had enough evidence to charge him with the crimes. The prosecutor’s office requested that D.T.’s case be transferred to Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, where he would be tried as an adult for the crimes.
The juvenile court judge discussed the competency evaluation with D.T.’s attorney at the hearing. The judge asked if D.T. was competent and understood what could occur in the bindover process requested by the prosecution. The attorney responded that the evaluation indicated D.T. was competent to stand trial. The attorney noted that D.T. wasn’t as “seasoned” as some of the other young men in the juvenile detention center, but did understand what he was doing in court. The court also accepted a copy of the clinic’s competency report, which found that D.T. had no deficits that would interfere with his ability to assist in his defense.
The juvenile judge then proceeded to the next step in the bindover process. The juvenile court conducted an amenability hearing to determine whether D.T. should remain in the juvenile system. The court had to decide if D.T. was amenable to treatment in the youth system or if he should face adult penalties if convicted. Ten witnesses testified at the hearing, including the five victims, a Cleveland police officer, and a psychologist who evaluated D.T. His mother and sister also testified.
At the end of the hearing, the judge verbally announced that D.T. should be transferred to the common pleas court, referred to as “adult court.” In September 2022, he was indicted by a grand jury on 42 counts, including six counts of aggravated robbery and 15 counts of robbery. He faced a maximum of 89.5 years in prison.
Second Competency Evaluation Issued
The adult court ordered another competency evaluation for D.T. In November 2022, a psychologist reported that D.T. understood the nature of the legal proceedings and was capable of assisting in his defense. The judge asked D.T.’s attorney to stipulate to the findings of the report, and the attorney did.
The prosecutor and D.T. discussed a plea bargain. D.T. pleaded guilty to felonious assault and five counts of aggravated robbery, along with some lesser offenses. The adult court conducted a plea hearing, and D.T. confirmed that he understood what was happening. D.T. also acknowledged that he was waiving some of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. As part of the plea deal, the parties recommended that the trial judge sentence D.T. to a prison sentence between 18 and 25 years.
D.T. was sentenced to 21 years in prison. Even though he had pleaded guilty, he appealed his conviction, arguing the juvenile and adult courts failed to follow the process outlined in state law for determining his competency. He also claimed the juvenile court transferred him to adult court without sufficient evidence to prove he couldn’t be treated in the juvenile system. In a 2-1 decision, the Eighth District Court of Appeals vacated D.T.’s conviction and remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
The prosecutor’s office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Guilty Plea Barred Juvenile From Appealing, Prosecutor Argues
When a criminal defendant, represented by an attorney, pleads guilty to an offense in adult court, the defendant waives all rights to challenge all alleged defects of the prior stages of court proceedings, the prosecutor’s office argues. Only those defects that prevent the trial court from having jurisdiction to hear the case can be appealed, the office adds.
The Eighth District found two errors wit D.T.’s conviction, which both happened during proceedings in the juvenile court. The prosecutor asserts that there may have been errors made by the juvenile court when it concluded that D.T. was competent. The juvenile court may not have followed the law exactly, but D.T. didn’t challenge the finding that he was competent to stand trial for his crimes, the office notes. The Eighth District also took issue with how the juvenile court determined that D.T. wasn’t amenable to being treated in the juvenile system, the prosecutor notes.
Neither of those issues affects the adult court’s ability to hear the charges against D.T., the office asserts. The juvenile court followed the law in transferring the case to the adult court, the prosecutor maintains, and the adult court judge took all the necessary steps to ensure D.T. understood the charges against him and the potential prison time he faced if convicted. D.T., with the help of an attorney, decided to plead guilty to fewer charges in exchange for a prison sentence between 18 and 25 years, the office asserts.
If D.T. wanted to appeal his case based on how the juvenile court treated him, he could have gone to trial in adult court and raised the issues, the prosecutor argues. He could also plead no contest, the office notes. Pleading no contest would have allowed him to appeal his conviction, the prosecutor explains. The prosecutor notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled there are a few exceptions where a defendant can plead guilty and then contest a conviction through an appeal. However, none of those exceptions apply to D.T., the prosecutor concludes. The office urges the Court to reverse the Eighth District’s ruling and uphold D.T.’s conviction.
Court Errors Can Be Appealed, Juvenile Maintains
D.T. argues the prosecutor has failed to show any case where the Supreme Court or a lower court in Ohio has held that a juvenile waives the right to appeal when claiming errors were made regarding competency or amenability. The Eighth District noted that D.T. was faced with going to trial, where the maximum sentence was 89.5 years. The appeals court wrote that under the prosecution’s theory, D.T. would have to risk that much time in prison if he wanted to appeal aspects of the juvenile proceedings, which is unfair.
D.T. supports the Eighth District’s decision and noted the court followed precedent when it found he could plead guilty and challenge the conviction. D.T. argues that mistakes when determining his competency go to the heart of whether he was capable of making a voluntary decision to plead guilty. The juvenile court discussed his competency and amenability, but didn’t follow the steps in R.C. 2152.12 that allow for his transfer to adult court. D.T. claims there wasn’t enough evidence presented in juvenile court to determine why he, who was 15 when the hearings took place, couldn’t be treated in the juvenile system. And the juvenile court didn’t provide a written determination that it reviewed the competency reports and found sufficient evidence that he wasn’t competent.
Because the steps weren’t followed, he wasn’t properly transferred to adult court, D.T. maintains. If the transfer is faulty, then the adult court doesn’t have jurisdiction to consider the case, he asserts. If there was no jurisdiction to consider his case, D.T. couldn’t plead guilty in adult court to the charges, he argues. D.T. maintains the Supreme Court should uphold the Eighth District decision and send the matter back to the juvenile court to reconsider its rulings.
Attorney General Supports Prosecutor
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor. The Court will permit the attorney general’s office to participate in the oral argument and share time with the prosecutor.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Support Teen
An amicus brief supporting D.T.’s position was submitted by The Gault Center. Greater Cleveland Congregations filed another amicus brief supporting D.T.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Anthony Miranda, amiranda@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing D.T. from the Office of the Ohio Public Defender: Brooke Burns, brooke.burns@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharen@ohioago.gov
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