Tuesday, Aug. 4, 2026
State of Ohio v. Gurpreet Singh, Case No. 2024-1043
Butler County Common Pleas Court
State of Ohio v. Anthony Talbert, Case Nos. 2025-1348 and 2025-1370
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Trumbull County)
State of Ohio ex rel. Attorney General D. Andrew Wilson v. Central Tobacco and Stuff Inc., Case No. 2025-1510
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Delaware County)
West Chester Man Challenges Convictions, Death Sentence for Murders of Family Members
State of Ohio v. Gurpreet Singh, Case No. 2024-1043
Butler County Common Pleas Court
On April 28, 2019, Gurpreet Singh of West Chester Township called 911 from his apartment, reporting that he arrived home and found four family members on the floor bleeding. They had been shot to death. Singh was later arrested and charged in the murders.
In May 2024, Singh was sentenced to death for the murders of his wife, his in-laws, and his wife’s aunt. Individuals facing the death penalty in the state receive an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Financial Troubles and Affair Uncovered by Police Investigation
Singh and his wife, Shalinderjit Kaur; their three children; Singh’s in-laws – Hakiakat Singh Pannag and Parmjit Kaur; and Shalinderjit’s aunt, Amarjit Kaur, lived together in a West Chester apartment. Singh drove a semitruck for a living, and he had a weekly route to Indianapolis.
After the murders of Shalinderjit, Hakiakat, Parmjit, and Amarjit, the police investigation revealed that Singh had been having an affair since 2017 with a woman in Indianapolis. Singh had given her money in 2018 for a down payment on her house and bought her an Audi. He soon began paying her mortgage of $1,649 per month and her car insurance. The same year, he bought a $330,000 house on her block.
He also was in the midst of a financial dispute with his father-in-law over a multimillion-dollar property in India.
The day before the April 2019 murders, Singh canceled his truck route because of back pain. On the day of the murders, Singh deleted text messages between him and the Indianapolis woman from that day and three days before the murders.
That evening, Singh’s cousins took Singh’s children out to dinner and for ice cream. When the cousins called Singh about 9 p.m. to tell him they were dropping off the children at Singh’s apartment, Singh said to instead take the children back to the cousins’ apartment and he would pick them up later. Data retrieved during the investigation showed that Singh was getting gas at a gas station about that time and was back in his apartment at 9:11 p.m. He called 911 at 9:40 p.m.
When police arrived, they found Singh covered in blood. He said it was from holding his wife. Police found a Beretta handgun and ammunition in Singh’s bedroom. A few days later, law enforcement recovered a 9mm semi-automatic pistol from a pond behind Singh’s apartment, about 35 feet from his patio. The serial number plate had been removed. Later ballistics testing showed that all the gunshots from the murder scene had been fired from the 9 mm pistol.
Jury Deadlocks at First Trial
Singh was indicted in August 2019 on four counts of aggravated murder. In October 2022, a three-week jury trial began in Butler County Common Pleas Court. Singh’s attorneys argued that unknown intruders – or perhaps people connected to the property dispute – broke into the apartment, they executed Singh’s family, and he fled. The jury deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial.
In November 2023, Singh waived his right to a jury trial and chose to be tried by a three-judge panel. The trial before the panel took place in April and May of 2024. The panel unanimously convicted Singh on the four murder counts as well as firearm specifications and death penalty specifications. He was sentenced to death.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh raises 24 legal issues.
Legal Handgun Discussed at Trial
Among his arguments, Singh contests the admission of evidence related to the Beretta handgun police found in his bedroom. Singh argues he legally obtained that gun, which had no role or relevance to the 9 mm pistol determined to be the murder weapon. He maintains that only relevant evidence can be considered at trial, and that the state introduced the Beretta to improperly infer that he was violent and had easy access to firearms.`
The Butler County Prosecutor’s Office counters that Singh opened the door to discussing the Beretta because his attorneys mentioned it in their opening statement as evidence of his innocence. The attorneys argued that because he had a legally obtained Beretta in his closet that wasn’t the murder weapon, it showed he wasn’t the killer, the prosecutor notes. Regardless, if the evidence had been improperly allowed, a three-judge panel is presumed to ignore evidence presented for improper purposes, the prosecutor maintains.
Jury Trial Waived Before Retrial
Singh’s brief argues that the written jury waiver presented to him didn’t include a statement that the waiver applied to both the trial and the sentencing phases of the proceedings. His brief asserts that this was particularly concerning because Singh, who is Indian, had an interpreter explaining the waiver, creating an unknown possibility for errors. The brief also maintains that the trial judge never told Singh that he could withdraw his waiver at any time before the state began presenting its case. These errors violated Singh’s rights to a fair trial and due process, the brief contends.
The prosecutor responds that the jury waiver met all requirements: It was in writing, signed by the defendant, filed, made part of the record, and presented in open court. The court also verified with Singh that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily signed the waiver. The prosecutor quotes part of the transcript to illustrate that Singh was told by the court that the three-judge panel would decide both his guilt and his sentence. In addition, the court conducted a colloquy with Singh that was far more extensive than required in a capital case, showing that Singh understood the decision he was making, the prosecutor argues.
Effectiveness of Singh’s Trial Attorneys
In 11 of the remaining arguments, Singh argues he was denied effective assistance from his trial attorneys. Among his examples supporting the claim, he objects to the judge from his first trial being part of the three-judge panel for his retrial. He contends that his attorneys should have filed a motion asking that judge to recuse from his retrial. Singh also maintains that his attorneys failed to present evidence to support their opening statement that people connected to the multimillion-dollar property dispute committed the crimes and that the attorneys didn’t effectively discredit and cross-examine the state’s witnesses.
The prosecutor disagrees, countering that Singh’s attorneys had no reason to object to the judge from Singh’s first trial serving on the three-judge panel for the retrial. His attorneys had a reasonable strategic basis to want that judge on the panel because he had extensive experience with capital cases and repeatedly emphasized the required due process protections afforded to defendants, the prosecutor asserts. As far as the alleged alternative suspects, the prosecutor notes that testimony proved they weren’t in the country at the time of the murders. The prosecutor also rejects the claim that Singh’s attorneys should have done more during their cross-examinations, contending that Singh’s view relies on speculation and presumes facts that aren’t part of the record.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Gurpreet Singh from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Kathryn Sandford, kathryn.sandford@obd.ohio.gov
Representing the Butler County Prosecutor’s Office: Willa Concannon, willa.concannon@bcohio.gov
Can Criminal Sentence Block Offender From Being Placed in Transitional Release?
State of Ohio v. Anthony Talbert, Case Nos. 2025-1348 and 2025-1370
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Trumbull County)
ISSUE: Is a trial court authorized to forbid an offender’s participation in a transitional release program during sentencing?
BACKGROUND:
In 2024, Anthony Talbert was indicted in Trumbull County on charges related to possessing and conveying a fentanyl-related compound on the grounds of a detention facility. He agreed to plead guilty to two felony drug charges. At sentencing, the trial judge noted that Talbert had a history of criminal convictions and was not amenable to available community control programs. The judge noted he had five prior prison sentences, including one for a violent offense, and was rejected from an inpatient lock-down treatment program at a community-based correctional facility.
The trial court ordered him to serve a 17-month and a 10-month sentence, to run consecutively, for a total of 27 months. The judge added the condition that Talbert is “not permitted to participate in any Department of Corrections early release, transitional control, alternative housing placement or any other program currently run by the Ohio Department of Corrections or developed in the future designed to shorten a sentence imposed by this Court.”
Talbert appealed the sentence, challenging the trial court’s ability to forbid his participation in a transitional control program as part of his sentence.
In a 2-1 decision, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled it had exceeded its authority by prohibiting Talbert’s participation in a transitional control program at sentencing.
The Trumbull County Prosecutor’s Office appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Eleventh District certified to the Supreme Court that its decision conflicts with rulings of two other appellate districts. The Court agreed to hear the case and consider the conflict.
Judge Can Limit Transitional Control, Prosecutor Asserts
R.C. 2967.26 authorizes the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to administer a “transitional control” program. When inmates are in their final 180 days of confinement, the department may transition inmates who meet certain criteria to a less constrictive detention setting such as a halfway house. Within 60 days of the potential transfer, the DRC must provide the offender’s sentencing court with an institutional summary report detailing the inmate’s behavior and notify the court of its intent to transfer the inmate. The trial court may, within 30 days of the notice, reject the request to place the inmate in transitional control.
The Trumbull County Prosecutor’s Office notes that state law defines “prison term,” and references prison terms shortened by transitional control under R.C. 2967.26. The statute creates this notice and veto option to prevent the executive branch from unilaterally shortening a judicially imposed sentence, the prosecutor explains. But the statute doesn’t limit the time when the trial court can act to reject the shortening of the sentence.
The prosecutor asserts that the law creates a duty for the DRC to notify a trial court if it intends to place an offender in transitional control, but the law doesn’t place a limit on the judiciary. The trial court doesn’t have to wait until notified by the DRC to reject transitional control and can do it at any time, including during sentencing, the prosecutor asserts.
The prosecutor also argues that the separation of powers principle is at play. Requiring the judiciary to wait until the DRC acts to shorten a sentence limits a court’s authority to impose a sentence. The trial court must follow state sentencing statutes and develop a sentence the court believes best meets the goals of protecting the public, punishing the offender, and promoting effective rehabilitation. The trial judge did that in Talbert’s case, noting his prior five prison sentences and concluding that allowing Talbert to participate in any program that shortens his sentence wouldn’t meet the goals of his sentence. The executive branch doesn’t have to abide by those objectives, and its motives for making inmates eligible for early release shouldn’t interfere with a trial court’s power to prescribe a sentence, the prosecutor maintains.
Sentence Can’t Ban Transitional Control, Talbert Argues
The DRC is tasked with keeping inmates safe and reducing recidivism, Talbert notes, and the transitional control program is one tool used by the department to provide for a more successful transition from prison while allowing an offender to reside in a monitored environment. R.C. 2967.26 provides the terms for operating the program and doesn’t allow the trial court to forbid transitional control when imposing its original sentence. However, the trial court can only act after it receives notice from the DRC that it intends to place an offender in transitional control. While the trial court retains discretion over whether to approve the move, it can’t act before receiving notice from the adult parole authority that the department proposes to transition the inmate, Talbert argues.
While the separation of powers principle doesn’t allow one branch of government to assume control of another branch, the Ohio Constitution does contemplate that the powers of each branch will integrate to allow for a workable government, Talbert argues. The sentencing function of government is shared by all three branches and doesn’t exclusively belong to the judiciary, he notes. The DRC has the authority to propose a shortened prison sentence, and it doesn’t infringe on the rights of the judiciary because the trial court has the power to veto the move, Talbert argues. The trial court has no unilateral power to ignore the provisions of the law and restrict access to transitional control before it’s proposed by DRC, Talbert concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2025-1348 and 2025-1370).
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Trumbull County Prosecutor’s Office: Charles Morrow, psmorrow@co.trumbull.oh.us
Representing Anthony Talbert: John Laczko, jplaczko@zoominternet.net
Can Ohio Store Selling Flavored E-Cigarettes Be Sued Based on State Law?
State of Ohio ex rel. Attorney General D. Andrew Wilson v. Central Tobacco and Stuff Inc., Case No. 2025-1510
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Delaware County)
ISSUE: Does the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or the federal Tobacco Control Act preempt state claims alleging that the sale of illegal tobacco products violates the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act?
BACKGROUND:
The federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for authorizing the sale of any tobacco products in the United States that weren’t commercially available in the country before February 2007. When this lawsuit was filed in July 2024, the FDA had authorized only 27 electronic cigarette products for sale. The approved products were either tobacco-flavored or menthol-flavored.
E-cigarettes, also called electronic nicotine delivery systems or ENDS, are battery-operated devices that heat a nicotine solution into a vapor that is inhaled. Unlike regular cigarettes, they don’t contain tobacco leaves and don’t rely on combustion or generate smoke.
In May 2024, an investigator for the Ohio attorney general went to Central Tobacco and Stuff, a retail store in Delaware, Ohio, and bought two packages of flavored e-cigarettes. In the lawsuit on behalf of the state, the attorney general alleged in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court that Central Tobacco sold flavored e-cigarettes that are illegal. The e-cigarettes were sold in flavors such as “Blueberry Raspberry Gami” and “Strawmelon.”
The attorney general sued to block Central Tobacco from selling the illegal flavored e-cigarettes. The attorney general asserted that the store violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act by deceptively selling e-cigarettes that it knew were illegal. The suit also alleged that the store violated state law by committing unconscionable acts through knowingly taking advantage of consumers who weren’t aware that the products couldn’t be sold legally in the U.S.
Central Tobacco filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that federal law preempts the state claims of violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case in October 2024.
The attorney general appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. In a 2-1 decision, the Fifth District upheld the trial court’s conclusion that federal law preempted the state’s lawsuit.
The attorney general appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
State Contends It Can Sue Under Ohio Law for Sales of Illegal Tobacco Products
The attorney general’s brief notes that flavored e-cigarettes are the most used tobacco products among U.S. youth, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In Ohio in 2023, 18.8% of high school students and 13.7% of all students vaped, the brief states. The number of Ohio high school students who vaped was more than double the number nationally. The brief adds that e-cigarettes – which can feature digital displays, smartphone integration, and games – are offered in vivid colors and fruity flavors.
In 2009, Congress adopted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act as an amendment to the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to expand the FDA’s authority to oversee tobacco products. In 2016, the FDA extended this oversight to nontraditional tobacco products including e-cigarettes.
Contrary to the arguments of Central Tobacco, the attorney general maintains that the expansion of the FDA’s oversight didn’t deprive states of their long-held authority to regulate the sale of tobacco products. Instead, the Tobacco Control Act gave the federal government exclusive authority over tobacco products themselves, including labeling and product standards, the attorney general explains. The act also explicitly preserved the traditional authority of states to continue to regulate the sale of tobacco products, the attorney general argues. The office contends that its effort to enforce the state Consumer Sales Practices Act falls with the state’s “sphere of authority” over tobacco products.
Specifically, federal law states that nothing in the FDCA as amended by the Tobacco Control Act “shall be construed to limit the authority of … a State [to] … enforce any law … or other measure … prohibiting the sale, distribution, possession, exposure to, access to, advertising and promotion of … tobacco products.”
The attorney general notes that the Tobacco Control Act does assign the federal government sole responsibility for establishing other requirements for “tobacco product standards, premarket review, adulteration, misbranding, labeling, registration, good manufacturing standards, or modified risk tobacco products.” Such activities are taken by manufacturers, not retailers like Central Tobacco, the attorney general argues. The state’s claims didn’t fall outside of its authority to regulate the sales of e-cigarettes simply because the lawsuit referenced the labels on the products found on Central Tobacco’s shelves, the attorney general maintains. The sale of these illegal products violates the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and the state’s lawsuit should be allowed to move forward, the attorney general concludes.
Store Asserts That States Can’t Sue for Lack of FDA Authorization
Central Tobacco focuses on a provision in the FDCA that explains that only the United States can enforce the act. The store argues that several courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have held that the provision preempts state law claims that wouldn’t exist if there were no FDCA. The attorney general’s lawsuit under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act is based on the lack of FDA authorization for the products, which are claims that the e-cigarettes are “adulterated,” Central Tobacco contends. It notes that the definition of “adulterated” tobacco products encompasses new tobacco products that lack FDA authorization.
Because the state’s claims wouldn’t exist without the FDCA, they are preempted by federal law and can’t be pursued in state court, Central Tobacco argues.
The store rejects the attorney general’s view that the federal law preserves for states the right to regulate the “sale” of tobacco products. Central Tobacco maintains that this case centers not on sales, but on the premarket authorization requirements, which are the federal government’s domain. The FDCA requires the manufacturer of a new tobacco product, including e-cigarettes, to obtain FDA marketing authorization through a premarket application process. Central Tobacco contends that federal law allows only the federal government to bring enforcement proceedings against anyone who sells a new tobacco product that hasn’t obtained FDA marketing authorization.
The store asserts that the federal preemption clause would be meaningless if a state could circumvent it by trying to enforce the FDCA’s provisions regarding premarket authorization, adulteration, misbranding, or registration by positioning those attempts as simply regulating tobacco product “sales.”
Multiple Groups Submit Friend-of-the-Court Briefs
The following organizations filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the Ohio attorney general:
- City of Columbus and 11 public health and medical organizations, including the American Medical Association and the Ohio State Medical Association, jointly.
- Public Citizen and the National Association of Consumer Advocates, jointly.
- Public Health Law Center.
- The seven legal aid organizations in Ohio.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Representing Central Tobacco and Stuff Inc.: Matthew Anderson, manderson@lnlattorneys.com
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